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ABSTRACT 
“VICIOUS INFANTS”: ANTISOCIAL CHILDHOODS AND THE POLITICS OF 
POPULATION IN ANTEBELLUM U.S. LITERATURE 
Laura Jean Soderberg 
Nancy Bentley  
David Kazanjian 
 
Childhood as we now recognize it – innocent, vulnerable, and above all, precious – is 
deeply rooted in antebellum thought, when a culture of child worship drove much of 
sentimental politics and literature. Yet, this version of childhood does not begin to 
address the host of antebellum children who were never imagined as the future of the 
nation, except as a future to be warned against and avoided. At the same time that images 
of children as angels and treasures saturated U.S. culture, regulations binding children 
under systems of indenture, imprisonment, and slavery also took their greatest hold. This 
dissertation therefore offers a counter-history of childhood that focuses on its function as 
social threat in the antebellum United States, contending that conventional accounts of 
sentimental youth have overwritten other, less comforting models. Linking a variety of 
institutional literatures, such as law, medicine, and carceral theory, to literature by 
authors including Herman Melville, Harriet Wilson, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Charles 
Brockden Brown, the dissertation argues that the antebellum period saw the rise of 
multiple modes of childhood governing a maturing subject’s trajectory towards or away 
from adult inclusion. These representations of childhood as antisocial serve to decouple 
the ideals of individual development and national inclusion, suggesting that children 
inhabiting a state were not inevitably its future citizens and could instead endanger its 
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stability. Instead, it argues, these children came to represent sites for the imagination of 
alternative models of reproduction and group coherence. 
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PREFACE  
In 1758, Carl Linnaeus set out a taxonomy of the human population. A revision of the 
system he had first published in 1735, Linnaeus’s tenth edition of Systema Naturæ 
classifies humans by the racial categories that were beginning to be consolidated – 
proposing different human species for African, American, European, and Asian peoples 
with a collection of physical traits describing each – but the system also includes two 
subspecies that operate much less conventionally. One, Homo monstrous, acts as a 
catchall for racialized groups whom he believed to be physically deviant from the larger 
categories. Each of these smaller groups, which include the so-called Patagonian giant 
dwarf of the Alps, are assigned a specific region and a set of common characteristics, 
such as size or timidity (22-23). The remaining type, Homo ferus, works more strangely. 
Although he offers three shared traits of four-footedness, muteness, and hairiness within 
the species, Linnaeus’ chief definition of homo ferus comes, unlike all the other species 
of humanity, as a list of six cases describing purportedly feral children: the Bear Boy of 
Lithuania (Juvenis Ursinus lithuanus), the Wolf Boy of Hesse (Juvenis Ursinus 
Hessensis), the Irish Sheep Boy (Juvenis Ovinus hibernus), Peter of Hanover (Juvenis 
hannoverans), the two Pryenean Boys (Pueri Pyrenaici) and Jean of Liège (Johannes 
Leodicensis) (Linnaeus 20).1 Apparently trusting to his readers’ familiarity with the feral 
children whom he references, Linnaeus provides no information about any of these cases 
beyond these names, nor does he give any further information about the group as a 
whole.  
                                                           
1 The 1766 edition adds three children to this list, two female and one male. Thus, although feral childhood 
may have more readily accorded to boys, gender was not a central organizing principle in the structure of 
Linnaeus’s taxonomy.  
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How do seven children scattered across Europe, most of whom never met one 
another, constitute a coherent group? And, more pointedly, what type of genealogical 
thinking is Linnaeus relying on when he so quickly assumes that the grouping will be 
clear to his readers? Systema Naturæ anchors the other taxonomic categories of humanity 
into a stable geography and more recognizable kinship; they are the people who have 
lived an area, reproducing their supposedly unique traits across the generations. They 
represent, in other words, a version of what Alys Eve Weinbaum has termed “the 
race/reproduction bind,” or a model of race that inheres within heterosexual reproduction. 
Parentage, however, does not define the feral child. Instead, one of their few common 
traits seems to be their disconnection from the predictable patterns of life around them; 
they are a population defined by their estrangement from the populations around them. 
The basic premise of genealogy asserts that a group – whether a family, race, or nation – 
can be recognized and traced over time, even as its individual members are entirely 
replaced by new individuals. Linneaus’s feral children function in almost perfect 
opposition to this, defined by individual examples and their discontinuity with previous 
generations. 
In other words, the category of the feral child does not only mark a type of 
childhood. What it means to live as a feral child or how an adult might recognize one is 
left entirely unexplained. The feral child is less the archetype of a subject than the 
concrete trace left by a system of reproduction and the measure of a group’s legibility as 
a collective identity. The species Homo ferus is as much a type of population, with its 
own source of coherence distinct from geography or genealogy, as it is a classification of 
certain exemplary children.  Nor is the feral child alone in bearing this representative 
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weight. As I will demonstrate across Vicious Infants, visions of childhood so often index 
different visions of reproduction, whether social or biological, that the implications of 
this uneven access to childhood extend beyond the experiences of children. Moreover, it 
is an assignment that enables authority. The feral children of the eighteenth century were 
objects of intense scrutiny, public spectacle, and pedagogical experimentation. One of 
Linnaeus’s most famous examples of Homo ferus, Peter of Hanover, was paraded among 
the British nobility until his novelty waned, and he was sent to a farm where he was 
collared and labeled, lest he wander away (Newton 50-51). Similarly, the “vicious 
infants” of my title were children legally classified as so criminal that they were given 
over entirely to state control, to be imprisoned until adulthood without right to trial. To be 
deemed a “vicious infant” was, thus, to have one’s future deemed intolerable and in need 
of unqualified state intervention.2  
As Kenneth Kidd observes, during the antebellum period, the scene of European 
stories about feral children begin to shift towards more distant imperial spaces, displacing 
these fears of child wildness onto bodies coded as foreign or primitive. However, as 
racial hierarchies began to be consolidated as an internal element of U.S. society, the 
category of the non-assimilated or unassimilable child persisted into the most domestic 
sites of nineteenth-century U.S. literature and – although they are often racialized – 
childhood otherness could take unexpected forms. Take, as one of the most obvious 
examples of deviant children, The Scarlet Letter’s Pearl, the illegitimate child of Hester 
                                                           
2 As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in 1838, the vicious infant who has been imprisoned has 
been “snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity” (Wharton 11). However, as I 
discuss in my first chapter, even imprisonment was seen as insufficient to “reform” a subset of these 
children. 
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Prynne and “born outcast of the infantile world” (84). Pearl is shunned by her Puritan 
community because of her social status, but Hawthorne also invests her with a more 
essential removal from her world. Her eyes possess “a strange remoteness and 
intangibility” that register a level of difference from even her mother, who finds her 
“intelligent, yet inexplicable, so perverse, sometimes so malicious […] that Hester could 
not help questioning, at such moments, whether Pearl were a human child” (82). 
Hawthorne’s catalog of traits – intelligence, inexplicability, perversity, and malice – is 
not the diametric opposite of the sentimental child. It is a version of childhood that has an 
opposite orientation towards adult authority, which can neither contain it nor understand 
it. The effect is not freeing. Under examination by the Governor and religious orders, 
Pearl refuses to declare that she was created by God, but instead insists that she was 
“plucked by her mother off the bush of wild-roses that grew by the prison-door” (99). 
Pearl’s proposal of an alternative genealogy echoes the fact of her birth outside of 
socially-sanctioned reproduction and symbolically aligns her with the pleasure of roses 
over the punishment of prisons. Most immediately, though, Pearl’s declaration nearly 
leads her to be taken into custody, separated from her mother, and presumably set to 
labor as an apprentice for another family. Only intervention from Dimmesdale, her guilt-
ridden father, prevents the then three-year-old girl from forcibly becoming a ward of the 
state.  
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 Hawthorne is relatively admiring of Pearl’s freedom and there are widely 
accepted arguments that she is based partially on his own daughter, Una.3 However, Pearl 
also acts a literary mirror for the specifically antebellum discourses that were increasingly 
coming to see childhood’s futurity not as a promise but as a threat. One commentator on 
these forms of vicious infancy was Charles Loring Brace, the philanthropist who would 
later become famous as the major force behind the so-called Orphan Trains that shipped 
children westward. His warnings, first published in 1854, about urban poverty and, in 
particular the urban poverty of children born to Irish and German immigrants, display a 
similar ambivalence about social disconnection of the children whom he wished to 
educate: 
It should be remembered, that there are no dangers to the value of property 
or to the permanency of our institutions, so great as those from the 
existence of such a class of vagabond, ignorant, ungoverned children. This 
‘dangerous class’ has not begun to show itself, as it will in eight or ten 
years, when these boys and girls are matured. […] They will vote. They 
will have the same rights as we ourselves, though they have grown up 
ignorant of moral principle, any savage or Indian. They will poison 
society. They will perhaps be embittered at the wealth, and the luxuries, 
they never share. Then let Society beware, when the outcast, vicious, 
reckless multitude of New York boys, swarming now every foul alley and 
low street, come to know their power and use it! (322) 
                                                           
3 The parallels between Una Hawthorne and Pearl were first explored in depth in T. Walter Herbert’s 1988 
“Nathaniel Hawthorne, Una Hawthorne, and The Scarlet Letter: Interactive Selfhoods and the Cultural 
Construction of Gender.” 
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Fear, rather than pity, drives his warning that New York was infested with an “outcast, 
vicious, reckless multitude” threatening to overrun it. The peril that this “dangerous 
class” offers to Brace is not a specific menace, though, so much as it is the internal threat 
to the known social order and more specifically to that predictable continuity of 
sovereignty that he terms “the permanency of our institutions.” As the conventional 
language of reproductive futurity takes on the character of apocalyptic prophecy, what 
seem like children – and therefore harmless, trivial, and above all apolitical – will rise up 
into rights-bearing adults, because to the eyes of the state, they are citizens as much as 
anyone else. Brace’s warning, though, is that these future citizens have no loyalty to the 
laws and class hierarchies into which they have been born, and thus no reason to continue 
them; their lack of recognizable socialization places them as far outside national tradition 
as “any savage or Indian.” The fear of these vagrant children, then, lies in the idea that 
they are the future, but a future with no affinity to the present and guaranteed only to 
appear to observers like Brace as a place of disorder and unpredictability.  
Reading Pearl’s ability to scare her mother alongside Brace’s jeremiad on the 
homeless children of New York alongside the taxonomies of feral children points to a 
counter-history of childhood as a social threat. I certainly chose my title, “Vicious 
Infants,” in part for the unexpectedness of the phrase, but more importantly because it 
registers a real and historically codified type of child. As a criminal designation, vicious 
infancy stripped subjects of their ability to participate in a social world outside of 
institutional control, potentially for as long as they could be classed as minors. The goal 
was sometimes reformation, albeit through brutal methods. Brace, for all his forebodings, 
was comparatively revolutionary in his belief that the children of immigrants could be 
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assimilated, but believed that they first had to be transported as far away from their 
communities. More often, and more importantly for my purposes, though, legal and 
scientific accounts of purportedly deviant childhood claim, by their own account, that 
some types of children exist beyond intervention. Like Pearl, whose adult self is banished 
from the narrative to an “unknown region” (277) out of reach of history, leaving the 
reader unsure whether “the elf-child had gone thus untimely to a maiden grave” or if she 
was eventually “subdued,” the children of this project are rarely reclaimed (226).4 In this 
regard, I scout the limits of sentimentalism to consider which children are beyond the 
transformational force of pathos, but I also push against the presumption that 
sentimentalism, even broadly defined, was the only discourse dictating antebellum 
cultures of childhood.  
My focus on these childhoods excluded from socialization emphasizes what 
childhood can tell us about the constitution of the social. By the antebellum period, 
childhood had crystallized as a key symbol of the relationship between generations, but 
also of the relationship between the individual and the larger social world. This is clearest 
for the most familiar case. Long before Linnaeus imagined the possibility of a feral 
population from a constellation of remarkable children, the balance between liberal 
individualism and the necessary continuity of a social world had been the rhetorical work 
of more conventional childhood. John Locke made his foundational claim for liberal 
individual freedom by managing the relationship between a newly born subject and the 
                                                           
4 In my emphasis on the irredeemability of some children, I also depart form Kenneth Kidd’s excellent 
study of feral children and late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century boyhood, which argues that the 
association between wildness and a normative child development out of that wildness structures much of 
our ideas about adult freedom.  
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established social and political world into which they were born. As the apparently pre-
cultural being described in Locke’s model of the tabala rasa (blank slate), the child 
promises, on one hand, evidence that adult subjects have an intrinsic claim to liberty. 
Locke writes,  “saying that ‘begetting of children makes them not slaves to their fathers’ 
as certainly sets all mankind free as his affirming the contrary makes them all slaves” 
(177). In this promised freedom from previous generations, is the presumption of a 
radical innocence of history; each birth, for Locke, represents an escape from history, and 
therefore offers an erasure of systemic history from private life. However, as that pre-
cultural tabula rasa, Locke’s version of the child was also primed to be a generality, a 
subject distinct but formally equally and socially identical to all other subjects. Locke’s 
child, in other words, formed a means to think about the liberal individual in the multiple.  
Scholars have increasingly recognized this centrality of childhood in antebellum 
conceptions of collectivities on a number of scales, whether nationality, race, religion, or 
the family.5 This new importance reflected and reinforced changing conceptions about 
the nature of childhood, as discourses about children began to consolidate into the form 
we recognize today. Holly Brewer, an early American historian, places the early 
nineteenth-century as the horizon of a new form of childhood premised on the exclusion 
of minors from legal consent or contract. Because minors in the early U.S. were seen as 
unable to play an equal role in law, Brewer contends, they came to be seen as needing 
protection from the public sphere – helping to spur the development of a more strictly 
                                                           
5 Anna Mae Duane and Robin Bernstein have each described the evolution of childhood in this period as a 
rhetorical tool for the consolidation of whiteness. Caroline Levander and Courtney Weikle-Mills have 
added to this a focus on a children’s role in antebellum visions of citizenship as simultaneously naturalized 
and freely chosen. Diana Walsh Pasulka argues for the sudden and pervasive presence of child saint figures 
in antebellum Puritanism, during which the genre of child hagiography became “ubiquitous” to mainstream 
U.S. religion (53).  
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delimited private sphere to shelter them. This notion that children should be primarily 
defined as the objects of protection also took momentum from its use by white supremacy 
to argue that the children of white U.S. Americans needed to be saved from racialized 
threats of violence or, in pro-slavery tracts, from labor. In her readings of Indian captivity 
narratives and other narratives of racial menace to white families, Anna Mae Duane 
suggests vulnerability as the defining term of childhood. Likewise, Robin Bernstein notes 
the emergence of innocence to separate the supposedly delicate white children from the 
coerced labor assigned to their black counterparts. 
Theorists considering sovereignty and social relations on a broader scale have 
further come to view such childhoods as ideal territory for conservative utopian thought. 
Because its futurity is bound up in adult retrospection, projection takes the form of an 
idealized regression back to a supposedly purer past. That is, adult thinkers often present 
childhood as a known entity, having been children themselves, and therefore assume that 
its trajectories into the future can be fully managed -- albeit through a regimen of 
painstaking corrections. As Foucault wrote of nineteenth-century Europe, “the education 
of children was the fundamental utopia, crystal, and prism through which problems of 
conduction were perceived” (231). Studies of childhood have accordingly concentrated 
on the dual uses of childhood as contact point and warrant for governmental power, in 
that the perceived vulnerability of the child to external forces serves both as an 
opportunity for social conditioning and a justification for a “protective” control. Child 
development, in this understanding, is inseparable from a forcible molding of citizens. In 
its assertion that young subjects have a natural belonging to a community and subsequent 
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insistence that these subjects be disciplined into belonging, socialization can act as an 
instantiation of sovereignty.   
More recently, too, queer scholars have added a focus on the ways that political 
obsession with utopic childhood shapes the lives of adults. Lee Edelman, Elizabeth 
Freeman, and Lauren Berlant have each argued that the relentless futurity associated with 
this utopian vision of the child is used to narrow the present desire of adults into 
heteronormative channels. This version of childhood serves a site on which the future 
may be inscribed; once designated as the fragile vessel of that perfect future, it becomes a 
pretense for policing the present. Moreover, the centrality granted to children in national 
discourse reflects and reinforces a sense that the temporality that matters is a linear 
futurity based in straight, biological reproduction. As Jack Halberstam explains these 
connections between generational rhythms and state power, the ongoing movement of 
“values, wealth, goods, and morals” from parents to children “connects the family to the 
historical past of the nation, and glances ahead to connect the family to the future of both 
familial and national stability” (5). By intertwining childhood, biological reproduction, 
and state structures of power, the nation creates a sense of naturalized continuity located 
in the family and then claims that continuity for itself. 
Critical work on childhood, however, does far less to address what happens when 
adults fail to recognize themselves in children – when the future that is ascribed to 
childhood represents an intolerable rupture or when the child in question is excluded 
from any socially acceptable adulthood. José Muñoz has commented, with devastating 
understatement that “the future is only the stuff of some kids. Racialized kids, queer kids, 
are not the sovereign princes of futurity,” noting that Edelman in particular “accepts and 
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reproduces this monolithic figure of the child that is indeed always already white” (95). 
What is childhood when it is deliberately cut off from national futurity?  
The challenge of the conventional answer – that such a childhood is no childhood 
at all – is that it overwrites the ways that juvenile bodies never eligible for sentimental 
childhood were nonetheless classified and defined by youth. Throughout the early 
nineteenth-century, industrial demands for the cheap labor of child workers led rural 
families to send their children away to work in urban areas and produced a legal 
redefinition of children as contractual agents in their own right, in order to allow hiring to 
go on at a distance from parents.6 The result was a wave of displaced children with 
dubious family ties, a legally uncertain access to personhood rights such as contractual 
consent and private property, and the mobility necessitated by temporary labor. A host of 
new categories came with this turmoil, from street Arab to juvenile delinquent, to 
describe children who had left the domestic sphere. Similarly, the antebellum period saw 
the increasing attention to black childhood under slavery, as it became a point of explicit 
management for plantation owners. In order to guarantee a steady stream of enslavable 
bodies once the international slave trade had been deemed illegal, slave owners learned to 
deploy the category of childhood as an investment strategy, producing a comparatively 
young labor force. According to the work of historian Marie Jenkins Schwartz, more than 
40 percent of slaves during the antebellum period were under the age of fifteen and a 
third of slaves were under ten.7 Childhood under these circumstances took on a double-
                                                           
6 Schmidt, James D. “‘Restless Movements Characteristic of Childhood’: The Legal Construction of Child 
Labor in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts.” Law and History Review 23.2 (2005): 315-350. JSTOR. Web. 
25 February 2015. See Chapters 1 and 4 for further discussion of these changes. 
7 Schwartz, Marie Jenkins. Born in Bondage, 5. 
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edged nature, wherein futurity could slip seamlessly into the actuarial terms of 
investment and return. Far from being irrelevant to such subjects, childhood operated as a 
dimension of power through which their property, labor, and freedom could be 
appropriated by the state. Moreover, childhood’s close connection to reproduction offered 
a means to control which groups were legible as groups. The ability to be recognized as a 
population, whether as a population with a history and a future or one with an 
essentialized and immutable characteristics, was thus bound up in the status of each type 
of childhood. 
What could be an obscure quirk of Linnaeus’s taxonomy helps us understand a 
strand of thought in the U.S. that had substantial material effects on those placed into 
these alternative models of population. Linnaean thought has been coupled to U.S. 
theories about humanity and its subdivision on the elite level since before Systema 
Naturae had even been published. The New York Mirror bragged in 1833 that the 
contributor most cited in the text is Alexander Garden, a Scottish-born botanist then in 
residence in South Carolina (325). Other US correspondents included Thomas Jefferson 
(“Celebration at Flushing”) and, botanist and New York politician, Cadwallader Colden 
(Vaughan 949). By the mid-nineteenth century, Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae become a 
standard part of academic libraries and was a common citation in scientific treatises.8  
                                                                                                                                                                             
As a point of comparison, Schwartz further notes that this demographic pattern was not present in slave-
holding nations in Latin America, which relied on the transport and purchase of new adults to maintain 
their labor force. 
8 For instance, even a cursory survey shows that Systema Naturae is included the library catalogues of 
Harvard University by 1830 (98), the Library Company of Pennsylvania by 1835 (272), the New York 
Society Library by 1850 (265), Brown University in 1843 (263), the University of Vermont by 1854 (77), 
the University of South Carolina by 1849 (80), and the Library of Congress by 1840 (173). 
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However, Linnaean taxonomies also had a more pervasive and less official place in US 
culture. Outside formal botany, as Alison M. K. Klaum demonstrates, Linnaean ordering 
shaped the largely female-authored genres of floral art instruction and floral poetry. 
Readers of James Fennimore Cooper’s The Prairie (1827) would have encountered Dr. 
Obed Bat, a character whom Joshua Masters observes is a disciple and parody of 
Linnaeus (67). More surprisingly, though, residents of Flushing, New York might have 
attended picnics thrown by the branch of the Linnaean Society in honor of the biologist’s 
birthday in 1823 and 1824, and those in Hartford, Connecticut might have encountered 
the society’s 1836 lengthy birthday proclamation.9 The 1824 party in Flushing, which 
began on the “new and elegant boat Linnaeus” featured a letter from Thomas Jefferson 
regretting his absence but stating his desire “of meeting the great naturalist himself, and 
of assuring him in person of the veneration and affection with which his memory is 
cultivated here” (“Celebration at Flushing” 148). The lectures in botany prepared by 
Almira H. Lincoln in 1829 may have best captured the ubiquity of Linnaean though in 
their explanation to adolescent readers that “the classification of Linnaeus was received 
with scarcely a dissenting voice” and that “what this system was, you have not now to 
learn, since it has been the basis of your botanical studies” (qtd. in “History of Botany” 
472). Lincoln may have overstated official acceptance of Linnaeus, but her essential point 
remains that U.S. taxonomic thinking drew reflexively from Linnaean thought. 
This question of how to constitute a group and what relationship that group 
identity has to genealogy was more than an abstract question in the antebellum US. 
                                                           
9 For accounts of these birthday honors, see “Arts and Sciences: Birth-day of Linneus [sic],” “Celebration 
at Flushing,” and “An Address to the Citizens of Hartford, on the Birthday of Linnaeus.” 
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Versions of childhood not bound up with a future community of adults were crucial in 
framing exclusions from adult citizenship. While much of the work on potentially deviant 
children has emerged from the field of British literature to examine figures like the 
criminal orphans of Charles Dickens or the so-called “watercress girl” of Thomas 
Mayhew, the US portrayals of childhood have their own specificity as a means to confer 
or contest political inclusion.10 The U.S.’s specific roots in settler colonialism meant that 
geography did not act as a simple register of belonging. This is, in part, because 
expansionism to the west incentivized the government to extend sovereignty over the 
mobile settlers, and thereby to the areas they entered, without extending citizenship rights 
to the indigenous peoples who continued to live there and, in part, because the slave-
based economy of the nation required a legal separation between the concepts of 
residency and citizenship. While Great Britain’s empire created similar racial hierarchies, 
the space of the island itself provided a symbolic source of purity and identity for British 
subjects. This spatial logic described by Carl Schmidt as division between the territory of 
insular European states, which were treated as discrete and individual (141), and all other 
land which was regarded as being amorphously “free to be occupied” (172). While 
questions of British identity unquestionably arose in late-eighteenth and early nineteenth-
century literature, they were treated in far more spatially defined terms.11 
By contrast, U.S. legal thinking relied far more on definitions of citizenship as a 
trait that could be passed between generations. In 1790, Congress established 
                                                           
10 For representative works in this vein, see Marah Gubar’s Artful Dodgers (2010), Claudia Nelson’s 
Precocious Children and Childish Adults (2012), or Jacqueline Rose’s foundational The Case of Peter Pan 
(1992).  
11 FN Simon Gikandi, Tropicopolitans and Out of Place 
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citizenship’s ability to be conferred by parentage, as well as location, structuring 
American nationality by jus sanguinis (right of blood) as by jus soli (right of soil). This 
law, entitled “An act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,” enacted three 
principles: long-term residents might receive citizenship through federal naturalization; 
the children of these residents would also be naturalized by this process, provided that 
they are under twenty-one; and the children born to U.S. citizens traveling abroad receive 
U.S. citizenship as a birthright.12 The goal of such laws is to define what legal scholar 
Kristin A. Collins has called the “parent-child citizenship transmission” and thereby to 
stabilize national identity over time (2136). As the law established, children marked a 
critical relay between generations of Americans, ensuring that travel – or conquest – 
could not disrupt the U.S.’s sovereign claim on a family and that the recognition of new 
citizens established their descendants as new chains of future citizens. Naturalization of a 
resident subject, and the accompanying incorporation of the resident’s children into the 
nation, however, applied to “any alien, being a free white person” (103). Collins 
describes force of such limits as amounting to a form of population control; she writes 
that “by determining which citizens’ children would be recognized as citizens, [jus 
sanguinis law] helped regulate the actual reproduction – and racial composition – of the 
citizenry” (2139). Antebellum ideas about how strongly and in what ways children are 
connected to their parents had significant effect on subjects’ lifelong ability to access 
rights.  
                                                           
12 This 1790 was replaced in 1795 by another law of the same name, which preserved these central points 
and added a more detailed description of requirements for naturalizations, including a renunciation of 
previous political loyalties and hereditary titles (Public Statutes 414-415).  
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 In 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment officially changed this, by establishing at 
least a technical right to citizenship for anyone born within the country’s borders. Though 
children have of course continued to be flashpoints of debate over questions of national 
belonging and government power, during the period from the nation’s inception through 
the Civil War, they were uniquely central to debates about relationship between 
individuals and the social body. These conversations draw from legal discourses, but they 
also extended to extralegal conceptions of community on scales ranging from parent-
child bonds, which I discuss in my first chapter, to the global population patterns of 
Malthusianism, which I discuss in my third chapter. Whether children were imagined as 
the reflections of their parents or as wholly new subjects made tremendous difference to 
the nature of any group identities that they were assigned.  
 The central stakes of my project are thus two-fold. First, my project continues the 
research by those like Bernstein and Duane into the historic inequalities contained in and 
perpetuated by literary representations of childhood. More pressingly, though, rather than 
adding to a catalog of oppression, I broaden our vocabulary for imagining childhoods that 
sprang up in the face of this abuse. Rather than returning to a set of historical children 
and pleading that they too be included in a version of childhood that we have already 
critiqued for its damaging effects, I return to a period when the languages of childhood 
were very much in flux in order to find alternatives to the current scholarly fixation on 
innocence and biological futurity. Because these configurations’ importance in asserting 
the individual’s connection to collective history, my interests also touch on the 
intersections between the politics of group identity and utopian imagination. As I have 
discussed, the most mainstream view of childhood in the U.S. asserts the moment of birth 
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as a break from the forces of history and government authority. When the child-figure 
grows up, her eventual assimilation can then appear as evidence for the goodness and 
rightness of the systems she is joining.  
Alternative presentations of childhood can borrow from this utopian opening 
without sharing its conservative conclusions. Linnaeus’s list of feral children, for 
example, offers a patterns of rupture that is very different and far less stabilizing. Feral 
children’s coherence as a group emerges not out of any simple line of descent but from 
their shared disconnection; they are a group defined by a failure of social reproduction to 
latch onto the products of biological reproduction. Their status as specimens permanently 
defined by youth (as juvenis or pueri) marks their ongoing orientation towards this 
socializing moment that never comes, but it also signals the feral child’s role in imaging a 
group sustained over time. It thus offers a frame for the arhythmical repetition of feral 
generations, born not of biological reproduction or social nurture, but of the former in 
absence of the latter. It acts, in other words, as the means of imagining a new form of 
population with a relationship to futurity that is equally distinct. Far from being a niche 
interest relevant only to young subjects, the many theories of socialization generated in 
the antebellum world reflect experiments in theorizing the social itself, as well as for 
imagining what might be possible outside the social.  
Throughout Vicious Infants, I return repeatedly to this space outside of the social 
and to representations of children who live in this state of persistent disconnection. A 
crucial framing for this project is thus that of “antisocial childhoods,” a term I use to 
describe the array of childhoods, including the titular vicious infancy, that were 
designated for subjects preemptively excluded from the markers of maturity, such as 
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property-holding and citizenship, that would otherwise guide their development. The 
antisocial child is one who can never grow up to join the social body that describes her 
and is therefore present by those adult observers as frighteningly unrecognizable or 
incomprehensible. Moreover, when antisociality is persistently ascribed to children who 
are racialized or classed, it threatens the coherence of the group to which they belong by 
disrupting generational interconnections. The childhoods I discuss in this project likewise 
act as a portioning out of collective futurity, seeking discursive control over a 
population’s ability to endure over time.  
Of course, my methodology imposes group identities of its own, and in focusing 
on versions of childhood that stray so far from conventional definitions, I risk 
naturalizing the idea that there is some inevitable or cohesive identity shared by subjects 
of a certain age. Instead, I want to resist this tendency. Age, as I study it, appears as a 
cultural narrative, not a biological reality, and the texts in my archive engage with 
childhood as a significant system of classification because they were writing in a world 
that had made childhood significant; childhood as a frame for understanding young 
subjects was only unavoidable to the extent that it had become a culturally dominant 
narrative of the antebellum U.S. As a result, my study does not attempt to set out any 
absolute age range and instead follows the texts own perceptions of what persons count 
as children. One version of this work might have resulted in a tracing of discourses of 
“childishness” as it migrates across peoples of every age, and in some moments I do 
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extend my focus to subjects traditionally considered adult.13 However, my chief interest 
lies in childhoods that were recognized begrudgingly from the antebellum sense that 
childhood was a natural phase of life, born of the Enlightenment use of children as a 
touchstone for natural man and enshrined, albeit with unstable age limits, by the laws of 
minority I discuss in my first and last chapters. I thus work from two central assertions: 
first, antebellum culture assigned different types of childhoods to children in different 
social positions and, second, that the writers nonetheless worked in a framework which 
viewed age categories as a source of identity. While I argue that age intersects with race, 
class and other categories, and was interpreted differently as a result, all of the texts that I 
consider also present themselves as participants in a larger conversation about childhood.  
In saying that I consider childhood a cultural narrative, I mean, of course, that it is a 
socially constructed and historically particular set of ideas about what it means to be of a 
certain age. However, I also mean the public discourse’s reliance on children to represent 
the border between individual and collective life makes the act of interpreting childhood 
a specifically literary task, rooted in figuration and characterization.14 Many of the labels 
I discuss arise in institutional contexts outside of literature, but their force is to make a 
literary argument that these children are representative outside themselves. The 
incorrigible delinquent was created amidst the paperwork of juvenile prisons, but it also 
provided an interpretative framework for narrating the social body and those who fall 
outside it. Medicine, likewise, produced the idea of the prodigy as a limit case for legible 
                                                           
13 For example, Catherine Robson’s excellent Men in Wonderland: The Lost Girlhood of the Victorian 
Gentlemen (2001) offers one such methodology in her argument that upper-class men defined their 
subjectivities through an identification with the fantastical and idealized girlhoods of Victorian literature. 
14 For further discussion of character as the intersection between a putative individual and multiplicity, see 
Julian Murphet’s “The Mole and the Multiple: A Chiasmus of Character.”  
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inheritance, endowing it with its own relationship to genealogy and history. The texts 
themselves bring a literary hermeneutic to interpret children capable of representing 
multiplicities outside of themselves. However, explicitly literary texts are also crucial to 
the project’s archive. As these figures repeat in more conventionally defined literature, 
their complex implications for the kinship and the social world of the U.S. are typically 
explored in greater depth – implications that can then be reabsorbed by the original 
institutional discourse. I therefore make no case for a strong division between the literary 
and the non-literary, but instead attend to their overlapping languages while respecting 
that they prioritize different questions. Combining institutional discourse’s focus on 
multiplicity with literature’s attention to singular subjectivity allows for the clearest 
attention to the ways that various iterations of childhood shaped recognition of group 
identity and of the continuity of a group over time.  
 
Thinking Population through Childhood 
Studying childhood beyond the trajectories of liberal individualism fundamentally 
changes how sovereignty emerges through and into opposition to child subjects. We are 
accustomed to theorizing children’s relationship to the state in terms of a Foucauldian 
discipline that works at the individual level or, more precisely, that works to constitute 
the individual so that it will have an object to control. This interest is not wrong – my 
first chapter is partly dedicated to following these questions – but it can eclipse children’s 
role in another, equally Foucauldian question, that of population. For Foucault, 
population is a different creature than the mathematical total of individuals living in a 
country; it operates on a scale entirely removed from individual subjects, encompassing 
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the whole bodily life of a state’s residents: “the population is pertinent as the objective, 
and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the objective, but 
simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of 
population” (42). This shift in focus from subjects to the amassed human life of a nation 
shows that what we think of as group identity is no less socially produced and changeable 
than subjectivity itself. More importantly, though, Foucault suggests that the forms used 
to describe subjectivity and reproduction, “individuals” and “the series of individuals,” 
change the form that population takes. Linnaeus’s feral child leads to a form of 
population that manifests its own ferality.  
 Working through the frame of population can do much to improve our 
understanding of the relationship between children and sovereignty. First, it replaces the 
attentiveness of discipline with a management that can entail neglect, taking populations 
of children as a physical reality without necessary investing in them as subjects that could 
take an active part in the system. The warehousing of children labeled as “incorrigible” 
criminals, for instance, would fall into this category of demographic management, which 
cares about accounting for bodies in the aggregate but not in individual subjectivity. 
Similarly, Foucault’s explicit break from the family as the central analogy of and locus 
for power has a startlingly literal equivalent in these children whose lives exist largely 
outside of the domestic sphere. Population instead emphasizes the power that stems from 
control on the largest scale, rather than repeating assumptions that children can be 
understood exclusively within the private sphere.  
Finally, reading the forms of childhood as reflective and constitutive of the forms 
of population reveals the uneasy stance that each holds between the discursive and the 
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material and the potential that both population and childhood therefore hold to slip, at 
least momentarily, outside imposed structures of power. I do not mean that children are 
somehow pre-social, nor that population is any straightforward reflection of nature. 
Instead, they are sites where discourse insists on the materiality of embodied life and on 
discourse’s own limits. This can be because liberal ideology has declared that children 
can be born as bodies outside of socialization, as I discuss in chapter 1, or because 
governmental understandings of population insist that the term is powerful precisely 
because it represents a supposedly unquestionable biological quantity. As Foucault 
defines it, population is a phenomenon that remains partially opaque, even to the 
governmentality that produces it: 
The population is […] everything that extends from biological rootedness 
through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided by the 
public. From the species to the public; we have here a whole field of new 
realities in the sense that they are the pertinent elements for mechanisms 
of power, the pertinent space within which and regarding which one must 
act. (75) 
For Foucault, this space between species and public provides both the sense of amassed 
life that the state sets out to control and the limits of a state that can grasp the “surface” of 
the public but not the underlying biological processes. In this regard, Foucault’s 
population is anchored in a biology that cannot be directly reached by discourse and that 
must be reached indirectly; Foucault’s example is a sovereign controlling imported goods 
in order influence a population’s access to food and, so, its ability to grow (71). This 
claim that “population appears therefore as a kind of thick natural phenomenon in 
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relation to the sovereign’s legalistic voluntarism” in turns lends population a measure of 
unpredictability (71). Sovereignty created population as a tool of management, but 
naturalized it and lent it credence by declaring it as existing, in part, outside of direct 
control.  
The childhoods I study draw on this peculiar relationship with materiality with 
dual effect. Because the child body is presented as an unsocialized, purely biological 
object, children are also assigned an estranged relationship with the state. This 
estrangement most often takes the form of exclusion, but it also opens up an opportunity. 
Antisocial childhoods reveal an incipient vocabulary of demographic management, in 
which the differential images of childhood produced for children of color and laboring 
classes served to naturalize hierarchies in adult society. However, they also mark spaces 
in which authors and historical subjects in these exiled groups could write about viable 
forms of life that are not permeated by U.S. sovereignty and which follow trajectories in 
new directions. They allowed such writers to attach value to children beyond the limited 
framework of innocence and vulnerability and also allowed experimentation with 
genealogies outside of straight reproduction. Thus, by turning attention back to these 
alternative formulations of childhood in which the juvenile represents danger rather than 
promise, we can better trace a history of contingent or refused assimilation to national 
citizenship. In reopening these past models of childhood, I therefore hope not only to 
build upon our understanding of a particular cultural history of age, but also to reassess 
alternative models of embodiment and political community.  
A corollary claim that Vicious Infants therefore makes is that studying childhood 
changes our theoretical understanding of population. Population, as Foucault outlines it 
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and as it has typically been used, is a predominantly singular entity. Certainly, it is 
defined by the exclusion or threatened exclusion of subjects marked as deviant. However, 
as the supposed sum total of life in a state, there is only one population by which to be 
counted or from which to be expelled. The US has never had such a singular accounting 
of the peoples whom it claimed to be under its sovereignty. My point is not just the 
obvious fact that different groups were treated differently. The archives of antisocial 
childhoods demonstrate that different groups were constituted differently and were 
defined as holding different relationships to reproduction and genealogy, both biological 
and social. More than multiple populations operating in parallel within a nation, we must 
understand the multiple forms through which populations may be interpellated or erased. 
 
Overview 
The opening chapters of Vicious Infants take up the antisocial childhoods as they 
emerged from law and medicine respectively. The first of these chapters, “The 
Incorrigible Child: Juvenile Delinquency and the Fearful Rise of the Child Self,” argues 
that theories of juvenile delinquency joined with models of family management of the 
child body to create a category of child criminal beyond socialization. The 1820s and 
1830s saw the first official classification of child criminals as a distinct group and the 
earliest institutionalization of these juvenile delinquents in child-only jails, known as 
houses of refuge. This chapter reads the day-to-day records of the New York House of 
Refuge, the first of these prisons, alongside popular domestic manuals ranging from John 
Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education to Lydia Marie Child’s The Mother’s 
Book. These texts, I argue, converged to generate visions of childhood as disruptive and 
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criminalizable. In their attention to the limits of the body as a means of reforming or 
interpreting child character, these manuals and institutional records frame a different 
relationship between body and subject than conventional Foucauldian discipline. This 
chapter examines how the perceived opacity of the child body to adult scrutiny 
reproduces juvenile subjectivity as a suspect entity, one that is unknowable and therefore 
always potentially deviant from the broader social body. 
The next chapter, “Medical Discourses of Prodigy and Constructed 
Discontinuities of Black Childhood,” moves to a still more extreme version of a 
physically alienated childhood. Prodigy has historically been a double-edged term, 
joining the marvelous and the monstrous together to name a category of the unpredictable 
and unprecedented. Redeployed in the Atlantic world to classify young black genius 
together with spectacles of black disabled bodies, however, the dual nature of the concept 
of prodigy came to pathologize and exclude black childhood from historical genealogy. 
This chapter follows the prodigy as it emerges from medical discourses on black infancy 
as a site of aberration and failed inheritance and then tracks the persistence of this figure 
into three literary texts – Jonah Barrington’s “Skinning a Black Child” (1827), Henry 
Clay Lewis’ “Stealing a Baby” (1850), and Herman Melville’s Moby Dick (1851). I argue 
that these texts take up the medical exclusion of the prodigy from inheritance in order to 
associate the black child with disruptions to white kinship.  Finally, the chapter turns to a 
little read African American-authored 1835 biography, Susan Paul’s Memoir of James 
Jackson, The Attentive and Obedient Scholar, Who Died in Boston, October, 1833, Aged 
Six Years and Eleven Months to argue that Paul’s portrait of a brilliant and doomed pupil 
reclaims the black prodigy’s exclusion from history into a form of practical utopianism. 
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The second half of the dissertation examines how these antisocial childhoods also 
provided new forms to two of the genres most associated with traditional or sentimental 
childhood: the sentimentalism reform novel and the coming-of-age novel. My third 
chapter, “The End is not a New Beginning: Harriet Beecher Stowe, Malthusianism, and 
the Reform Novel,” considers how Harriet Beecher Stowe’s brush with Malthusian views 
of children allowed her to rewrite the easy resolutions of sentimental fiction, in which the 
birth of a new generation often offers utopian escape, into the more crowded world of her 
novel Dred (1856). As scholars such as Elizabeth Povinelli, Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth 
Freeman have discussed, the conventional role of children in sentimental reform novels is 
to promise an easy end to the problems raised by the novel. The birth of children, as signs 
of pure futurity, banishes the social problems of the plot into a redemptive horizon 
beyond the end of the book. Reading Stowe’s second novel in light of her interactions 
with Thomas Malthus, however, reveals a vision of white children as indexing histories 
of settler colonial violence, rather than escaping it. Through the specter of an 
overpopulating U.S., Stowe deploys childbirth to resist sentimentalism’s impulse towards 
cathartic closure and to demonstrate that white childhood instead perpetuates the racial 
violence that it seeks to erase.  
The final chapter of the project, “Outgrowing the Body: Contract Law, Child 
Labor, and the Coming-of-age Narrative of Harriet Wilson’s Our Nig,” takes up the 
coming-of-age narrative in Harriet Wilson’s Our Nig. Noting Wilson’s projection of a 
contractual framework to her protagonist’s unfree labor, I argue that Wilson uses civil 
law’s unstable construction of child privacy to redefine the bildungsroman for a working-
class, black subject. During early industrialization, the legal standing of child workers 
xxxv 
 
was subject to constant revision as courts attempted to balance a version of freedom 
through contract against the belief that childhood was imperfectly rational and only 
partially autonomous. In the process, the contractual child worker became an instance in 
which legal persona could not be cleanly abstracted from the material body and thereby 
troubled the line between social and corporeal versions of personhood. By drawing on 
this legacy of child contract, Wilson experiments with the meaning of physical 
development when it is disconnected from economic markers of adulthood, in essence, 
asking what a growing body signals when it is paired with a stagnant social position. In 
attempting to write the answer, Wilson uses the child body as a means to reintroduce the 
physical particularities of race and disability into the language of labor contract. In so 
doing, she imagines a distinct form of privacy for her protagonist that provides a 
recognizable subjectivity and will that remain wholly isolate from the intrusions of 
contract.  
This sweep from laws written to separate children from the social body to subjects 
invoking legal childhood to exclude themselves suggests the degree to which antebellum 
visions of childhood were inextricable from visions of socialization and of the social 
world itself. Whether a social group is presented as naturally and continuously 
replenishing itself with children who were legible heirs to its adult members or whether 
its children were eclipsed and its population imagined as erratic, disjointed, or irregular 
could determine if that group could be counted as a part of the nation and determine its 
members’ claim to citizenship. The damage that can be done by declaring certain 
childhoods antisocial occurs both individually and in the aggregate. However, as I hope 
to show, the child deemed antisocial has therefore also been a means of imaging different 
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forms of sociality and new configurations of sociality. The denial of innocence can insist 
on historical memory. Conversely, the erasure of history can make space for less 
constraining types of belonging. To be clear, I make no pitch for antisocial childhood as a 
utopian escape, if for no other reason than that utopian escape is the very way by which 
liberal sovereignty insists that each new generation of its chosen children are kept in 
perpetual innocence from the historical conditions of its existence. Most antisocial 
childhoods proved to be sources of pain or dispossession, but even those authors bent on 
reinvesting them with other meanings were necessarily engaged with a discourse that 
held the potential to wound. Much like recent challenges to definitions of the human, 
these rewritings of the child retain awareness of the category’s past and ongoing violence. 
However, by insisting that new experiences of childhood and new relationships between 
generations or within generations all be recognized as such, these authors challenge the 
inevitability of that “the child” might be. 
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The Incorrigible Child: Juvenile Delinquency and the Fearful Rise of the Child Self  
 
One peculiarity of the child's deportment remains yet to be told. The very first thing which 
she had noticed in her life, was—what?—not the mother's smile, responding to it, as other 
babies do, by that faint, embryo smile of the little mouth, remembered so doubtfully 
afterwards, and with such fond discussion whether it were indeed a smile. By no means! But 
that first object of which Pearl seemed to become aware was—shall we say it?—the scarlet 
letter on Hester's bosom! 
 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Scarlet Letter (1850) 
 
 
If antisocial children, feral or otherwise, haunt the edges of antebellum discourse, the 
most basic question is their origin. How does a child become antisocial, or alternatively, 
how does she fail to enter the social world? My introduction proposed that the 
antisociality of the Scarlet Letter’s Pearl mirrored contemporary thinking about whole 
host of historical children who were placed outside of conventional assimilation. In this 
chapter, I begin this broader project by focusing on how the inhabitants of the antebellum 
U.S. imagined this assimilation and how they imagined that it might fail. Although she 
will not appear again in this project, Hawthorne’s wild child provides on last clue to how 
this process was understood. Pearl’s isolation – Hawthorne describes as her as possessing 
a “depth” that “lacked reference and adaption to the world into which she was born” – 
appears to have been cemented by a primal scene gone desperately wrong. In place of an 
emotional connection with her mother, in which Pearl might have echoed, “as other 
babies do,” Hester’s smiles and so learn to share affect, Pearl’s first social encounter 
occurs under the emblem of punishment. As Hawthorne describes, with an almost 
exaggerated horror, the spark of Pearl’s affective life is the scarlet letter itself, the sign of 
her mother’s criminality and her own illegality. 
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 The terms of Hawthorne’s concern are allegorical and historical. However, the 
stakes of imagining children who had been socialized by punishment were entirely 
topical at the time of The Scarlet Letter’s 1850 publication. As child subjects began to 
flood cities, prisons became an increasingly common means of managing children and 
conversations about child socialization became increasingly focused around punishment’s 
effect on character. The immediate catalyst for these changes was a demographic one. By 
the early to mid-nineteenth century, industrialization had increased urban populations of 
all ages, and child workers, useful in factories for hands able to fit the tight spaces of 
factory machines, were no exception. Moreover, because states had responded to the need 
for short-term child labor in factories by allowing juvenile workers to make their own 
contracts without requiring parental oversight, many of the children in these cities were 
operating with an unprecedented degree of independence and mobility.15 A boom in 
immigration brought around 300,000 new arrivals to New York every year (Stoutt 71). 
The immigrants who remained were, in the words of Walter Kamphoefner, 
disproportionately “young, single, and mobile” (84). This shift presented a two-pronged 
problem to commentators: caught in a contradiction between this urbanized youth and 
Romantic visions of pastoral childhood, they also had to account for the sheer numbers of 
unattached children that immigration and industrialization had brought. In 1849, for 
instance, the New York chief of police estimated that 10,000 children lived in the streets 
(qtd. in Hindman 464). While a fraction of these subjects were funneled into the public 
orphanages that proliferated between the 1830s and 1860 (Hacsi 19-21), a parallel 
                                                           
15 For a discussion of the legal details of this transition, see James D. Schmidt’s “‘Restless Movements 
Characteristic of Childhood’: The Legal Construction of Child Labor in Nineteenth-Century 
Massachusetts,” Law and History Review 23.2 (2005): 315–350. 
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discourse emerged from the penal system to define the social standing of these urban 
youth. Labelled with the newly popular term “juvenile delinquent,” children in the city 
could be criminalized for having unstable housing or a home that was deemed unsuitable 
by authorities or for participating in informal economies ranging from prostitution to 
petty theft to picking chips of dried horse manure to sell as fuel. 
The development of the special category of the criminal child required a 
reworking of both labels, reconciling the guilt attached to the former with the innocence 
attached to the latter. On one hand, the version of criminality that could encompass 
childhood’s diminished agency called for a focus not on personal morality but rather on 
subjects formed by environmental determinism. On the other hand, to criminalize 
juvenile subjects is to imagine a child without attachment to the social order whose future 
they represent. Thus, instead of framing children as the natural property of the state, 
delinquency presents a set of young subjects who must be forced to belong and, in doing 
so, projects a set of eventual citizens explicitly coerced into their civic roles. Delinquency 
discourse instead abandons judgment of personal character of the delinquent by imaging 
that character as wholly inaccessible to others and therefore to disciplinary surveillance.  
Sovereignty, under such a regime, becomes an explicit assertion of power operating 
without fictions of consent and, in turn, generates a trajectory to adulthood for these 
subjects that is not a growth into the social contract but a static exclusion. Delinquency 
discourse, in other words, naturalizes the position of poor children who have no legal 
adult roles available to grow into, categorizing them as subjects who can never be 
incorporated into the social order in order to justify their exclusion. Yet this language of 
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ungovernable children also provided antebellum Americans with a way of conceiving of 
themselves as free adults with individual character.  
Specifically, I argue that a legal construct from the early days of delinquency 
discourse, that of “the incorrigible child,” can help unpack the juncture between the child 
and disciplined subject by adding an emphasis on the ways that child characters like Pearl 
defy scrutiny. From a legal stance, incorrigibility emerged a penal category tied to 
harsher penalties. As it appears in William Blackstone’s Commentaries, the “incorrigible 
rogue” is the most extreme of the criminal classes, exceeding both “idle and disorderly 
persons” and “rogues and vagabonds” in their hardened criminality (169). When applied 
to juvenile delinquents, then, incorrigibility marks a similarly habitual deviance. For 
juvenile law in particular, though, incorrigibility came to be an offense deemed in itself, 
labeling those children beyond correction and paradoxically placing them in a position 
that is so outside the reach of state discipline that they are given overly to state discipline 
entirely.16 In its wider legacy, however, the incorrigible gains a measure of power from 
the quality of being beyond correction. For instance, in the Yale Literary Magazine in 
1847, “incorrigible” is deployed to describe not a recalcitrant child, but a geometric 
principle which cannot be disputed. In this sense, the “incorrigible” takes on a specific 
epistemological standing based on the idea that some statements must be accepted as true. 
Grounded in phenomenological experience of the body – scents, tastes, pains – the 
incorrigible assertion is one that, whether true or not, exists beyond interrogation by any 
other parties; it is a personal claim simply not open to question (Coliva 59). Likewise, 
                                                           
16 See, for instance, the 1826 Assembly Act founding the Pennsylvania House of Refuge and authorizing it 
to commit children indefinitely for “incorrigible and vicious conduct,” and the 1838 case, Ex parte Crouse, 
confirming the already extent practice of doing so without the extension of habeas corpus.  
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when the children were labeled as incorrigible, the word carried with it an association 
beyond the immobility or refusal to change and, instead suggested an asociality so 
fundamental that it defied surveillance. Incorrigibility named, therefore, the infuriating 
and frightening gulf between disciplinarians and the charges whom they wished to form 
into their image, the state of seeing a set of children as the future but failing to recognize 
any connection extending from themselves into that future.  
I approach the category of the incorrigible child by bringing together two distinct 
archives written from either side of the question, one which assumes deviance and the 
other which assumes its absence: records from the early years of New York’s juvenile 
delinquency facilities and the popular genre of domestic manuals on child rearing.  
Despite the differences between their intents and venues, both discourses converge on the 
same question: by what means can one assert authority over an unformed subject and, 
more difficult still, from that foundational assertion, what paths exist to a socialized, adult 
citizenship? By reading these two archives in parallel, we find a conjunction of state 
sovereignty and everyday domestic life beyond the common metaphors of paternalism 
and into the messy details of ushering a subject, often an unwilling one, from the bare life 
of infancy and into the possibility of civic life. In each set of texts, the attachment of 
sovereignty to the child subject relies on managing a balance between the projected 
interiority of the individual and the physical body born into a system of power. The 
uncertain civic status of children highlights this tension between narratives of sovereignty 
by bringing together fictions of citizenship by blood or birthplace and citizenship freely 
chosen. That the domestic manual and the legal institutions of delinquency, on the whole, 
deploy divergent strategies for imposing belonging upon their charges, however, points to 
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a process of differentiation between the types of citizens that they can become. Middle-
class children, disciplined by appeals to sentiment and inner feeling, are raised to 
internalize sovereignty while poorer children are raised into adult roles that never escape 
the reassertion of power by force. Incorrigibility, I argue, comes to describe this latter 
form of subjectivity, inscrutable to power and thus left to remain under its full power. 
In framing how antebellum Americans attempted to frame interactions with 
children, I read from five popular domestic manuals discussing the methods of correct 
parenting. Four of these are products of roughly contemporary American writers and 
were originally published in either Massachusetts or New York: Amos Bronson Alcott’s 
Observations on the Principles and Methods of Infant Instruction (1830), Lydia Maria 
Child’s The Mother’s Book (1831), Heman Humphrey’s Domestic Education (1840), and 
John A. Gere’s The Government of Children (1851). The fifth, John Locke’s Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, is an obvious outlier geographically and temporally, but 
despite its English origin and 1693 publication, Locke’s work had a considerable afterlife 
shaping American attitudes about childhood. Its most prominent antebellum publication 
was in an 1830 volume, The Library of Education, edited by prominent educational 
writer and the editor of the American Journal of Education, William Russell. Moreover, 
in her work on the coevolution of child rights and American independence, Gillian 
Brown also reminds us that Locke’s Thoughts on Education was broadly consumed, even 
more so than even his most popular work on political theory, Two Treatises on 
Government (17).  Nor was Locke’s advice taken merely as abstract philosophy. As The 
American Annals of Education describes Russell’s edition, Locke’s work is “not mere 
speculative essays, – but the simplest and most direct discussions of subjects in the 
7 
 
highest degree practical” (393). Thus, while Locke’s historical role in forming the 
foundational ideas U.S. childhood was considerable, I here group him with U.S. manuals 
to preserve the on-going use of Locke to address immediate questions of child rearing.  
Two chief factors guided the selection of my five sample texts from the considerable 
stacks of manuals published. First, I sought texts which were prominent either for their 
authors or for their popularity with readers. Locke’s importance to the genre, as I have 
discussed, is clear. Lydia Maria Child had gained fame for her earlier historical fiction, as 
well as for another household guide, The American Frugal Housekeeper (1829) and her 
work in the juvenile periodical press. Moreover, The Mother’s Book, in particular, met 
with such success that it was republished not only in England, but also in Germany. A. 
Bronson Alcott, too, was an emerging, if polarizing, celebrity in the field of education for 
his pedagogical experiments, particularly at the Temple School in Boston, and for his ties 
to the Transcendentalists, ties which also helped his ideas receive repeated coverage in 
The Dial. John A. Gere, a leader in the Methodist church, was lesser known, but his guide 
found very high, if not entirely surprisingly praise, from The Methodist Quarterly 
Review, which declared a wish that his books might “[find] its way into every Christian 
family in the land’ (146). Finally, Heman Humphrey, though no longer well-known, was 
a widely-published Congregationalist minister and early president of Amherst College, 
who was discussed and published in a range of periodicals including The North American 
Review, The Christian Observer, The Christian Secretary, and The New-York Monthly 
Magazine. In addition to readership, I chose texts whose content traced childhood back to 
infancy, rather than focusing only on older children, in order to match my particular 
interests in the intersections of primary socialization, discipline, and the child body. For 
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instance, while both Humphrey and Alcott also published texts directed at adolescent 
students, I focus on their writings about the more primal scenes of education.  
From these manuals, I turn to a survey of the inmate profiles written during the 
first five years of the juvenile delinquency institution of New York, beginning with its 
first entry on December 25, 1824.17 As I read them, the records of the New York House 
of Refuge work as an ad hoc attempt to reconcile the methods put forward by domestic 
manuals with the group of delinquent children to whom they can claim no genealogical 
connection and whom House officials were preparing for lives in a different class than 
their own. Because they did not see these children as versions of themselves, House 
officials turned instead to environment as a key to understanding delinquent children and 
to violence for molding them. In selecting the physical as sole object of scrutiny, 
however, House officials lost their claim on the inner lives of delinquents, declaring them 
to be a mixture of inaccessible and unchangeable that I classify under the term 
incorrigible. That is, by reading what were functionally bureaucratic documents as formal 
experiments in characterization, these delinquency records reveal the strange place of 
incorrigible subjectivity between the environmental and the individual, between the 
physical body and projection of a mind within. Rather than arguing that this log offers a 
well thought-out framework, I emphasize the moments of rupture when the observer can 
make nothing of the child observed. Faced with a child self whose interiority cannot be 
fully gauged either in the terms of agential consent or physical duress, the authors of 
these records came to see young bodies with a menacing degree of social illegibility. 
                                                           
17 The institution would not officially open until January 1st, 1825, but then Superintendent Joseph Curtis 
began mustering and profiling the first group of inmates shortly before that date. 
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Unlike the accepted Foucauldian theory of discipline, in which the self is invented as a 
means of control, I argue that this invention also enabled the social alienation and 
atomization of such subjects who, from poverty or ethnicity, were placed the discipline of 
delinquency. 
 
Socializing the Child Body  
For all of his interest in educating the mind, John Locke was also absorbed by the 
problem of disciplining the body. While the bulk of his Thoughts on Education is devoted 
to developing faculties such as reason, judgment, and virtue, Locke begins his text by 
noting the impossibility of rational improvement without physical management: “I 
imagine the minds of children as easily turned this or that way as water itself: and though 
this be the principle part, and our main care should be about the inside, yet the clay 
cottage is not be neglected” (84). Unlike the easily swayed mind, the physical conditions 
of the child could only be managed, not scripted wholesale. As a result, Locke’s famous 
treatise on the training of human reason begins with an exhaustive regime for addressing 
the child body. Cold, wet feet are recommended to strengthen character (82). Melons, 
peaches, and plums must be banned, but gooseberries are acceptable – provided they are 
eaten ripe, with bread, and only before meals (96). Beer is allowable but only at “Blood-
hot” temperatures (95), and bowels movements must be carefully monitored and kept to a 
strict schedule (101). Locke’s digressions on the body seem to balloon, unable to leave 
any aspect of physical life as a variable in his curriculum. Attempting to control the 
bodily condition of the child at every turn, Locke suggests that the physical must be 
corralled by constant and painstaking discipline to give access to the mental. In other 
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words, as I want to suggest, the unruliness of the child’s body is threateningly contiguous 
with the limits of adult authority.  
 This problem of socializing the corporeal was at the heart of one of the driving 
tensions of the antebellum domestic novel as a genre: the need to incorporate children 
into liberal democratic society while preserving the decidedly non-liberal dependency of 
childhood. In his history of the concept of character in U.S. reform literature, James 
Salazar argues that such literature struggles with the paradox of being simultaneously a 
nationalist project in training children in American behavior and a project in asserting 
that an independent American character had existed all along. He writes that, because 
they acted “as guides as well to the formation of self-governing and independent citizens, 
these character-building manuals imagined the child not simply as the ‘plastic’ material 
[…] but also as the kind of self-founding, antigenealogical national subject” (14). As 
Salazar observes, the drive to naturalize national identity required the projection of an 
innate personality, where an innate Americanness might reside. Moreover, the idea of a 
child who could be perfectly conditioned into obedience conflicted with the need to 
understand adults as individuals capable of autonomous thought and, therefore, properly 
democratic voting practices. The child of these manuals’ rhetoric must retain a measure 
of selfhood that remains asocial, in order to imagine them growing as having the personal 
freedom necessary to be a socially functional adult.  
 The difficulty of imaging even the model childhood as continuous with the 
disembodiment of rights-bearing adulthood was most pointed in such manuals when they 
attempted to address the determined corporeality of the child – the awkward predicament 
of severing physical growth from rational development and, subsequently, of preserving a 
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fantasy of the pristinely disembodied citizen. Much as the officials of the House would 
do, these domestic advisors relied upon the body as an index to understanding and 
asserting authority in the form of corporal punishment over child subjects who seemed 
too little socialized for other appeals. In this reliance on the body as a failsafe to 
accessing a selfhood posited as elsewhere, however, writers meet with the corollary fear 
of disconnection between bodily comportment and interior state. Too much attention to 
the body could produce a deceitful subject who learns to conform only outwardly. 
However, because the discourse of childhood also foregrounded the body as a non-
negligible aspect of the juvenile subject, attempts to understand juvenile discipline appear 
stranded between the embodied dependent that they saw children as and the vision of a 
disembodied, rational adult that they wished to create. These manuals collectively reveal, 
then, a crisis over the child body as the simultaneous grounds and obstacle to 
socialization. 
 Locke’s emphasis on the physical management of childhood as the underpinning 
for moral adulthood permeates guides written during the antebellum period as well. 
Humphrey, in fact, very nearly paraphrases Locke’s metaphor of water and clay cottage, 
declaring in one passage, that “although the young mind is that priceless gem which it 
should be a guardian’s supreme care to polish, the casket must not be overlooked, nor 
neglected” (61). Similarly, Alcott believed that the primary force in infancy was the 
“claims of animal nature” and insisted that a session of active play was the necessary 
preparation for a child to be able to engage intellectually, claiming that bodily energy 
must be dealt with for intellect to be invoked (5). Child, meanwhile, goes so far as to 
trace the national characters of the Dutch and the French back to the manner in which 
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they are physically handled as infants. Dutch “heaviness,” she ponders, must spring from 
Dutch infants being kept in “repose” for too long, while French “vivacity” originates 
from the parental tendency to be “perpetually tossing them about” (1). An American 
body, too, was not simply born but had to be handled into being, according to her theories 
of attending from the beginning to the sensory life of the child. If the ideal subject of the 
early U.S. was the disembodied subject of liberalism, these manuals make clear that the 
training of that eventual adult was nonetheless a process rooted in the physical.  
Accordingly, in these U.S. manuals, children’s bodies appear overwhelmingly as 
the first means for socialization of a non-speaking infant. Humphrey, for example, sees 
the primal scene of the infant social life as lying in a recognition that bodies code a 
deeper feeling, promising that a mother “conveys her meaning in tones, and looks, and 
smiles, and frowns, to her darling boy, long before it is capable of understanding a single 
word she utters […] and in this way she begins to mold its temper and habits to her 
wishes” (Humphrey 42). Faces act in the absence of language as a naturalized method of 
communication, allowing immediate access to an infant’s character and allowing its 
socialization to begin before it is physically capable of social behavior. An infant is 
rewarded with a smile and punished with a frown, and this basic affinity through 
superficial recognition allows the mother a means of controlling the deeper questions of 
the child’s “temper.” Child seconds this idea of infantile responses to a mother’s face and 
extrapolates a version of the child body that remains connected to its mother even after 
birth. Claiming that infants will cry at the sight of their mothers looking unhappy, Child 
frames the situation as a matter of innate communication. She explains that such a young 
child “cannot possibly know what that expression means, but he feels that it is something 
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painful [emphasis in original]” (4). In this privileging of feeling over knowledge, Child 
imagines an inner life that need not be socialized from a blank slate, as it were, but one 
that receives the emotional life of its parents so immediately as to be almost an 
inheritance. This connection, so visceral that it almost exceeds the category of 
communication, stages the child as always already socialized by merit of belonging to the 
body of the mother; she imagines infants as, in a very literal way, being a part of a social 
body through the intensity of the maternal bond.18  
This method of infant training through bodily response, however, had its more 
brutal extensions as well. Gere, too, insists that there is no reason to delay training a child 
until it is capable of either speech or reason, because it can instead be made to respond to 
physical stimuli. He therefore promises a technique for teaching crying children to calm 
themselves on command before the age of six months. Instead of maternal empathy, 
though, Gere admits that “in general, it will be indispensable to make an appeal to fear” 
as the basis for this pedagogy (59). His advice is that a guardian faced with a crying child 
should first attempt to distract it with a few words but, as this will often fail, recommends 
that he or she escalate to violence: 
It may be necessary to add, on the same principle on which physicians 
apply counter-irritants, suddenly but gently, a slap, or a shake, just 
sufficient to render fear the predominant passion at the moment, – and 
then it may be eased off, as already described. But some rare instances 
will occur, in which these means will not only not answer the purpose, but 
                                                           
18 It is worth mentioning that, as with many of the mechanisms of childhood, this imagined bond was a tidy 
way of policing female sociality, as well, by insisting that mothers refrain from any “violent passion or 
emotion,” lest they be responsible for poisoning their child. 
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serve only to increase the passionate excitement which obtains in the 
midst of a fit of squalling, or of obstinate, silent resistance to parental 
authority. In such instances, imitate the practice of physicians, who order 
blisters to establish upon the surface a centre of sympathy, and repeat the 
slap, or ply the rod, the instrument directed by the Holy Scriptures, with an 
intention to smart, but never to bruise or injure, until it is obvious that the 
sensation upon the surface becomes the centre of interest, and no longer. 
(59-60) 
Given the excess of the advice itself – that if slapping an infant once fails, then the 
answer is to strike again – it does possess a strange kind of internal logic, offering a 
theory of interaction with what is still a largely asocial being. If the child is crying, Gere 
reasons, the adult can distract it out of a tantrum by inspiring a new “predominant 
passion” of fear or pain. In his choice of medicine as the arena for a training that could as 
easily been made a matter of etiquette or morality, Gere makes an implicit claim that the 
route to a child’s thoughts and feelings is fundamentally a physical one. Sympathy, as it 
appears in this interaction between parent and child, is hardly the product of abstract 
affinity but rather the physiological impulse that can spur feeling; the “centre of 
sympathy” is the site of an instructive pain, coupling physical sensation and mental 
attention in an immediate proximity. 
 Gere’s suggestion would have been thoroughly controversial and he himself 
acknowledges that some of his methods have been condemned as “oppressive and cruel” 
(82), but they would have been polarizing precisely because they pinpoint contemporary 
fears about whether childhoods predicated on force could produce the types of middle-
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class, liberal adult that the manuals’ readers would have imagined themselves to be. As 
they would with the New York House of Refuge, discussions around how embodiment 
shaped the social status of the child converged around the issue of corporal punishment. 
Corporal punishment made explicit how greatly adult authority relied on the child body 
as a relay for controlling the child self. However, in isolating the body as the source of 
power, corporal punishment also articulated limits to adult authority, tracing it to a mode 
of domination that was judged as always partial and, moreover, as a thoroughly 
unacceptable basis for sovereignty over the adult citizen that these manuals attempted to 
produce. Thus, when Gere advocates that pain precede language as a system for 
communication with infants, he does so directly from the premise that authority over the 
child corresponds strongly with authority over the adult, because at the heart of Gere’s 
method is his belief that fear “appears to lie at the foundation of all human obedience, 
from infancy to old age” (59). In other words, for those opposed to corporal punishment, 
identifying physical force as the fundamental socialization for the child self threatens to 
undermine the putative freedom and rationality of the adult self. 
 Gere’s theoretical basis, if not his conclusions, follows directly from Locke, for 
whom corporal punishment threatened to disqualify children from democratic citizenship. 
While Locke’s extrapolation between child liberty and the political rights of adults 
springs from a considerable tradition of paternalist analogies – his Two Treatises of 
Government famously rebuts Filmer’s own conflation of royal and paternal authority – 
his discussion moves beyond analogy and into an analysis of how corporal punishment 
shapes the development of child subjectivity itself. He critiques whipping, therefore, as 
making the child into an adult unfit for political participation: 
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Such a sort of slavish Discipline [as whipping] makes a slavish Temper. The Child 
submits, and dissembles Obedience, whilst the fear of the Rod hangs over him; but when 
that is removed, and by being out of sight, he can promise himself impunity, he gives the 
greater scope to his natural Inclination; which by this way is not at all altered, but on the 
contrary heightened and increased in him; and after such restraint, breaks out usually with 
the more violence. (113) 
The prospect at least of physical discipline seems inevitable, because for all his 
reluctance, Locke still admits that when faced with what he interchangeably terms 
“obstinacy” and “rebellion,” physical checks are the only assertion of control (138). 
Counterintuitively, though, the failure of corporal punishment is the submissiveness it 
first seems, for the child’s “natural Inclination” is not subdued but “heightened and 
increased” until it is capable of all the more violence. Whipping is ineffective, in other 
words, because it isolates the body and thereby teaches the child that outward appearance 
can be used as a shield between its inner self and any illicit desires lurking there and 
disciplinary surveillance. Instead of the self imagined by liberal democracy that 
internalizes the authority to which it answers, the beaten child is made into a slave only 
able to resist power by deception. Moreover, this invocation of slavishness in the context 
of child rearing would have registered more than incidental rhetoric to its U.S. readers. 
As Richard Brodhead has argued, there was a general shift in discourse around corporal 
punishment, particularly the language of whipping, that made it inextricable from the 
violence of plantation slavery. Locke’s turn to the slave, already more than metaphor at 
the time it was written, would have appeared in the antebellum period as an especially 
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pointed instruction for how to preserve the democratic mindset, and tacit whiteness, of a 
potential citizen.  
Locke’s warning against corporal punishment links questions of the child body 
and civic identity by suggesting a bifurcated theory of the self. To some extent, treatment 
of the child body matters because it molds the character of the adult. Yet it cannot do so 
entirely. Locke’s model of the self in this passage, instead, divides between the social 
presentation of the self and an asocial, private self, labeling them “temper” and “natural 
Inclination” respectively. Temper, as the aspect of character that can be made “slavish,” 
is socially-determined and determines, in turn, how the self is expressed to others. 
Natural inclination, on the other hand, is the innate element of the character which does 
not seem to depend on nurture and which may be hidden or revealed to others, according 
to the individual’s temper. Corporal punishment intervenes in this dynamic by 
strengthening the asocial tendencies of the self; as Locke concludes, a beating leaves the 
child’s natural Inclination “heightened and increased,” but better concealed. To grow into 
a proper citizen, on the other hand, children must be trained with a temper that can 
moderate between their desires and the external social world. Essentially, it must undergo 
the process which I have been referring to as socialization. 
 The aversion to corporal punishment in Child’s manual is similarly not concerned 
with an abstract dislike for violence or even a wish to avoid causing the children pain, but 
rather with the fear that it would teach children how to put on a deceptive face of 
obedience. They might learn to act good without being so. Unlike Gere, Child finds 
intimidation to be an inadequate source of authority, on the grounds that “mere fear of 
suffering never makes a person really better. It makes them conceal what is evil, but it 
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does not make them conquer it [emphasis in original]” (36). As she continues to explore 
the division between children that “conceal” and those that “conquer” their vices, Child 
outlines the dangerous possibility that a man may grow up having learned by force to 
“regulate his outward behaviour” and to project “outward goodness” all without having 
“cleanse[d] his heart,” avoiding punishment through “hypocrisy” or “concealment” (37). 
In this worst case scenario, the child disciplined by force matures into an adult who lives 
deceptively, functioning socially yet never revealing a true self to the rest of the world. 
Indeed, Child’s feelings about the dangers of corporal punishment were so strong, or the 
social pressure to condemn it compelling enough, that she added a “Concluding Chapter” 
to her 1844 republication of the Mother’s Book, which recants her original edition’s 
stance that physical discipline might be acceptable in some very rare instances and 
instead insists that force could never be used without sparking “rebellion” even when “its 
outward manifestations might be restrained by fear” (171).  
For both Humphrey and Alcott, too, corporal punishment comes to be associated 
with an asocial emotional life, because the two agree that beating children threatened to 
teach them to perform an insincere obedience and thereby to cordon off their feelings 
from scrutiny. Rather than restricting the practice, however, as Locke and Child do, they 
reshape corporal punishment to train children explicitly in the proper way to feel about 
their pain. For Humphrey, this attempt to reconnect the child’s mental and physical 
response is a fairly conventional suggestion that guardians themselves perform the 
emotional effect that corporal punishment is intended to have upon the child. “Let him 
see,” Humphrey advises, “from your countenance and from the tones of your voice, that 
every stroke costs you more pain than it does him; and he must be perverse indeed, if he 
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does not yield and reform” (60). Though beatings should be rare, when they happen, 
parents must actively present that beating as an act of emotional transference, suppressing 
the role of physical suffering so much that the chief injury should apparent to be parental 
grief. What Humphrey’s recommended ritual assumes is that the physical punishment 
will not naturally have an affective impact or will have an impact that is unpredictable. 
Much as his advice pivots syntactically from one meaning of pain to another, the 
suggestion is pedagogical exercise in teaching children to translate from violence to 
sentiment and to understand corporal punishment as focused on that latter intangibility 
rather than on physical threat. To put it differently, Humphrey implicitly argues that if 
parents want to discipline children through the body, they must also socialize how the 
way that children connect interiority to flesh. 
Alcott extended this idea further still. In an even more unusual stance on corporal 
punishment, instead of advising guardians to convey their own pain with every blow, 
Alcott entirely redirects the physical pain to the adult. Although he does not directly 
discuss the practice in his own writings, Elizabeth Palmer Peabody’s Record of a School 
(1833) describes him inverting the scene of punishment and requiring that disobedient 
students strike Alcott for penance (Brodhead 68). As Peabody describes it, this reversal 
was the “most complete punishment that a master ever invented,” because it produces a 
pain that can “touch the heart to love” (145). Likewise, in Alcott’s explicit advice on 
governing infants, interiority is a learned trait. He writes: “the reflection of [the teacher’s] 
character will open the deeper fountains of their nature, and prepare them for the 
knowledge of themselves. Taught to look within for the dictates of duty, they will be led 
to the exercise of self-knowledge” (21).  This elaborate pattern of reflection and 
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substitution – children must observe adults so that the children can observe their own 
desires and learn to live without external guidance – follows a similar pattern to his 
insistence that a child striking an adult to see adult suffering in order to teach a self-
inflicted pain born of remorse.  
Alcott’s reversal of disciplinary roles appears bizarre, if not somewhat sexualized, 
from modern perspectives, but, though it was always controversial, there is also evidence 
that his methods struck a popular chord in its own time. When his daughter, Louisa May 
Alcott, fictionalized his pedagogy and included approving scenes of his unique proxy 
approach of punishment in her 1871 novel Little Men, public interest was enough to spur 
Peabody to republish her own account of Bronson Alcott’s teaching. Indeed, read in the 
context of these other domestic manuals, Alcott’s inverted approach to pedagogical force 
responds to the same problem of how to understand and discipline an asocial subject as 
his generic contemporaries, even if his answer is a more extreme one. Set alongside 
Humphrey, especially, the scene of suffering adulthood takes on a different light and 
becomes an exercise of teaching intersubjective relationships. Humphrey’s lesson that 
internal and external must correspond recurs in Alcott’s underlying premise that when a 
guardian feels grief at the behavior of a child, its corollary is that the child should cause 
the corresponding physical pain as well. Rather than teaching children to mimic the grief 
of their parents, Alcott assigns physical pain to adults in order to make the punishment a 
pristinely emotional exchange. In thus forcing children to inhabit the place of the striking 
adult while also in the place of the chastised child, Alcott expands a child’s misbehavior 
into a communal injury in which physical pain cannot mark an incorrigible child self 
because even that pain is attached to the parental authority. Alcott transforms the 
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isolating effect of corporal punishment into a way to make children embody discipline 
themselves and thereby submit to it.  
In this ultimate preference for a suffering adult over a suffering child, Alcott 
marks the extent to which neither children nor the pain of children was a simplistic 
rallying point for U.S. society. Instead, as fears of antisocial childhood moved between 
the institutionalization of poor children and the training of the affluent, disciplinary 
experts from both spheres came to see child bodies themselves as products of human 
training and, in that recognition, came to doubt their strength as relay between adult and 
child. Moreover, because those in authority saw themselves as products of the system 
they ran, the child came to signify a paradoxical site, in which to imagine the potential for 
a democratic citizen also required preserving the possibility of a profoundly 
unassimilable childhood.  
The risk of such an oppositional childhood, however, is higher for some children 
than others. As these manuals make clear, the danger of the body barring access to the 
child’s character was far less with one’s own, biological children than with the children 
of strangers. In fact, according U.S. manuals, the supposed bond between a mother’s and 
child’s bodies offer the first means for socialization. Recall, for instance, Humphrey’s 
belief that a mother’s face was innately legible to her child. Similarly, Child extrapolates 
from this theory of face that a version of the child body must remain connected to its 
mother even after birth. Claiming that infants will cry at the sight of their mothers 
looking unhappy, Child frames the situation as an instinctive physical bond that links 
their emotional states, explaining that such a young child “cannot possibly know what 
that expression means, but he feels that it is something painful [emphasis in original]” (4). 
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The extent of this corporeal connection to the family so intense that Child returns to an 
already rather outdated theory that a mother’s emotions could be transmitted to a child 
through milk, declaring that “children have died in convulsions, in consequence of 
nursing a mother, while under the influence of violent passion or emotion” (4). This 
connection, so visceral that it almost exceeds the category of communication, stages the 
child as always already socialized by merit of belonging to the body of the mother. She 
imagines infants as, in a very literal but temporary way, being a part of a social body 
through the intensity of the maternal bond. 
Where a biological relationship could stabilize this fear that the body would 
prevent true socialization, then, no such privilege existed for the children of strangers. In 
a passage that she later recanted, even Child, the otherwise staunch opponent of corporal 
punishment made an exception for the children who might join the family as adoptees, 
servants, or apprentices. She explains that, while she “[does] not believe that most 
children, properly brought up from the very cradle, would need whipping,” she also 
cautions that “children are not often thus brought up; and you may have those placed 
under your care in whom evil feeling have become very strong” (37). Violence, for Child, 
is reserved for children brought from outside the household, as a means of compensating 
for the affective gap between a guardian and a child estranged by the “evil feeling” of an 
improper background. It might evoke incorrigibility, but it seems the only bond possible 
when a child has been raised so outside an adult’s experience. As I will argue, for House 
officials, too, the paranoia that their charges had secret inner rebellion marked a sense of 
wider disconnection. The institutions had brought them in contact with types of 
childhood they had never lived from classes and ethnic groups to whom they felt no 
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affiliation. To see a child as incorrigible, then, was to see him or her as a break in the 
social order, living at a remove from any life that persons in authority could imagine. 
 
Delinquent Characters in Profile 
The first prison intended specifically for juvenile criminals in the United States was built 
in New York City in 1824. Known as Houses of Refuge or, less frequently, as Houses of 
Reformation, such institutions were part of a larger transatlantic fascination with juvenile 
delinquency, explicitly borrowing their design from similar establishments in London and 
Dublin (Hart 25). Though the U.S. was slower than Britain to adopt separate penal 
systems for minors, the idea caught on quickly enough that within thirty years, as the 
Pennsylvania Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy from 1854 reports, Houses 
of Refuge had since been founded in Philadelphia; Boston; Portland, Maine; Providence, 
Rhode Island; Westborough, Massachusetts; Rochester, New York; Pittsburg; Cincinnati; 
and Chicago (“Art. Lii.”).19 Although the details of the schools differed, the typical 
program for inmates consisted of a full workday meant to train the children in a 
profession while also allowing the institution a source of financial support. An 1827 
report by the New York House of Refuge, for instance, reported that inmates attended 
two two-hour school lessons and labored for another eight hours with its one hundred and 
twenty-two boys working at “chair-making, shoe-making, tailoring, brass nail 
manufacturing, and silver plating” (16) and its twenty-seven girls working at “baking, 
                                                           
19 Even this list is not nationally comprehensive, missing at least the incorporation of a New Orleans House 
nine years prior to the report’s publication (“Records of Correctional Institutions”). 
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tailoring, sewing, and washing” (18).20 Because time served in the House was regarded as 
rehabilitation rather than punishment, inmates were not given sentences of a specific 
length.21 Instead, if their behavior was deemed suitable and an opportunity was available, 
they left the institution by indenture into an apprenticeship or, more rarely, they were 
released to familial. If not, Houses had authority over their charges until they reached the 
age of majority, which was typically twenty-one for male subjects and eighteen for 
female.  
 The common arguments for building Houses of Refuge, rather than age-integrated 
prisons, relied on bringing together the two contradictory halves of the discourse on 
juvenile criminality. On one side, the pathos of a popularized childhood innocence 
suffering in prison permeated many sentimental appeals for the construction and funding 
of institutions of delinquency. The Chief Justice of Massachusetts in the 1820s, for 
instance, wrote a much-quoted address endorsing South Boston’s House that declares 
prison unfit for minors, because “these unhappy little victims of neglect, or shameful 
abuse of authority, are hardly proper subjects of punishment – their offences are not their 
own” for, as he continues, “what more terrible than to immure in the physically and 
morally foul apartments of a jail, a child of eight or ten years of age, without means of 
instruction or information, and then to turn him into the world with an atmosphere about 
him, which will repel every thing fitted to purify his body or his soul! [sic]” (qtd. in 
                                                           
20 As an official report on the institution’s benevolence, these work hours may well have been exceeded in 
practice, especially as increasing income from inmate labor was both a source of direct funding and 
evidence of sustainability used to argue for future support from external patrons. Moreover, the report itself 
notes that the in-house work done by female inmates “engrosses almost the whole of their time” as those 
twenty-some children were responsible for clothing the whole of the Institution’s population (18). 
21 Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqville seized on this point in their On the Penitentiary System in 
the United States as a proof of the educational value of the House (112). 
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Sergeant 39-40). Children, such advocates argued, erred through ignorance of the law 
brought about by bad upbringing, rather than individual malice. Putting minors in prison, 
therefore, was merely to educate them in the ways of adult criminality, corrupting their 
remaining purity by contact with convicts.  
 On the other hand, texts such as Gustave d Beaumont and Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s On the Penitentiary System in the United States (1833) complained that, 
because of the pathos inherent in the child prisoner, juries would refuse to convict even 
repeat offenders when the only option for sentencing seemed so harsh (111). As 
advocates for the Philadelphia House of Refuge put it in an 1840 pamphlet entitled 
Design and Advantages of the House of Refuge, this pity itself can breed further 
criminality in its young objects: 
If such delinquents are liable to be treated, when pursued, in the same 
manner as older and hardened ones, it is almost impossible to arrest their 
progress in depravity and mischief. Most men shrink, with repugnance, 
from harshness to youth. The prospect of making them convicted felons is 
repulsive; and thousands have been permitted to continue unmolested, in 
preference to hurrying them to the Penitentiary. Thus our most natural 
sensibilities become panders to public wrong, and contribute to keep up 
the juvenile gangs so necessary to the schemes of old culprits. (4) 
Too much sympathy is actually an act of unkindness instead of mercy, the author 
contends, because it leaves children on the street, where they may be preyed upon by 
gang leaders. Keeping child criminals away from adult convicts, in other words, returns 
them to the hands of the adult criminals still outside of prisons, so that the only way to 
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keep the two groups reliably apart is to found an alternative institution. In separating 
these two classes of bodies, the pamphlet also seeks to guard a rhetorical gulf between the 
social standing accorded to criminals and that accorded to children. To juxtapose the 
treatment of the former onto the putative precious body of the latter produces the 
“repulsive” chimera of social positions; it is, in other words, to imagine into being the 
hardened criminal child known as the incorrigible. 
Translating the mechanisms of the adult criminal code into a penal code for 
juveniles, however, also required developing a system for gauging the character of 
subjects liable to be seen as blank slates. Thus, along with this new form of criminality 
came a need to recalibrate the alignment between individual and environment as 
commentators were forced to reckon with just how responsible delinquents could be held 
for their actions.  A few reports of juvenile crime did frame it, explicitly or tacitly, as a 
matter of individual moral choice. The discussion of a young thief in an 1835 New York 
newspaper shifts immediately into a repetitive apostrophe of the “Young Man!” reader, 
warning that he avoid the same fate (“Crime Among the Young”).22 More famously, 
Charles Dickens, an otherwise strong proponent on behalf of criminalized youth, formed 
his 1839 Oliver Twist around the notion that his protagonist’s innate goodness saves him 
time after time from attempts to drag him into crime and so disinherit him; Oliver’s 
continued innocence offers proof of upper-class moral strength and condemnation of all 
those lower-class characters around him who do not themselves resist delinquency. More 
                                                           
22 For a similar instance of delinquency as a subject of didactic literature, see also “The Children’s Column: 
What I Saw: Or, Little Lee’s-Sin.” Christian Advocate and Journal (1833-1865) 3 Jan. 1850, which takes a 
juvenile theft as occasion for individual moral speculation and readerly instruction.  
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generally, too, the basis of nearly all reform movements, Houses of Refuge included, was 
that of moral education, with the accompanying notion that a “good” child could not be a 
criminal child and, conversely, that criminal child could not be a good one.  
As a general rule, though, the discourse of delinquency is less likely to ascribe 
bad character to a delinquent than it was to ascribing an absence of any character. That is, 
the discussion of child crime is far less interested in inner motivation or intention than in 
inventorying the external causes that had produced child subjects as criminal. The 
suspects were many. For example, when the board of managers of the Philadelphia House 
of Refuge offered a prize for the best essays on juvenile delinquents, they introduced the 
winners with a list typical for the period, including “the rapid natural increase of our 
population,” “the influx of ignorance, sottishness and crime from foreign lands,” and “the 
corrupt influences which grow with the growth of our cities, and extend with the 
prosperity and enterprise of the country” (6). For such commentators, delinquents act as a 
social barometer, absorbing and reflecting whatever set of social evils are preoccupying 
the writer, such that their share of childhood “innocence” lies in their lack of personal 
will. The 1850 New York sermon, Juvenile Depravity and Crime in Our City by 
revivalist and eventual utopian Thomas Lake Harris, presents delinquency as a product of 
overwhelming influence rather than personal failing: 
A man can conquer circumstances of evil provided his spiritual will be 
quickened […] But the Child is passive. Circumstances exercise over it a 
forming and influencing power. Poison may be mingled with its food and 
with its drink that shall disease and madden its young life in body and 
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mind. It may drink vice from its mother’s bosom and imbibe contagion 
from its father’s touch. (6) [emphasis in original]  
Child subjects in this framework were distinct from adults in their unusual openness to 
the influence of their environment. They were able, as Harris writes, to “drink vice” and 
imbibe contagion” because they lack the clear boundaries between internal and external 
worlds that would allow for anything like a private self in the liberal sense. They are 
reflective, not agential figures.  
The importance of the environment in anchoring adult understanding of the child 
was not a model exclusive to delinquency. Rather, delinquency’s obsession with urban 
youth (a term that remains something of a euphemistic pejorative) derives from a more 
general coupling of child and nature arising the late eighteenth century. Observing the 
period’s preference for meadows as the site of “true” childhood rather than factories or 
even classrooms, Alan Richardson has observed that the prototypical child of early 
Romanticism is “Edenic, natural, and asocial,” in that the child’s singular connection to 
the idyllic natural world marks its innocence of human vice, even as the child’s 
innocence acts as guarantor of that the natural world really must be idyllic (14). The use 
of the pastoral to link ideas of childhood with pristine nature carried over into the U.S. 
context as well. As Ralph Waldo Emerson described childhood in his 1836 essay 
“Nature,” the natural world surrounding a child is so constitutive of the child’s character 
that there is no clear boundary between the one and the other. While “the sun illuminates 
only the eye of the man,” he writes, it “shines into the eye and heart of the child” such 
that “the inward and outward senses” perfectly correspond (11). The idea of innocence 
relies, in part, on a natural setting, because the child’s singular connection to the idyllic 
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natural world marks its innocence of human vice, even as the child’s innocence acts as 
guarantor of the natural world’s idyllic character. 
From this perspective, for a child to be born and reared in a bustling city bordered 
on perversion. Where a child in open exchange with nature signified purity, a child whose 
sense of self fused instead with the artificial space of the city verged upon an equally 
unnatural character. Children of the city might have been objects of pity, but they were 
not to be trusted. An 1856 self-help manual from Boston, How to be a Man: A Book for 
Boys, put the matter directly, declaring that “cities abound with boys who are old in 
mischief and crime. They take great delight in leading astray the simple-hearted; and if 
boys from the country come within reach of their influence, they are almost sure to be 
ruined” (179-80). Rural boys are “simple-hearted” and untainted, but city boys become 
“old” beyond their age. City children are equally corrupted and corrupting to others, 
acting at once as victim and perpetrator.  
The inmate profiles written by the House Superintendent mirror this divide 
between delinquent as a victim of environment and as culpable criminal agent. As 
institutional texts, these case histories are fairly consistent and systematic in their 
structure. As each new inmate entered, he or she were assigned an identifying number 
and would have an interview with the current superintendent who would ask for a brief 
version of their early biography (e.g., age, birthplace, ethnicity, status of parents, with 
whom the child had lived) and then press them for an account of all past crimes, however 
minor, the inventory of which would be recorded in full. This biographical background 
forms an introduction to the second half of the document, those records taken of the 
child’s time after they had become an inmate of the House. This portion, entitled 
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“Remarks,” consists of dated entries which could vary in frequency from every few days 
to an annual update and which featured brief character sketches or recorded significant 
events in the child’s reformation, or non-reformation, such as indentures, escape 
attempts, or persistent rule-breaking. Nearly all remarks sections include at least one 
entry made after the delinquent had left the House recording relapses, professional 
standing, or merely a lack of further information.23 
Treating these entries as an attempt at a hermeneutics of child subjectivity which 
dissolves into incoherence suggests the anxiety that surrounded the child body when it 
emerged from the space of the city. Michel Foucault has argued that reformative 
discipline constructs the subjectivity that it reforms by treating the corporeal as the 
immediate sign of a non-corporeal, truer self; he writes, in Discipline and Punish, the 
body “serves as an instrument or intermediary” which power interacts with only in order 
to “reach something other than the body itself” (11). The body which House 
administrators encounter, however, is a denaturalized one, formed by an artificial 
environment. That bodies are social objects is no revelation from a critical vantage, but 
the archives of the House show the official realization that the corporeal could be an 
unreliable witness to the intentions and inclinations of the children they imprisoned. As 
the House trained the body into compliance, its officials are forced to recognize their 
failure to scrutinize anything but the body itself. 
The disciplinary history of Ann McCollister, the fifth inmate to enter the House 
and one of its early failures, suggests the frustrated attempts at communicating with a 
                                                           
23 The organizational layout of these documents requires an unorthodox citation method. To preserve 
specificity, I have chosen to cite parenthetically first with the relevant case number and then, when 
relevant, with the date of the cited remark. 
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delinquent subject. Her biography prior to entering the House includes more criminal 
activity than the average entering child, but her involvement in petty theft and sex work 
was nothing out of the ordinary. Born in New York to an enlisted and subsequently 
absentee father and a working mother, Ann bounced between informal employments, 
roaming the streets, the Almshouse, and, after being taken up for theft, Bridewell prison. 
On January 5th of 1825, Ann was transferred from Bridewell into the House of Refuge. 
She was, at that point, twelve years old. Ann remained at the House until 1830, when she 
aged out of the program and was moved back into the Almshouse as a “hopeless subject.” 
In the interim, she escaped or attempted escape from the House continually, stole, injured 
a teacher with a knife, and was almost consistently defiant to attempts at rebuke. At last 
record, she had left the Almshouse, collected several other women who had been 
delinquents with her in the House, and, together with these House veterans, started her 
own brothel. In short, Ann was not reformed.  
The process of Ann’s non-reformation as it was recorded by Superintendents 
Joseph Curtis and N.C. Hart was a process of trying and failing to find a medium of 
communication. 24 Most pressingly, the records come as an attempt to make Ann’s body 
into the point of contact for her subjectivity, against her considerable resistance. The 
unusually lengthy first entry of the Superintedent’s remarks written twelve days after her 
entry to the house in the log portion of her profile, for example, offers a miniature drama 
                                                           
24 Curtis resigned as superintendent in 1826 and was succeeded by N.C. Hart (Doc. Rel. 100), who 
remained in the position until he stepped down for health reasons in 1837 (“Annual Report” 74). Because 
the two held converging attitudes regarding delinquency and to highlight the institutional nature of their 
narrative voice, I refer the author of a given entry by title rather than personal name. 
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of refusal on Ann’s part to be involved in the House’s discipline. The Superintendent 
describes the event: 
She is the most refractory of all the girls she appeared to treat the repeated 
admonitions with indifference, and as if to [illegible] whether she could 
receive any but pleasant words her conduct during most of the day 
bespoke a total indifference to all that was said to her; in private (before 
tea) she would not give the least appearance that she was disposed to do 
better, [I] found it necessary to chastise her as a child which she received 
with a display of stubbornness to me surprising though she must have 
suffered much yet after she was seated there was no appearance of a tear 
or any irregularity in breathing Her reply to my first question was as 
clearly spoken, as full of temper as before she was corrected, after a few 
moments reflection, I found myself considerably exhausted I then found it 
necessary to give her solitary confinement. She went to Prison at 6 o’clock 
PM with much firmness of manner Shortly after I carried her 3 Blankets 
and made her bed not a word was spoken. (Jan. 17, 1825) 
This interaction comes in three waves. The first is purely discursive. At stake are 
“repeated admonitions,” “pleasant words,” and Ann’s “total indifference to all that was 
said to her,” whether praise or criticism. Ann does reciprocate, though, in her meeting 
with the superintendent through her entirely clear and forthright refusal to change her 
behavior; she is honest about her intention to remain criminal. After talking fails, the 
superintendent turns from words to action – appealing to his authority over her body by 
“chastis[ing] her as a child,” a euphemism for corporal punishment that emphasizes the 
33 
 
body as a source of influence for subjects seen as underdeveloped in reason. Finally, the 
corporal punishment having failed to subdue Ann’s speech, all attempts at verbal 
communication are cut off (“not a word was spoken”), and the Superintendent reduces 
the demonstration of his authority to his control over her physical experience in its 
entirety by isolating her in prison; his personal delivery of blankets to her appears then as 
a performance of Ann’s material dependence on his good will.  
 I also want to pause, however, on the specific moment of failed corporal 
punishment in this anecdote and suggest that its ability to leave the Superintendent 
“considerably exhausted” – and thereby to turn the record’s scrutiny fleetingly back on it 
author – represents a crucial moment of disjuncture in the attempted socialization of Ann. 
As I have discussed, under Foucauldian models, the disciplined body acts as a means of 
inventing an inner self or soul, with materiality acting as the immanent medium on and 
through which power can operate. What the author encounters in Ann, though, seems to 
be a body that itself has not been socialized to respond to discipline. Though the 
Superintendent imagines from his experience of bodies that Ann “must have suffered 
much,” she shows none of the bodily signs that would have let him interpret her pain, for 
as he marvels, “there was no appearance of a tear or any irregularity in breathing.” 
Unsurprisingly, without Ann’s body as a point of contact, her posture towards the House, 
and her “temper” at the Superintendent, remain unchanged. Instead, it is the 
Superintendent who is left apparently shaken and in need, as he writes, of “a few 
moments reflection” by the paradox of corporal punishment’s effect on a subject whose 
physical body appears unruly. The regularity of Ann’s breath has itself become an 
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element of her moral deviance, not because it reflects any specific vice, but because it 
marks the Superintendent’s utter failure to engage anything other than the body. 
 The lessons that Ann learns in her time at the House and the height of her 
improvement lies, in fact, in constructing a wall between her intentions and her outward 
comportment. At her best, Ann’s profile presents her as having tricked her observers into 
optimism. Only two notes of more than two dozen show approval of Ann, one noting that 
she has “recently made profession of a religious nature which gave us much 
encouragement” (Sept. 31, 1825) and the other, more ambivalently, observes she “now 
and then evince[s] […] a disposition to do well” (August 1, 1828). The case history, 
however, describes both her religious awaking and more general wish to improve as 
diversions and false signs, which prove utterly useless in predicting Ann’s future 
behavior, as in each case, the entry that signals hope also includes its disappointment. Her 
religion is quickly submerged in “her strong propensity to evil” such “she again becomes 
ugly and troublesome,” and the entry that observes her occasional improvement in 
disposition declares that she would always “again break forth in wickedness” and 
comments, almost passingly, that her “last very bad act was in stealing the matron’s 
sweetmeats, and plotting to burn the female house.” Where, in most cases, arson plots 
alone are enough to justify an entry in the log (which is not to suggest that they were 
especially rare), for Ann, the case is extreme enough that they become merely anecdotal 
evidence of an incorrigibility that is much broader than any set of acts alone. After this 
latter entry, the record stops for two years, resuming only to recount the aftermath of 
Ann’s departure from the House, as if stymied entirely by her recalcitrance. In fact, 
Ann’s education lies entirely in this improved ability to perform a mode of sociability 
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that she does not feel, moving from an unrepentance that permeated speech, body, and 
putatively mind into an unrepentance that could be kept temporarily apart from her 
external behaviors and sheltered in a version of selfhood that not only remained 
unchangeable but had become thoroughly illegible.  
Perhaps an even more pointed example of the anxiety surrounding the unstable 
signification of child bodies comes in the profile of Samuel Slowly, who as admitted in 
1826 at the age of fourteen. Unlike Ann, Samuel was criminalized without his having 
committed criminal acts of any kind, entering the House solely because his father took 
Samuel to be committed to avoid supporting him.25 The first portion of his stay in the 
House is accordingly low profile. The first note made under “Remarks” records Samuel’s 
indenture away at little less than five months after his arrival, suggesting that he was 
found to be in no need of major reform. The profile takes a sharp turn, however, after it 
records Samuel’s escape from his indenture and his eventual recapture by police, because 
the Samuel who returns is markedly different than the one who had left. The 
Superintendent marvels at the scenes caused by Samuel’s arrival: 
His appearance was very excentric – his hair long – his movement much 
like a female &c. – He states that he left his Master Mr. Mappa in Girl’s 
clothing to avoid detection – served better than a year in the country in the 
capacity of a Girl – came to the City in the same habelement – some 
however judged that he was a Morphredite [sic] – and whenever he 
                                                           
25 This type of immurement for entirely financial reasons was technically against the original spirit of the 
institution, but was not especially unusual – for John A. Mead, for example, the Superintendent ponders, “I 
rather think this boy has been sent here in consequence of the poverty of his mother” (214; Dec. 2, 1826) – 
and by the 1838 Pennsylvania case, Ex parte Crouse, the right to treat children as delinquent for having 
parents guided inappropriate was legal precedent. 
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appeared in the Streets, let his apparel be what it might, he was mobbed by 
boys &c. so strong was the impression that he was neither male nor female 
by the remarks of the boys in the Yard – that means was taken to ascertain 
the fact, - when lo, he was a man – but had practiced to put on female airs 
in walk &c. – so much that he still in walk &. carries the appearance to 
this day [sic] (Inmate 138; April 5, 1831) 
Samuel returns to the House physically changed, but the Superintendent is hard-pressed 
to locate precise nature of the change. The most he can do is to list – “hair,” “movement,” 
“walk” – but his frequent refrain of the catchall “&c.” in this short paragraph suggests his 
difficulty in finding exactly what it is that signifies Samuel’s gender as female. Foiled by 
appearance, he turns to anatomy as the ultimate arbiter of identity, recasting the mob 
assaults of Samuel, which he also reports as incessantly repeated, into a singular moment 
of discovery building to a dramatic apostrophe, “lo, he was a man.” Of course, the 
physical conclusion itself was a foregone one. As a former inmate, Samuel’s anatomy 
would have almost certainly already been known to House officials. However, the 
insistence on returning to the body to settle what had already been an officially settled 
question, whether Samuel was to be treated as male or female, appears as an attempt to 
manage the fact that Samuel’s body has also learned to be female so thoroughly that, 
even after a seemingly definitive conclusion, the Superintendent circles back to the 
femininity that continues to mystify him.  
 Whether Samuel saw his assumed disguise as an opportunity to express a gender 
identity which had to be otherwise hidden or strictly as a role that he had be forced into 
situationally in order to avoid arrest is beside the point, because what is threatening about 
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the incident from the Superintendent’s vantage is the impossibility of resolving that 
question. Even the noun provided to name his gender indeterminacy, “Morphredite” (a 
colloquial variant on “morphodite,” itself a variant of “hermaphrodite”), is a hazy 
assignment of an already unstable signifier, rather than any stable pathology or a 
taxonomy. Etymologically, too, the label is apt. “Morphredite” sheds its ties to the 
classical namesake suggested by “hermaphrodite” and instead takes up a closer 
association to the Greek “-morph,” a suffix which would normally indicate a formal 
similarity to the thing named by the first portion of the word. Without this first element to 
anchor the suffix to a particular thing, however, “morphredite” signals the purely formal, 
suggesting the recognition that a structure or order exists, while giving no sign as to what 
that organizing principle might be. To mark Samuel as a morphredite, then, is to record a 
form of subjectivity which eludes other understanding; the Samuel of House records is 
coherent but not recognizable.     
 The Superintendent’s greatest frustration, though, comes not in spectacular 
failures like Ann’s recidivism or Samuel’s feminitiy, where there is at least a narrative to 
the failed reformation, but in those cases where he realizes his inability to describe at all. 
A persistent rhetoric emerges across the first five years of the House’s records in which, 
rather than characterizing the most difficult children, the Superintendent collapses into 
tautology. Entries declaring, often in full, that “John is John still” (385; Oct. 27, 1831), 
“Wesley is Wesley still” (454, June 11, 1828), and “Alfred is Alfred still” (323; Feb. 1, 
1828) are less description than they are abdication of description: when past entries 
struggle to set down just what John, Wesley, and Alfred were like, such notes add 
nothing but temporal duration to the portrait. Similarly, to move from a portrait of Sarah 
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Doxey that describes her as having “a curious combination in conduct and disposition” in 
that “sometimes she is as good a girl as can be wished” but “at other times she is 
disagreeable and stubborn and but little dependence can be placed upon her” (116; Jan. 
1828) into the plain declaration that “Sarah is about Sarah still” (116; Oct. 15, 1830) is an 
abbreviation, not a change in meaning, because the latter is the only reliable thing to be 
said about a girl who is sometimes one way and sometimes entirely different. Where 
external signs promised to be symbols of an inner self, these tautologies suggest a 
collapse of this relay. To be Sarah has a particular meaning, but the Superintendent has 
no insight into the content of that meaning beyond that particularity. Her behavior can be 
documented endlessly, but nothing like the portrait of private self can be gleaned from 
that data. As result, the Superintendent cannot have the slightest assurance that a 
moment’s good behavior is an internalized improvement rather than either a calculated 
ploy or just a fluke. Because the House cannot construct a knowable version of Sarah’s 
self, it certainly cannot hope to reform that self into a lawful citizen.   
As a result, the language of individual progress, that ideal bildungsroman of 
growth into conformity which would signal institutional success, instead lapses into 
stasis. Tautology, by definition, cannot develop into anything but itself, and bureaucracy 
takes on something very near despair as it struggles to manage such records like those for 
Peter McKeaman, a boy sent to the House in early 1828 at the age of ten for petty theft 
and vagrancy, for whom sequential entries read:  
March 31, 1831 – Peter is about Peter still 
October 27, 1831 – I hardly know what to say about Peter – he affords but 
little hope, – no confidence can be placed in his word, gets clear of all the 
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labour he can by dishonesty – restless in his disposition, forward in his 
manners – and on the whole we have to hold him with a curb bit as to 
government to keep him any way tolerable 
Sep. 10, 1833 – Peter is about Peter still 
 (400) 
The imposition of dates seeks to corral the profile into an appropriate temporality, 
dutifully insisting that two and a half years have elapsed, but the contents of those 
remarks suggest strongly that something other than the linear time of calendars is at 
work. Peter at sixteen is indistinguishable from Peter at thirteen, and Peter at thirteen 
equally seems alike to the eight-, nine-, and ten-year-old Peter said to have denied his 
“roguery so innocently” to the judge that he was twice let off from jail. Peter seems at 
once to be a set point in the history of the House, but also, to be a figure who defies any 
stable description; the Superintendent has “but little hope” for the future, while also 
“hardly know[ing] what to say” about the present. Peter cannot grow up because he 
cannot be known well enough for officials to notice a change, and severed from the 
potential for an eventual maturity, he loses his claim to childishness as well. 
Paradoxically, the categories of delinquency present him as a subject removed from age 
itself, stranded in a persistent exclusion.   
 
Trajectories of Incorrigible Lives   
If delinquency can have this freezing effect on individual development, eclipsing 
biological age for the civically-defined adulthood which delinquents were ineligible to 
mature into, the status of delinquency also threatens to expand beyond any discrete period 
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in a subject’s life. It is a preemptive dismissal of a life in its whole. In this light, the 
trouble which inmates like Peter and his associates represented to the House was not a 
problem of a few exceptionally “hard” cases, but rather the exposure of an underlying 
complication to disciplinary methods more generally, one which the cultural standing of 
childhood at the times brings into particular relief. In his comparatively neglected section 
on the importance of juvenile criminals in establishing institutional discipline as we know 
it, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish declares that “delinquency is the vengeance of the 
prison on justice,” arguing that the sudden ability to punish children as criminals without 
attaching criminal culpability to them allowed criminology more generally to broaden 
from crime as event to crime as pathology (255). While I thoroughly agree with this 
assessment, the conjunction of childhood and the penal system that appears in the 
antebellum U.S. has even broader consequences for thinking about the criminality 
assigned adults. In this section, I will suggest that, when read together, domestic 
manuals’ devotion to finding a baseline medium for socializing children and the House’s 
records of children who seem never to be brought into the social world of discipline 
reveals a different type of subjectivity assigned to this intractable deviance by institutions 
unable to characterize them otherwise: the incorrigible. A double-edged status of being 
undisciplinable and therefore turned over entirely to state power, incorrigibility allows us 
to see both how populations of children are differentiated into their adult roles and to 
understand the configuration of the child body more generally under state power as a 
potential obstacle to state surveillance.  
That is, the grounding assumption of the House’s disciplinary regime is that, by 
constant monitoring and correction of the body, the child’s character may be formed, 
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monitored, and corrected. As Foucault writes, that surveillance “invests bodies in depth,” 
so that the corporeal must be read as a symbol of the incorporeal (217). Delinquents such 
as Ann and Samuel, however, present bodies that explicitly need socialization before they 
can become intelligible to others and, in the process, learn to trick observers into thinking 
they have more insight than they do. Ann, whose body is displayed as horrifyingly 
unresponsive to violence when it fails to provide the tears and labored breathing that the 
Superintendent demands, must gradually learn to present a face of strategic remorse. 
Perhaps even more unsettlingly to the House’s taxonomies, the fugitive Samuel retrains 
his previously masculine posture into a feminine one as a disguise from surveillance. In 
other words, the putative correspondence between body and character, which had made it 
possible for the House to imagine reforming children by changing their environment and 
dictating their routines, became a tool for inmates to foil observation. The idea that one 
can act one way and feel another is hardly unique to delinquency, but to consider children 
simultaneously as having been born outside of social norms and as capable of this 
deception is to accept that there may never be full understanding of the children being 
raised. Even the best-behaved child threatens incorrigibility if behavior can be a ruse 
rather than a reflection of a stable, inner self. 
Delinquency discourse thus reproduces domestic manuals’ fears how corporeal 
punishment alienates rather than integrates the child. Beginning as it does from a position 
of alienation, however, it reaches a more extreme conclusion. That is to say, domestic 
manuals, whether they support or oppose corporal punishment, identify the consequences 
of focusing attention on the body as losing the chance to control interiority – a program 
which, thus far, is quintessentially Foucauldian. The difficulty which the House 
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encountered was that it found it had no stable handle on the body either. External 
observations fell terrifying flat in guessing inner desire. This illegibility of incorrigible 
delinquents gives the Superintendent’s records an air of paranoid reading, as they 
struggle to attach meaning to signs given by inmate behavior, while also doubting the 
reliability of those signs. Even good behavior could inspire doubt in an inmate’s profile.  
Where bad behavior is at least taken as a faithful reflection of the child’s-wishes, 
good behavior can equally signal reformation or manipulation. For instance, when the 
fifteen-year-old John Beekman was sent to prison for three days following an escape 
attempt, his promises to improve were read only as further symptoms of his depravity. 
The Superintendent records: “He is this evening taken out of Prison, he appears penitent, 
as could be expected; we think him capable of acting the Hypocrite to an uncommon 
extent, shall not restore him to full privileges at present” (9; April 30, 1825). By forcing 
John to submit to authority, the punishment would seem to have had exactly the desired 
effect, but as the Superintendent presents it, the effort was a failure. The promise offered 
by John’s penitence is reversed by the qualifier that it is only what “could be expected” 
and thereby reframes it as a confirmation of his skills in “acting the Hypocrite.” This 
socialization into acceptable behavior is as much a liability as it is progress, because that 
it is shown transparently as a product of force. John’s penitence is to be “expected” from 
his circumstances and therefore is discredited as evidence of personal inclination. 
Delinquent motivation is thus caught in a curious bind. Though it must be legible to the 
Superintendent for him to trust it as a stable sign of character, for it to be too legible as 
stemming from convenience, necessity, or coercion risks leaving the child’s projected 
truer desires more inaccessible to the House than ever.     
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This sense of inaccessibility breeds in turn a feeling that incorrigible delinquents 
are entirely unpredictable in their actions. If good behavior might be calculated to 
deceive, then past action is no sign of the future. Thus, the Superintendent often returns to 
his fears that inmates who reform, do so only when an authority is watching. Of James 
Bennett, for instance, he writes that “perhaps we never had a much more hopeless case 
but by preserving with strict discipline of every variety, that appeared rational for several 
months, he begins to be afraid, however of nothing but punishment” (442; May 17, 
1828). Charles Wright, too, an inmate repeatedly beaten for trying to climb over the 
House walls, is damningly set down for good behavior so strategic that it cannot be 
believed, for, as the Superintendent frets, “the whole of his conduct appears to be 
governed by policy” (69; April, 16, 1826). The improvement in Charles’ behavior is no 
sign of an increased willingness to follow House rules, for the Superintendent speculates 
that in fact “he has never lost sight of his former propensity for escaping” (69; April, 16, 
1826). The practical effect of guarding subjects like Charles and James who were 
“governed by policy” or “afraid […] of nothing but punishment” is to mandate keeping 
those policy and punishment constantly present, so that the like-reformed behavior, 
however insincere, also remains present. Hypersurveillance is the only response to a 
prisoner who always needs watching. The apparent common sense of this policy, 
however, stems from incorrigibility’s particular production of an unknowable subject, by 
failing to provide a deeper self for the House to monitor, incorrigible delinquents are 
excluded from the more common narrative of internalizing and reproducing an external 
force and remain instead in the stage of needing a constant monitor. 
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If incorrigibility sounds like a frustration of power on any level higher than the 
personal temper of the Superintendent, its longer term effects suggest that any temporary 
victory came at a high price. Most obviously, they tended to be incarcerated at the House 
for far longer, because official had no legal recourse for expelling unredeemable inmates. 
They were allowed to send inmates deemed physically unable to work away to the Alms 
House, and there are hints that the House used this outlet to expel at least a few 
troublesome children.26 Given the number of successful escapes from indenture, as well, 
it is tempting to suspect that some of the runaway apprentices were pursued were harder 
than others. In general, though without set sentences, inmates had to be held until they 
were no longer delinquent, whether because they had reformed enough to be indentured 
or because they had aged out of the category. When they did leave, the category of 
incorrigibility channeled inmates’ lives along tracts which were deeply gendered but 
joined by their marginal statuses and their persistent vulnerability to the type of absolute 
power represented by the House. 
Men had the most defined path for leaving the House. The labeling of male 
inmates as incorrigible may have kept them from entering many of the more skilled 
professions, but as a group believed to need constant force, they were primed to entered 
into the whaling industry’s a system of coerced labor. Whaling became a place of last 
resort to warehouse delinquent boys who were held to be unfit for other professions. A 
sampling of these dismissals gives a sense how common and how unvaryingly boys were 
                                                           
26 I refer here chiefly to the suggestive case of James Dillon, a boy whose record consists of two remarks. 
The first, made two months after his entrance to the House, declares that him “the most extraordinary we 
have yet to deal with” and “in every respect disobedient and disrespectful,” despite multiple beatings, so 
that he was eventually sent to the main prison to subdue him (55; June 16, 1825). After an unusually long 
period of two and half years without any documentation, the silence is broken by an abrupt declaration that 
James is “an unfit subject” due to “Epileptic fits” and has been sent off to the Alms House. 
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written off from the House as well as from freedoms which life on land more generally 
provided: 
 Isaac is an unstable and wickedly disposed Boy and I think will never do 
for anything out of the House but a Whaling Voyage (136; January 1828) 
 
 He’s a smart boy, but deep – little can be said as to his state of mind, we 
fear that he will not stay anywhere, except on board a 3 year voyage (416; 
April 24, 1829) 
 
 In the Boy there is nothing special he is rather inclined to vagrancy than 
otherwise. We hope that the advantage of a good long voyage will help 
him (35; March 14, 1825) 
 
We fear James will ruin himself. Nothing more can be done for him if 
returned, except sending him a [sic] Whaling voyage (78; December 12, 
1828) 
 
Edward became unmanageable by his Master, who in consequence sent 
him a whaling voyage (80; December 12, 1828) 
 
The most popular destination for troublesome male inmates, whaling in many ways 
offered a close approximation of House conditions for incorrigible subjects believed 
never to have matured into a larger scope of freedom.27 With open ocean substituting for 
the walls of the House, shipboard indentures prevented the escapes frequent in the 
countryside, while the beatings that had forced submission from inmates continued as 
floggings onboard. The concordance, however, reads in both ways. The whaling industry 
suited the beliefs of House officials that incorrigible delinquents could not be self-
controlled agents, but the House’s production of a set of young men eligible for unfree 
labor also fueled whaling with a body of men that it could justify coercing into work. 
                                                           
27 House officials were also quite canny about the institutional benefits of disposing of the most difficult 
inmates, as the Superintendent records expressing, when a mother complained about her son’s indenture at 
sea: “I told her that after a two years trial we were unable to qualify him for anything except the Floridas or 
Navy – and that the managers had no idea of keeping hopeless boys, they must make room for more 
hopeful cases, etc. (454; October 21, 1829).  
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Whipping a negligent sailor might have been seen at best as unfortunate necessity, but 
whipping an incorrigible delinquent into productive citizenship was public service – an 
early and casual privatization of penal reform enabled by incorrigibility’s pathologies. 
For incorrigible girls, adulthood held still fewer options. Without a profession available 
to women that held equivalent recourse to the bare force and strictures as whaling, they 
were largely left to struggle haphazardly to find a place outside the House. The records of 
women who left unreformed thus are slipshod and patchy. The assumed fate for those 
who did age out was that, one way or another, they would eventually end up in 
institutions that were the adult equivalent of the House. Hence one inmate, Sally Ann 
Kingsland, is sent off with the note that “We fear the Refuge has done her no good – and 
that she will fetch up at Bridewell or the penitentiary [sic]” (45; April 8, 1825). Many 
women did end in with a last record in an institution, but many more slipped out of the 
archive altogether. Euphemisms such as having “returned to her former habits” or being 
“back on the Town” obscure the precise fate of women who might be surviving off 
hidden economies such as sex work and theft or be engaged in an illicit relationship or 
more generally be living in a way not legible to the Superintendent. Precise fates seemed 
to matter less when subjects neither qualified for legal positions in the market nor fell 
back into the reach of record-keeping institutions.  For women, then, the legacy of 
incorrigibility was the permission for official legers to leave their lives in disapproving 
silence, under the assurance that they were incapable of more productive lives and 
undeserving of happier ones. 
The final blow of incorrigibility is thus to isolate those lives it has touched and cut 
them out of history. The judgment that person a person was fundamentally sealed off 
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from the other lives around them was also a judgment that to be incorrigible was to be 
external, exceptional, and forgettable as minor flukes of a system that bears no 
responsibility for their condition. This erasing is already at play in the same archives 
dedicated to amassing delinquent histories. Even a cursory reading of House records can 
feel like an exercise in superlatives: each bad case contends to be the worst, wickedest, 
and most hopeless case that the House has ever had the misfortune of seeing. Where this 
hyperbole at first individuates its objects by making them at least remarkable in their 
shortcomings, by the fourth, fifth, or tenth extreme, these worsts of the worst begin to 
blur together. The rhetoric of each individual profile argues that that the case is too 
unusual to represent any larger whole, but the repetition of singularities builds its own 
collective of children raised to be left out. 
 
Coda: Incorrigible Afterlives 
In 1925, Sigmund Freud wrote a brief foreword to a colleague’s book, Verwahrloste 
Jugend (Wayward Youth), by August Aichorn. The choice of Freud to write an 
introduction seems as though it should have been a natural fit: Aichorn’s text consisted of 
a series of case histories of delinquent youths in Vienna, detailing in classical 
psychoanalytic terms the drives behind acts of deviance and advising how these drives 
could be redirected in appropriately social ways. Yet, within a space of his three-page 
preface, Freud falters as he tries to lay out the relationship between psychoanalysis as he 
understood it and the analysis of troubled children. “The child,” he writes, “has become 
and the main object of psychoanalytic research,” supplanting even its original object, the 
“neurotic” because “analysis has revealed that the child lives on almost unchanged in the 
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sick patient” (v). Thus the child, even as it supplants, is subsumed and remade into a 
diagnostic tool for the neurotic, worth understanding as the reference point for a neurotic 
patient’s development that, by evidence of a deviant adulthood, must have gone awry. 
Childhood is important because it produces the symptoms of adulthood, and thus as the 
chief tool for analysis, becomes more important than even those symptoms themselves as 
the way to understand neurosis.  
 This positioning, however, cannot stand entirely unchallenged as the introduction 
for a text about children who display deviant symptoms in their own right, and Freud 
seems ill at ease in characterizing these patients who seem to be precocious in their 
neuroses. Already a surprisingly brief introduction for a lengthy monograph, Freud 
strikes a tone stranded between self-deprecation and dismissal as he distinguishes the 
“healing” process of analysis and the “education” of child analysis and then distances 
himself from the latter, explaining that he has only on a “slight” role in this new child-
centered model. Yet the relationship between adult and child subject shifts again, as 
Freud attempts to distinguish his work in treatment – as he calls it, re-education – from 
the pedagogical work that he introduced: 
The child, even the wayward and delinquent child, should not be 
compared to the adult neurotic, and re-education is something quite 
different from the education of the immature. The possibility of exerting 
influence through psychoanalysis depends on quite definite conditions, 
which may be described as the “analytic situation”; it requires the 
formation of certain psychic structures and a special attitude towards the 
analyst. When these factors are lacking, as in the case of children and 
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young delinquents and, as a rule, in criminals dominated by their instincts, 
the psychoanalytic method must be adapted to meet the need. (vii) 
While the neurotic as victim of delayed development may be usefully compared to the 
child, the child must not be compared with the neurotic because their development is too 
early even to be delayed. The psyche to be analyzed, those “certain psychic structures” 
which separate the child from the child-like neurotic, does not yet exist fully enough to be 
treated. As Freud seems to understand childhood, even in the case of delinquency, the 
problem takes the form of a dearth to be filled, a need for education install those 
apparatuses which would then allow the analyst to confront a recognizable subject.28 
Freud thus turns to an alternative pairing, that of the child and the criminal, through the 
idea that both are unformed interiorities who must be educated into have “psychic 
structures,” before they can be disciplined into psychological normalcy.  
 This leap from one form of asociality to another, as Freud likens the child too 
underdeveloped for therapy with the equally unresponsive criminal, hints at the ways that 
incorrigibility and its offshoots are coded into the models still in use for imagining the 
psyche. Just as the linking term of “young delinquents” emerges in Freud’s passage to 
bridge between the categories of child and criminal while existing in an unsteady 
combination of contrast and overlap with each of those two, incorrigibility provides a 
language of alienation to describe criminality through unlikely analogy with the child. 
Childhood deviance provides evidence of adult individuality, registering interiority as an 
accumulation of memory and private development. The possibility of delay or rerouting 
                                                           
28  Worth noting, too, is that nothing more is said about how psychoanalysis might be “adapted to meet the 
need” of these unsuitable objects of analysis, except in the form of general education. 
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in child development promises a tool for observing, understanding, and normalizing 
adults behaving outside of social constraints. The delinquents themselves remain 
inscrutable; absent the socialization into psychoanalytic constructs, they have no inner 
landscape that Freud can recognize. Freud’s inclusion of the criminal “dominated by […] 
instincts” further underscores that the delinquents of Aichorn’s study are largely 
ineligible to grow into the neurotics of his work. The unspoken factors of race and class 
that leave children more likely to be labeled delinquent can therefore disqualify them 
from the very concept of a psychoanalytic adult self. 
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Prodigious Pip: Black Infancy and the Medical Construction of Racial Kinship 
 
I have heard,” murmured Starbuck, gazing down the scuttle, “that in violent fevers, men, 
all ignorance, have talked in ancient tongues; and that when the mystery is probed, it 
turns out always that in their wholly forgotten childhood those ancient tongues had been 
really spoken in their hearing by some lofty scholars. So, to my fond faith, poor Pip, in 
this strange sweetness of his lunacy, brings heavenly vouchers of all our heavenly homes. 
Where learned he that, but there?  
Moby-Dick (1851), p. 463 
 
Among the many strange metaphors of Moby-Dick, the particular strangeness of 
Starbuck’s comparison of Pip, after he has been abandoned for hours on the open ocean, 
to a fever patient hardly registers. The basic meaning of the image is familiar to readers 
of Herman Melville: the sublime manifests itself in the contrast between infinite 
knowledge and its emergence in the singular and socially abject Pip. What threatens to be 
lost in this reading is the function of the medical and, more particularly, its mediation of 
childhood and history. Starbuck may be justifying his faith in eternity, but he does so 
through diagnosis. From his perspective, the “lunacy” of Pip’s speech is as pathological a 
condition as a fever, regardless of how lucid or discerning he is in this purported 
madness. It is pathological, in fact, precisely insofar as Pip is discerning. Much as the 
fever transforms men into unconscious containers of languages that they cannot know, 
Pip’s wisdom proves to Starbuck that Pip must not understand what he says. Starbuck 
thus transforms the ocean’s partial destruction of Pip, as it “jeering kept his finite body 
up, but drowned the infinite of his soul” into a hermeneutic practice (401). Defining Pip 
by his physical body – its illness and vulnerabilities – Starbuck reads his words as 
symptoms of Pip’s materiality, rather than signs that Pip has a transcendence of his own, 
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excluding him from the symbolic weight of his speech. His words may carry futurity in 
their promise of “heavenly homes,” but Pip himself remains trapped by the flesh.  
This mixture of racialized medicine and social unmooring in the discussion 
surrounding Pip may seem like esoteric choice on Melville’s part. However, I argue that 
this figuration is instead part of a persistent association of black infancy in the antebellum 
U.S. with medical abnormality and genealogical unpredictability. Medicalizing black 
infancy became a means by which white supremacy sought to present black subjects in 
the United States as collectively being an anomaly, at once unanticipated and 
unrepresentative, and so exclude them from the continuities of national population. In my 
analysis, inheritance, or rather the exclusion from inheritance, thus takes two primary 
meanings. First, in the days of early race science and shortly before the rise of genetic 
theory, the burgeoning science of inheritance sought to define how traits were passed 
from parent to child and to create racial boundaries based on these heritable traits. 
However, inheritance also has a less clinical role in historical imagination, determining 
who holds an ongoing relationship with which aspect of the past or, in other words, who 
can claim what history. Through this intersection, medical discourse can help us 
understand how literature defined the black child’s relationship to both private family and 
public history. Namely, by pathologizing black infancy as a case in which the lines of 
inheritance break down, medical discourse and the literatures that adopted its ideas works 
to distance African American subjects from national history.  
Starbuck’s confusion about Pip’s relationship to past and future alike echoes 
throughout Moby-Dick, reflecting the larger dislocation of a character who has neither a 
certain age, nor origin. For Melville, the terms of biological childhood and social 
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infantilization are identical, and though it is Pip is repeatedly called small, dubbed “Black 
Little Pip” (115) and “poor little Pip” (511), Melville gives him more pathos than definite 
standing as adult or child. Likewise, his being called “boy” relentlessly throughout the 
novel could as easily signal the racist address of a grown man or the status given workers 
low on the ship’s hierarchy. As Melville writes in Redburn (1849), “boy” is also a class 
demarcation onboard a ship: “You must not think […] that persons called boys aboard 
merchant-ships are all youngsters [….] In merchant-ships, a boy means a green-hand, a 
landsman on his first voyage. And never mind if he is old enough to be a grandfather, he 
is still called a boy; and boys’ work is put upon him” (111). Because it has been so 
implicated as a language of power to demarcate who should and should not be accorded 
authority, age cannot be isolated to any simple biological or chronological absolute. His 
personal history is similarly muddled. As an “Alabama boy” (115) from Connecticut 
(420), Pip defies any simple categorization as enslaved, free, or fugitive, but he also 
troubles the conventions of backstory; Pip presumably had a life before he boarded the 
Pequod, but not one that we are allowed to see. 
 Pip, in other words, has an uncanny relationship to historical genealogy, one that I 
term prodigious. In its common contemporary meaning, only one aspect of prodigy’s 
definition has truly survived, the idea of a child who is precocious beyond her years. In 
the antebellum period, however, the word indexes a deeper history of collision between 
science and religion, as the term that had once meant miracle moved into medical 
journals to name the unpredictable form and behavior of unruly bodies and to call for 
their great scrutiny from the medical profession. The kernel of religious wonder at the 
root of prodigy, in other words, became a way of naming something that seemed to fall 
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outside of scientific explanation and therefore to urge the need for closer scrutiny by 
medicine. As such, the prodigy was used to name the body whose difference emerges 
from outside of medicine’s understanding of causality, and therefore seemingly from 
nowhere. The prodigy names the moment created where science looks from child back to 
parent and recognizes no link, or when science examines the child and cannot recognize 
the possibility of a parent. It is, in part, the stripping of kinship that Hortense Spillers 
describes when the medical solicitation for black bodies denies the subjectivity within 
and kinship between these bodies, rendering, as she writes, “the entire captive community 
[…] a living laboratory” for dissection (68). But more particularly, it is the child left as an 
apparently spontaneous life, after the genealogy that created her had been erased, 
illegitimated, and ignored.  
 When analyzing antebellum Black childhood, scholars most often frame their 
analysis through the figure of the picaninny, the pejorative term most popular in white 
descriptions of children with African or indigenous ancestry. The two figures certainly 
have overlap. However, studying their cultural presence brings a different set of questions 
into view. In my reading, the picaninny represents the inverse double of the prodigy, 
framing black childhood as a site of utter fungibility, as disconnected from the past as the 
prodigy is but focused on a belief in the exchangeability of black children in the present. 
As Jayna Brown shows, the word itself encodes the economics of slavery into black 
childhood: 
The term picaninny comes from picayune, a coin of small value 
circulating in the United States during the 1800s. The derivation of the 
term picaninny signals the interchangeability between the black child 
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bodies and the small bits of money required for their acquisition. Not 
always purchased but often “made” on the plantation, they embodied the 
very public marketplace politics of sexualized subjection at the heart of 
the domestic sphere. Slave children were living currency. (24) 
To frame a child as a picaninny, then, is not merely to dehumanize her, but also to 
homogenize her value as one commodity among a pool of many.  As Brown notes, this 
lateral mobility also encodes an alienation in temporality similar to the prodigy’s, citing 
Topsy’s famous declaration in Uncle Tom’s Cabin that she’d had no parents but had 
“grow’d” as a sign of her displacement in time (86). As she notes, too, the Pequod’s 
demands that Pip dance and play music for them suggests the minstrel performances 
demanded from the “picaninny” stage tropes on tour at the time (27). 
 Nonetheless, the physical manifestation of the prodigy is quite different and as a 
result brings to the fore a white supremacy focused on seclusion rather than equivalence. 
To return one final time to Uncle Tom’s Cabin for an example, on his first introduction, 
Eliza’s son Harry is made to perform in the role of picaninny, singing and doing a series 
of imitations, while his owner addresses him by the name “Jim Crow.” At the heart of the 
performance is the frenetic mobility of Harry’s body, which allows him to match his song 
with “many comic evolutions of the hands, feet, and whole body” and enables his parody 
of old age with a transformation of “the flexible limbs of the child” into an “appearance 
deformity and distortion” (3). The ease with which Harry’s body shifts from one role to 
another upon command hints at the more literal ways in which he cannot possess his own 
body and harkens back to the liquidity of a body circulating on the market which Brown 
observes. Unlike the fungible picaninny, the prodigy represents a break in the chain of 
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social equivalence between subjects that also redefines the prodigy’s relationship with 
temporality. As many scholars of queer theory have demonstrated, white childhood has 
been a tool for ordering the temporality of social life around projected future 
generations.29 Much as this projection imbues white children was an almost sacred value, 
the affiliation of childhood with futurity also rests in the reading of the child as a 
transparent symbol of the citizen to come, rather than as a subject who is already 
immediate in the present. The infant’s material dependency must transform into a 
symbolic promise that of an adult future. The prodigy, on the other hand, particularly as it 
emerges from medical discourse, is stuck in an all too recalcitrant body and, through this 
language of freakishness, estranged from community with others and any sense of 
continuity with his or her history. 
 To track the use of prodigious childhood as a means of denying black futurity, I 
turn first to medical discourses presenting black childhood as a site of aberrant bodies and 
disrupted genealogy. These increasingly technical discourses surrounding infancy seize 
on the body of the black child as a spectacle of frighteningly unpredictable inheritance, 
which threatens to overwrite categories of whiteness. From this broader survey of 
medical journals, I consider two texts that exist in both the literary and medical spheres: 
Sir Jonah Barrington’s “Skinning a Black Child” (1827) and Henry Clay Lewis’s 
“Stealing a Baby” (1843). As these authors draw from medical discourse and ideas to 
construct their fictional worlds, they provide a clear fossil record of the prodigy’s 
                                                           
29 Jack Halberstam, for instance, enumerates a reproductive time that dictates a proper age by which an 
adult should marry, a family time that centers on perceived needs of children for stable scheduling, and a 
time of inheritance that tracks the slower drift of property and culture between generations (5). For 
Elizabeth Freeman, this generational logic allows for the equation of family futurity with national and 
racial teleologies, using individual births to suture public and private temporalities. See also Lee Edelman 
for a focus on child futurity. 
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transformation into a literary figure and its role in the narration of racial kinship. As I 
argue, the prodigy offered a way to capture and contain challenges to white paternity by 
exiling blackness outside of genealogy.  
 By contrast, I then turn to a neglected work of African American biography, 
Susan Paul’s The Memoir of James Jackson, the Attentive and Obedient Scholar, Who 
Died in Boston, October 31, 1833, Aged Six Years and Eleven Months, arguing that this 
early portrait of black childhood as a positive experience draws on the elements of the 
prodigy in order to challenge that erasure of prodigy but also to expand recognition of 
kinship beyond the nuclear family (183). An attempt to rewrite the figure of the black 
child denied futurity as a hagiography, The Memoir of James Jackson transforms the 
atemporality of blackness into a saintly transcendence. Paul’s portrait of her brilliant and 
doomed pupil thus acts as a means of harnessing black prodigy into a form of practical 
utopianism, in which James’ early potential and untimely death unify readers in a call for 
their own self-perfection. This little-read narrative, labeled by its editor Lois Brown, as 
the first biography by an African American author and likely the first non-fiction 
biography of an African American child, also challenges the most basic conventions of 
sentimental child death (1). By redefining the child martyr as a black boy, Paul 
transforms the exclusion of the prodigy from history into a transcendent overcoming of 
history that eschews linear genealogy for a network of communal pedagogy and care. 
 Finally, in my conclusion, I return to Pip to show how reframing him as one 
among a company of comparable prodigies reveals a network of intersecting models of 
racial kinship already present in Moby Dick. While the isolating logic of the prodigy 
pushes us to see Pip as a singular, exceptional figure, the fuller reading of the figure’s 
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history allows us to see him as a part of a larger system in which children of color are 
made exceptional in order to exclude them. Recognizing this pattern allows us to see not 
only the cancelation of black kinship, but also how dependent antebellum understandings 
of white kinship were upon that cancelation. Namely, that the cultural work of prodigy 
provides the necessary backdrop for white genealogy to take shape at all. 
 
Medical literature and the elaboration of the prodigy 
In 1808, more than a dozen physicians were summoned to a New York court to give their 
expert testimony on the race of an eighteen-month-old girl. The case at hand was a 
paternity suit brought against Alexander Whistelo, a black coachman in the city, by the 
municipal almshouse housing the child and her mother, Lucy Williams, a woman who 
described herself as the daughter of a “Scotchman” and a “black sambo”30 (Wheeler 200). 
Williams had identified Whistelo as the father because, as she testified, he had kept her 
prisoner and repeatedly raped her in the time leading up to the pregnancy. Whistelo, in 
turn, claimed that a white man who had broken into his home and had also assaulted 
Williams was the father, while Williams maintained that she had successfully fought off 
her white attacker before he could rape her (195-8).31 The role of this panel of medical 
experts, then, was to determine whether her daughter, a child with phenotypically white 
features, could have been fathered by a black man.  
                                                           
30 Later in the case, a witness would define “sambo” as the racial category for person who is half “black” 
and half “mulatto,” though it is not certain that this is the sense in which Williams used the term (Wheeler 
364). 
31 In an extra complication to the case, as D. Graham Burnett notes, one of the testifying experts was a 
biologist who also employed Whistelo and was rumored, at least in part by the defense lawyer, to be the 
absent white father in question (87).  
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 Medical expertise, however, could arrive at no consensus. The majority of the 
physicians agreed the child’s appearance appeared too white for her to have a black 
father. A few, however, were not so sure. Most notably, a witness for the almshouse 
introduced as Dr. Mitchill argued – in testimony ranging from albinism to vitiligo to his 
past treatment of a woman so startled during pregnancy by the butchering of a favorite 
cow that it purportedly reshaped her child’s feet into hoofs – that parentage did not have 
such a stable effect on racial presentation. The immediate reason for the difference of 
opinion was that Mitchell drew his conclusion from a much broader mixture of sources 
than the other physicians testifying, including three case studies from contemporary 
medical journals, references to Buffon’s natural history, a personal anecdote, an appeal to 
the incidents portrayed in Scottish poetry, and a story told by the early modern 
philosopher Nicholas Malebranche. In response, Whistelo’s lawyer sarcastically cross-
examined him on the scientific theories of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and Pliny, 
suggesting that Mitchill’s brand of medicine should be dismissed outdated and irrelevant 
(211-212).  
In other words, the crux of the case rested simultaneously on the definition of 
racial heritability and on the consolidation of medicine as an expert discourse. This 
confrontation between the exceptional case and more everyday medical experience is best 
defined by another witness, Dr. Williamson who argued that “if this was the child of that 
woman [Williams] by that man [Whistelo], it is a prodigy; and he did not believe 
prodigies happened, though daily experience unfortunately proved that perjuries did” 
(202). Drawing on older definitions of prodigy as a religiously tinged wonder, 
Williamson’s quip, which was repeated in the defense’s closing statement, outlines a 
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boundary to the data that is intelligible to science. To understand the child in question as 
being the phenotypically white daughter of a black man would make her appearance 
unexplainable by modern medicine and therefore place her outside of medical experience. 
Unable to reconcile William’s account of her pregnancy with his understanding of 
science, Williamson discounts the former. Thus, in contrast to Mitchill’s openness to 
consider reports of nearly any genre, his testimony evokes and then banishes the older 
scientific tradition of marvels and hearsay.  
Williamson’s point-of-view proved to be the more persuasive. The judge 
eventually found in favor of Whistelo, and Williamson’s sense of a more carefully 
controlled set of scientific data matched the larger trends of the medical field as the 
century progress.32 Yet, if the prodigy represented cases too extreme, unexplainable, or 
arcane to be treated as medicine, that term would have a surprisingly resilient life in 
antebellum discourse. Of course, during the period, prodigy encompassed several 
meanings. The new centrality of childhood to popular culture helped to put its modern 
suggestion of young genius into heavy circulation, as part of the discussion around the 
“natural” potential and limits of youth. Prodigiousness, too, often circulated with a 
somewhat flattened meaning to indicate quantity or size. However, when the Boston 
Medical and Surgical Journal describes the conjoined twins Chang and Eng Bunker as 
“prodigies” in 1829 (“The Siamese Brothers”) or comments on the “prodigious muscular 
                                                           
32 For instance, in an 1825 manual on the presentation and analysis of medical evidence by Scottish surgeon 
and editor of the London Medical Repository James Gordon Smith, Mitchill’s testimony is mocked with the 
note that “Surely, American judicature, outré as we are taught to believe it, could not allow this to as 
evidence [emphasis in original]” (365). Williamson’s comments on prodigies and perjuries, on the other 
hand, are applauded as doing “great honor” to its speaker and as being an exemplar of “forensic wit” (363). 
61 
 
power” of J.A.J. Bihin, who was known as “The Belgian Giant” in his act for P.T. 
Barnum, the word points in a different direction (“The Belgian Giant).  
  What I want to suggest is that Williamson’s choice of “prodigy” as the term for 
those with bodies outside of medical understanding would nonetheless remain a part of 
the vocabulary of medical discourse, coming to describe subjects who were made into 
medical spectacles because they did not fit medicine’s narratives of embodiment. This 
use of the term has long-standing relationship with Disability Studies more broadly. The 
Bunker twins, for instance, have been the subject of a recent increase in scholarly interest 
in racialized disability, and the label of “prodigy” is itself has also been discussed in 
specifically DS works.33 I want to pursue, however, is a narrow focus on the way that 
prodigy captures a particularly raced frame into which black bodies, particularly those of 
infants, were placed by the medical gaze.  Returning to the more specific context of Lucy 
Williams, a child scrutinized by a dozen doctors to determine whether she had three black 
grandparents or only one, emphasizes how medical discourse turned to blackness to 
construct their theories of heritability.  
The focus on black infancy as a limit case for the inheritance of parental traits 
stems in large parts from the continued influence of Enlightenment authors on antebellum 
medicine. A passage republished repeatedly in the antebellum US from Georges-Louis 
Leclerc, Compte de Buffon’s Natural History, for instance, lingers on the cases of albino 
children born to black African as a potential threat to theories of innate, heritable 
blackness, only to dismiss these children as “accidental” and “barren” flukes not 
                                                           
33 See, among others, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s “Staring at the Other,” Disability Studies Quarterly 
(2005) or Joseph M. Straus’s Extraordinary Measures: Disability in Music (2011). 
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reflective of race broadly (178-180).34 Similarly, Immanuel Kant’s “On the Different 
Races of Man” (1775) uses the heritability of blackness to children in order to define the 
concept of race, arguing that the children of one white and one black parent are 
“necessarily hybrid, or blendlings,” rather than proper continuations of either parent’s 
genealogy (qtd in Eze 40). Unlike the case of the child of a blond and a brunette parent, 
in which the infant might have the physical traits of either one of her parents, the child of 
a black and a white parent would, Kant contends, resemble neither parent. In these 
ventures into scientific inheritance, the infant born black became a key sign of congenital 
difference, promising through the evidence of complexion to be an empirical metric for 
the relationship between parent and child as well as for racial categorization. In other 
words, because blackness was seen as a hypervisual and distinctly bounded trait, it 
became one of the key phenotypes used represent both racial and familial inheritance.  
 In this pursuit for a scientific measure of race, however, the black infant was also 
significant not as a symbol of racial stability, but as a point of apparent systemic 
breakdown. Specifically, much as these early iterations of racial science were drawn to 
discussing black infants as signs of intrinsic difference, they were also faced with what 
must have seemed to them as the uncomfortable fact that, like white infants, black infants 
may be born with a range of complexions, including the same complexion as a newborn 
white infant. As a 1797 translation of Buffon explains, the “children [of African descent] 
are born white, or rather red, like those of other men. But two or three days after birth 
                                                           
34 Alongside a number of British editions, versions of this passage were published in Boston in 1831 as part 
of A Natural History of the Globe, in Brattleboro MA in 1834 as part of A System of Natural History, and in 
New York in 1857 as part of Buffon’s Natural History of Man, the Globe and Quadrupeds. I cite from the 
earliest of these three. Kant’s work was frequently printed in the US; however, his work was discussed in 
periodicals of the time, including Littell’s Living Age and The Biblical Repository and Princeton Review.  
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their color changes to a yellowish tawny, which grows gradually darker till the seventh or 
eighth day, when they are totally black” (Barr’s Buffon 345). Similarly, an 1865 English 
translation of Blumenbach’s anthropological treatise declared that infants were born all 
with the same complexion and that it is only “in progress of time [that] the skin of 
Ethiopian infants turns to black” (108). For some, including Blumenbach, this shift in 
skin tone was evidence that whiteness and blackness were environmental effects only 
gradually inscribed on the body, but for others, particularly as environmental theories of 
race declined, the existence of light-skinned African children remained an unexplained 
oddity – Kant’s Physical Geography, for instance, lists it as one of several “curiosities” 
of blackness (qtd. in Eze 60) – paralleling the figure of the “albino negro” as a limit case 
for complexion’s ability to function as the marker of race. 
 The confusion, and sometimes consternation, surrounding the apparent paradox of 
the black infant who is not yet black, however, lasted far beyond Enlightenment science, 
lingering in white medical discourse produced throughout the nineteenth century. As late 
as 1898, the New York-based Medical News ran a column declaring its total ignorance 
about the color of the black newborn. The impetus of the column was an international 
debate on the subject; the Medical News piece mocks the London-based Lancet for its 
uncertainty about a French doctor’s claim that “negro babies up to the age of seven days 
are similar in every respect to white babies” and ridicules for the Lancet’s call for 
physicians in South Africa to settle the question. The columnist suggests that American 
doctors might be able to answer the question more conveniently, but strangely, the 
American doctors whom it cites are equally contradictory: “an Alabama medical man 
says negro babies are black from the beginning, a Missourian says they are sallow or 
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creamy-white” (766). While taunting the importance of the question, the Medical News is 
itself absurdly unable to answer it, concluding with a general call to readers “with a 
newly-born picaninny or two on hand” to write back with an answer. That is, if the 
sarcasm of the author seems directed at English doctors’ ignorance regarding something 
commonplace for Americans, the piece illustrates a more pointed ignorance on the part of 
U.S. doctors. The variability of infant complexion that was well-known a hundred years 
earlier, if an exaggerated or distorted form, and still directly encountered by 
contemporary doctors on a regular basis has by the point of this publication been so 
erased from official knowledge that to ask the question itself appears as a joke. 
 Before this officially sanctioned ignorance of the late-nineteenth century, 
antebellum medical discourse more readily discussed the obstacle that a newborn’s 
complexion offered to the racialization of infancy. New Orleans physician and race 
scientist, Samuel Cartwright’s 1857 essay “Natural History of the Prognathous Species,” 
contends that races constitute different species in a genus of humanity, going so far as to 
assert a fundamental difference in the number of skeletal plates in the skulls of white and 
black infants. 35 Absolute as Cartwright attempts to make this divide, he stumbles over 
what he terms “one remarkable particular,” the question of infant complexion: the 
children of white and black parents “are both born white, and so much alike as far as 
color is concerned, as scarcely to be distinguished from each other [emphasis in 
original]” (708). Cartwright quickly promises that, however white at birth, the child of 
                                                           
35 I here cite from an 1860 republication in a proslavery volume entitled, Cotton is King. However, 
Cartwright’s work extended beyond his region, appearing in one of its earliest forms in The New York Day-
Book in 1857, and eventually was republished as an appendix to the volume of trial records published for 
the Dred Scott case. 
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African American parents “begins darken and continues to grow darker” after an 
unspecified “very short time” (708). The emphasis, though, which he places on both how 
dark the child will eventually become – a healthy child will age into a “shining black 
color” – and the care with which he underlines the inevitability of this differentiation, 
which will happen “whether exposed to air and light or not,” signal the potential danger 
of a such instability and Cartwright’s desire to contain it (708). For infancy to have a 
changeable complexion, particularly in a period when the very notion of heritability was 
under heavy debate, was to suggest a permeability in racial boundaries in serious need of 
management.  
 Thus, as color became solidified as the ultimate marker and metonymy of race, 
the black infant (or rather, the black infant who might not yet be black) existed in a state 
of strange suspension. On one hand, infancy could appear to prove that racialized 
phenotypes – and therefore race – were congenital and essential to the individual body. 
However, the black infant body did not fit such a convenient model for medical 
discourses of race. Instead, as I have suggested, the material circumstances of birth fed 
into a more oblique but no less destructive ideology of race: the construction of black 
infancy as a chaotic site of freakishness on which history and genealogy alike have no 
purchase. As disabilities scholar Ellen Samuels defines it, the discourse of freakishness 
was used in the antebellum period to racialize disability. In her discussion of Millie and 
Christine McKoy, Samuels explains the racialization of disability in this way: 
“enfreakment describes the process by which individual difference becomes stylized as 
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cultural otherness” (56).36 However, the enfreakment of black childhood, to borrow 
Samuels’s term, runs in both directions. The figure of the black infant “born white” 
conflates the categories of racial difference by making individual variation into a trait of 
racial variation. Put differently, the black child “born white” is racialized by not only by 
the color of her eventual complexion or that of her parents’, but also by the perceived 
unpredictability of her body.  
 In the early nineteenth century, this association of black infancy with physicians’ 
attempts to study heritability on an empirical basis was further intensified by new interest 
in superfoetation. Now more commonly referred to as superfetation, the phenomenon 
refers to the purported possibility of an additional fertilization occurring in an already 
pregnant woman, producing two fetuses gestating simultaneously without being twins. 
Eager to find instances of this unusual situation, doctors had essentially two ways to 
recognize a pregnancy involving superfoetation. The first was to look for cases in which 
a woman either had a miscarriage and then, shortly after, delivered a child or had two 
miscarriages with a short period of time – the presumption being that twins would have 
miscarried or been born together and that such events must represent two distinct 
pregnancies. Such scenarios were reported, but they could be difficulty to substantiate, 
given the difficulty of diagnosing a miscarriage and the hazy sense that doctors had of 
normal conception times.37 Such cases were also not easily distinguishable from the 
conception of twins and subsequent miscarriage of one. 
                                                           
36 The McKoys were enslaved, conjoined twins displayed in circuses and medical journals since infancy 
and who might easily have joined the prodigies considered in this chapter, 
37 Schwartz, for instance, cites an antebellum doctor who announced that a large baby had be gestated for 
eleven months (129). 
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A more supposedly definitive method of demonstrating superfoetation, and one 
certainly more salacious to readers, was to report women who seem to have fathered 
twins by two different, racially distinct men. For example, a letter written in The Medical 
Repository, a New York medical journal, incidentally edited Dr. Mitchill of the Whistelo 
case, supported claims of superfoetation with two cases of women giving birth to twins 
who appeared to have different racial identities. In a brief anecdote, mentioned as an 
aside, the author recounts “negro woman brought a black child and a mulatto at a birth,” 
after purported sexual encounters with her black husband and, later, with a white man 
(323). His focus, however, is given to a longer tale of a white woman who delivered 
twins with differing complexions, leading the physician to conclude that she had been 
impregnated by both her white husband and an unnamed black man. He teases out the 
mechanics of this situation in some detail, reasoning that “the one [egg] was accidentally 
impregnated with semen of the white man, and the other impregnated with semen of the 
black man, and therefore one [child] was white and the other a mulatto” (323).38 By this 
account, race (or more precisely, the phenotypes associated with race) is made to act as 
an early guarantor of parentage, promising to differentiate between the “semen of the 
white man” and the “semen of the black man.” Paternity can, the author suggests, be 
indisputably inscribed on the body.  
 Much as these reports seems to promise to stabilize genealogy, they also reiterate 
the constant threat of a broken genealogy, summoning up visions of women who cross 
                                                           
38 For examples of other medical accounts tracking superfoetation by race, see John Stearn’s “Article VII. 
A New Theory of Conception,” New York Medical and Physical Journal (July, August, September 1825) 
4.3, 360-368; “Superfoetation,” The Medico-chirugical Review (June 1824) 1.1, 181-2; or, for a British 
example, A.T. Thomson’s “Lectures on Medical Jurisprudence: Pregnancy,” The London Lancet (January 
21, 1837) 1.699, 578-582. 
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the color line to have multiple sexual partners and threats of black men lurking to ruin 
white marriages. All this is a familiar set of tropes, invoking fears of miscegenation, 
female desire, and black masculinity.39 Collectively projected onto the symbol of the 
black infant, however, they take on the more particular form of the prodigy, marking the 
limits of what can be recognized as kinship. The ability to project racial identity onto 
infants - effectively, to diagnose a child as black – provided physicians a seemingly 
unquestionable way to trace inheritance, but in a way that could only negate genealogy. A 
white-appearing child of a married, white couple does not eliminate the possibility of 
infidelity, but a black-appearing child of that couple appeared as proof of a different 
father. Racial phenotype could not confirm paternity, but it did seem to offer a way to 
definitively negate it.  
 The signification of the prodigy as a life outside genealogy could even emerge in 
more extreme cases where black childhood may have no literal presence. One 1808 letter 
written by a Dr. Chris. C. Yates and published in the journal The Philadelphia Medical 
Museum entitled “Account of a Monster” opens with the promise of presenting “a very 
extraordinary animal […] produced by a three year old heifer” (254). The details of this 
origin are quickly thrown into doubt, however, by his tale of a heifer that showed 
“symptoms of great distress” and is locked in a barn on the farmer’s quoted presumption 
that “she was getting mad.” On his return, the farmer finds the heifer “licking what he 
supposed was her calf,” though he had not believed that she was pregnant. In a strange 
                                                           
39 This sensationalism can also have more explicit presence in the clinical tone of the report. An account 
from the Dublin Journal of Medial and Chemical Science and republished in The American Journal of 
Medical Sciences shows its alarm through excitable punctuation: “One child was white, the other evidently 
a half caste […] The same difference of color was strikingly evident in the umbilical cords of the infants! 
but not in the membranes or placenta. On inquiry it appeared that she was in the habit of intimacy with a 
negro, shortly after or at the time she had conceived by her husband!” (“Case of Superfoetation”). 
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turn, Yates reports that “on a nearer approach [the farmer] discovered its form different 
from what he expected, and attempted to take it up by the legs, when the heifer darted at 
him with violence, struck her hoof against the monster’s head and broke it,” after which 
the cadaver was promptly sold, preserved, and put on display, where Yates first 
encountered it.  
From this gothic beginning of a disturbed animal that may or may not have given 
birth to a strange “monster” whom she seems to instinctively fear, the report shifts 
abruptly into a more conventionally technical description of the body’s anatomy, which 
the examiner presents as the uncanny double of a black child:  
From the forehead over the back of the neck, it very much resembles a 
child; indeed the head from a back view would be mistaken for that of a 
child. The nose resembles about as much that of a negro as of a calf, I 
think rather more. [… .] The arms or fore legs resemble the human; there 
is one joint more; it measures from the shoulder to the elbow about four 
inches; from the elbow to the next joint (which is half way between the 
elbow and hoofs) three inches; […] from here the hoofs or webbed 
fingers begin to extend themselves, dividing into five parts, 
distinguishing thumb and fingers, having at the extremity small marks or 
spots where the nails should have been, the substance of the hand or hoof 
the same as of the calf. From below the under jaw or chin down to the 
pubes, human; breast broad, abdomen full.  [emphasis in original] 
It is hard to pinpoint the ethical standing of the body that Yates describes. On one hand, it 
is most likely nothing more than a cow fetus that had developed in an unusual way and 
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whose owners had packaged in extra mystery for the sake of profit. But it is impossible to 
miss, in the constant refrain of how very much like a black child it is, the possibility that 
this was a human life that Yates has reduced past the level of even the animal. Note, too, 
how careful the farmer is to avoid stipulating that his heifer actually gave birth to the 
body he sold; absent for the birth and unsuspecting of the pregnancy, he can only say that 
he “supposed” the body to be a calf.  
Rather than trying to tag some certain status to body described, then, it is more 
critical to notice how easily the black child becomes the form through which uncertain 
genealogy is attached to a body. In reports of superfoetation, the black infant signaled a 
transgression across racial boundaries, but her complexion also promised to allow an 
accounting for genealogy. For “Account of a Monster,” the transgression is more 
stigmatized and relies on the conflation of blackness with animality. Bestiality, rather 
than miscegenation, is the threat underlying this report, an explanation that Yates 
manages both to suggest and to distance himself with his conclusion that “at first glance 
every one is impressed with its resemblance to a negro child, and many suppose it the 
issue of a man with the heifer.” The accusation would follow antebellum association of 
black masculinity with hypersexuality, yet this is not precisely the scenario that Yates 
offers. Rather than attributing blackness to the putative father, race emerges only in the 
child, acting not as a sign of membership in a group identity but as an additional 
symptom of its confused status between human and animal. 
 There is a further material factor to this rhetoric only hinted at in Yates’ mention 
of the infant body sold and displayed. Because enslaved subjects were often sold, or just 
given, to physicians as objects to be manipulated for research, black bodies became a 
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central source of subjects for reports on physical deformity and disease. As Todd Savitt’s 
work on antebellum medicine establishes, the bodies of slaves of all ages were routinely 
made test subjects for experimentation, dissection, and exhibition. However, the greed of 
plantation owners who were eager to raise birthrates left pregnant women and their 
children especially vulnerable to physicians attempting new procedures. This worked to 
the advantage of medical students as well as to established practitioners. In Southern 
medical schools, students learning obstetrics routinely used the childbirths of slave 
women as opportunities for practice, until their skills were deemed polished enough for 
white clients (Stowe 55). For many doctors working in that area, the first infant they 
would ever deliver would have been black and born enslaved, while slave women were 
forced to endure the mistakes caused by these doctors’ inexperience. For established 
physicians, too, access to enslaved women significantly enabled the founding of 
reproductive health as a science. Among example, J. Marion Sims, the so-called “father 
of gynecology” and inventor of the modern speculum, claimed his title through a 
prolonged sequences of experimental vaginal surgeries performed on three slave women 
named Anarcha, Betsey, and Lucy, all of which were done without anesthetic and 
frequently in the presence of spectators (McGregor 49-50). It was the living bodies of 
enslaved women and their children, then, which provided the foundation for the new 
fields of reproductive science.40  
While physicians framed their work on adult slave women largely in terms of 
their reproductive potential, black infancy came to be particularly associated with the 
                                                           
40 For more on the role of black women in the early development of obstetrics and gynecology, particularly 
in the work of J. Marion Sims, see also “Mastering the Female Pelvis: Race and the Tools of Reproduction” 
in Terri Kapsalis’ Public Privates: Performing Gynecology from Both Ends of the Speculum (1997).  
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commercial and medical display of congenital disability. In her history of childbirth 
under slavery, Marie Jenkins Schwartz demonstrates the competition and informal 
marketplace for possessing the bodies of black fetuses and infants as medical samples, 
particularly when they commanded the extra medical “interest” of disability (220). She 
notes, in particular, one southern doctor named Charles A. Hentz, whose journal revels in 
receiving one infant slave cadaver swathed in newspaper as a “present” for his collection 
and another, an only partially developed fetus, which he kept for himself after treating an 
enslaved woman who had miscarried (qtd. in Schwartz 218). Schwartz further argues that 
attending the birth of a child with unusual, congenital disability was a source of 
publications and prestige for physicians, who in turn were ruthless in obtaining the bodies 
of such children from enslaved parents unable to protest. As she records, at least one 
former slave, Ellen Betts, recalls a child who had been born with two faces being bought 
from its owner by a physician, who then murdered the child and preserved its body in “a 
jar of brandy” (qtd. in Schwartz 223). Black infants were one of the key populations 
through which physicians discussed disability and therefore generated spectacles of 
disability to be presented to the wider public. 
Thus, through the conditions of medical practice, blackness became doubly 
associated with unpredictable bodies, first because non-white skin was represented as a 
physical abnormality in itself but also because the most prominent examples of disability 
were drawn from slave bodies, recirculated from plantations into the market of medical 
specimens. While antebellum discourses of blackness and disability converge on a very 
broad level as categories of bodies pushed outside of normativity, through the filter of 
infancy, they took on a far more particular and overlapping symbolic weight. The black 
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infant body and its unruly complexion appears already in such discourse as a body that 
defies management, its categorization suspended or made provisionally as an act of faith 
in the heritability of racial markers. Its association with congenital disability mirrors and 
reinforces this fixation on the body which breaks from its genealogy. If normative 
reproduction imagines the birth of each generation as a uniform extension of the present 
into the future, through medical discourses of abnormality, the figure of the black infant 
came to represent a perceived threat to these continuities.  
As mentioned, in her brief discussion of medicine under slavery, Spillers 
identifies the medical gaze as having an unbinding effect on enslaved bodies’ relationship 
to social structures. In a physician’s advertisement to slave owners to sell him ill or 
injured slaves, she notes that, amid his list of valuable diseases, not only are slaves are 
made into bodies without subjectivity, but the possibility of those bodies having feeling 
for one another is erased (68). Medicine’s objectification acknowledges no possibility for 
black kinship. Yet, the black infant, perhaps precisely because her origin has been so 
mystified by this refusal to see kinship, provides the key figure for medicine to consider 
how bodies are inherited between generations and the limits to that inheritance. In other 
words, at the same time that medical portrayals of black infants as prodigies erase black 
kinship, they provide the technical framework through which white kinship is allowed to 
exist. As I argue in my next section, when the prodigy moved into the realm of the 
literary, it took on still greater and more explicit power in defining white genealogy, such 
that the refusal of blackness from history became the precondition for even imaging 
white genealogy.  
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Literatures of Medicine 
Accustomed as we currently are to a sharp division between the prose of the medical 
report and the prose of literature, the two appear side-by-side in antebellum journals, 
making the drift of medical notions of race into literature, at times, a very short journey. 
Historically, the growing preference for medical schools over individual internships was 
contributing the establishment of medicine as an expert discipline, with an emerging 
system of credentialization and technical discourse. Still, this shift was in its early days, 
and even professionally trained physicians routinely drew on the information from other 
medical traditions, such as female midwifery and folk knowledge of herbs (Stowe 7). 
Medical discourse could thus be quite wide-ranging in scope. For example, in Almshouse 
v. Whistelo¸ the paternity suit I discussed above, the expert witness Dr. Mitchill draws 
one of his references from poetry and treats the authority that case as comparable to his 
other evidence.41 Literature and medicine certainly represented different fields, but they 
were fields with significant crossover. 
Medical journals at the time tend to take a protective view of their authority, 
frequently publishing columns decrying “quacks” or making uncomplimentary asides 
about midwives, but even they can be decidedly esoteric in their contents. Discussions of 
disease often run alongside commentary on medical ethics or the health concerns of 
marrying young or long epistolary debates on academic scandals; The London Medical 
and Surgical Journal includes in an 1830 issue, without other context, a recipe for 
dandelion coffee taken from a gardening manual (175). Likewise, a blurb it published in 
                                                           
41 Mitchil cites “a case, called the Black Case, in Haddington’s poems” (209). I have not been able to trace 
the poem in question, but Mitchil summarizes it as a white woman giving birth to a black child after her 
husband spills ink in her shoes.  
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the following year considers new regulations concerning beer brewing (348). However, 
even articles that are conventionally medical in content also often take the form of 
literary genres. Reports on the state of medicine abroad are often upfront that they 
represent the author’s memories of a trip and thus strongly echo the form of 
contemporary travel literature.42 Similarly, first-person narration was the common model 
for case studies, recounting how the doctor encounters a patient, how treatment unfolded, 
and at times, the dialogue exchanged between doctor and patient. Published in another 
venue, some antebellum case studies could be taken for memoir or short story, rather than 
rarefied science.  
In tracing the appearance of the prodigy into more conventionally literary canon, I 
therefore begin by examining how it appears in two texts that emerge in this space of 
disciplinary overlap, asking how the prodigy’s role in marking biological reproduction 
also shapes notions about kinship more broadly. These two texts reveal that, when the 
prodigy migrates into literature more explicitly interested in social structures, it figures 
most immediately in a crisis over the status of white paternity. Where the social 
structures of kinship had served as the sole guarantors of fatherhood, the medical 
trappings of the prodigy threaten a different mode of tracking genealogy, one that is less 
easily contained. The fear of miscegenation is active, but this racial policing also suggests 
how much the ability to use race to define biological inheritance and kinship – to 
proclaim with confidence, as the superfoetation cases studies do, that this twin is the child 
of a white man and that twin the child of a black man, regardless of whom their mother 
                                                           
42 An 1831 article on the “Medical Institutions of Naples” in the North American Medical and Surgical 
Journal, for instance, punctuates its descriptions of various Italian hospitals with recollections of patient 
performances he saw and the individual doctors whom he met (17-62). 
76 
 
had married or of what their mother might say – threatened the legibility of white 
genealogy. If a medical examination could assign children from one race to another and 
therefore from one father to another, it could also throw any other signifier of kinship into 
doubt. Thus, the ability to expel the black child from narratives of white family and to 
disqualify them from genealogy as spontaneous and isolated flukes was both a reiteration 
of black social death and an attempt to redefine white genealogy.     
The earlier of these texts, Barrington’s “Skinning a Black Child” (1827), seems to 
have migrated into the medical world partly by merit of the already literary qualities of 
the case studies. “Skinning,” a parody of country doctors that first published as a part of 
Barrington’s satirical memoir of life in Ireland, was republished fairly predictably into 
The Athenæum, a London literary journal. Then, and perhaps less predictably, it 
reemerged in the London Medical and Surgical Journal, where it was presented between 
a report on blood chemistry and a report on cholera treatment and given the headline 
“State of Medicine in Ireland.” The format of all three of these articles is the same, with 
only an editor’s foreword to warn that the story’s report should not be read seriously. Nor 
was the inclusion of conventional literature (i.e., fiction, drama, or poetry) a recurring 
feature of the journal, which suggests that the journal’s editors saw “Skinning” as some 
combination of a satire of a medical case studies and commentary on colonial medicine, a 
topic that was often covered in the journal.43 When the excerpt was republished in the 
United States, it appeared mainly in generalist magazines or literary gazettes. 
                                                           
43 A survey of the eighteen issues of the London Medical and Surgical Journal leading up to the issue with 
“Skinning” reveals no other explicitly literary pieces, but does show multiple articles on medicine in 
Ireland, the West Indies, and the United States. There are also a few lengthy excerpts from biographies 
written about notable thinkers that might have helped make Barrington’s memoirs less incongruous in a 
medical journal. 
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Nonetheless the medical jargon which forms a central portion of the prose echo the other 
conventionally medical articles often republished by mainstream papers and might 
persuade an unwary reader that it is a scientific, rather than fictional account.44 
 The scene opening “Skinning a Black Child” is a hopeful one. George 
Washington is hosting a banquet to celebrate the birth of his first child as his wife is in 
labor upstairs. The revelry is interrupted, however, by the midwife’s stammering 
announcement that, while mother and child are both healthy and resting, there is 
something unusual about the newborn son.  First, she exclaims of the infant, “it’s – not so 
– so white as it should be [all emphasis in original]” and, to the contrary, “the dear little 
boy is – is – is – quite black” (152). As a chorus of “‘Black! black!’ echoed from every 
quarter of the apartment,” the women of the party quickly decide that, as Mrs. 
Washington’s virtue is beyond question, the child must be a Satanic imp, a quite literal 
offspring of the devil. Meanwhile, Mr. Washington and his wife’s brother, Lt. Palmer, 
seek a more empirical reassurance in the form of a physician who convinces them that, 
the coloring of the child’s skin is actually a rather large birthmark. Though 
acknowledging that the mark is unusually expansive, covering the entire body of the 
child, he argues that it might still be removed like other birthmarks, through a gradual 
removal of the affected skin. Thus, they settle on the titular strategy – skinning a black 
child in order to find the white child within. The plans fails in a predictably ghastly 
fashion, as deeper and deeper gashes reveal only deeper and deeper levels of blood, flesh, 
                                                           
44 I have found republications of this tale in Philadelphia’s The Ariel, a “Literary and Miscellaneous 
Gazette,” as well as in New York’s Evening Post, although its contemporaneous republication in The 
Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser further suggests the popularity of the story in the larger 
Anglo literary sphere.  
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and finally bone that is itself revealed to be black. The physicians declares the boy to be a 
hopeless case and refuses to further attend to “a thing that was so clearly supernatural.” 
The family, thus, exiles the boy to live with a dry-nurse and to die an early death after 
being gored by his father’s cattle (152). 
Hard as it is to process, readers of its day seem to have encountered “Skinning a 
Black Child” as a joke, a funny quip about the rural Ireland. Although it is introduced in 
its Philadelphia and New York republications with little comment, “Skinning a Black 
Child” was printed in London’s The Athenaeum with the description of being a tale “too 
good to pass up” (409) and is recommended for “those who love a hearty laugh” (411). 
The London Medical and Surgical Journal very carefully  and somewhat stodgily 
outlines the reasons why the story should not taken as documentary truth but eventually 
settles on the surprising endorsement of it as a “precious narrative” nonetheless (818). 
These short paratexts are, of course, nowhere close to a satisfying reception history, and 
presumably not even all white readers, much less black readers, would have taken the 
violence quite so in stride. Still, the dramatic irony of a narrator announcing an obscure, 
Latinate condition to explain a white woman’s giving birth to a black child in almost the 
same breath that he mentions a black man also being in the household makes it clear that 
the story was structured to be humorous. The ease with which laughter and black children 
– or more particularly, laughter and the medical torture of black children – go hand-in-
hand points the particular short-circuit that the black child represents between thinking of 
family as a social structure and family as a biological unit. Their appearance in these texts 
is as proof of infidelity, their blackness an uncomfortably biological sign that sex, rather 
than (white) marriage, has produced them.  
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 This disconnect between the respectable and the bodily forms the basic premise of 
Barrington’s joke. Polite society is so eager to preserve Mrs. Washington’s honor that 
they overlook the black valet living nearby in her brother’s household, revert to 
antiquated and absurd medical theories, and eventually attempt physically to hack away 
the evidence of an indiscretion from the newborn’s body, all in order to avoid doubting 
her loyalty. However, rather than simply being a misogynist parody about the 
faithlessness of women, though it certainly is that as well, “Skinning” offers a 
fundamental challenge about whether patriarchal genealogies have ever been reliable. 45 
From the outset, the patriarchal figure’s own identity is as much as matter of dispute as 
his son’s. Mr. George Washington is not the George Washington but “Mr. George 
Washington, of Dureen, in Ireland” and is only “supposed” by local rumor to be “some 
distant blood relation” to his more famous counterpart (152). The basis of this belief, 
which Barrington frames as laughable, is the town’s absurdly strong faith that social 
genealogy (the stuff of marriage, pedigree, and surnames) is the equivalent of biological 
genealogy and blood relation. The same logic that makes his wife’s son unquestionably 
his drives Washington’s assurance that two men of the same name must inevitably share 
a lineage.  
Through this blurring between the social and the biological, the specific crisis of 
inheritance represented by the unexpectedly black child represents is a crisis of inherited 
property. A large part of the obsession with his child’s racial presentation lies with 
                                                           
45 If Barrington’s introduction of the black servant in the opening of the tale, immediately before a 
paragraph on the inexplicable variation of skin color among  newborns is not enough to tip off the reader, 
the child’s eventual death after a “horning” from one of his father’s cows ensures that a cuckolding is in 
play. 
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Washington’s attempt to reinforce his own claim to a vaguely imagined, but strongly held 
belief  that “his Excellency [President Washington], when dying, would leave a capital 
legacy in America to his blood relation, Mr. George Washington” (152). This more 
distant and more explicitly property-minded tie thus ultimately becomes most important 
goal in the bloody attempts to re-race the infant: 
The mode [the physician] pursued was very scientific; he made two 
parallel slashes as deep as he could in reason, about three inches down the 
upper part of the arm, and a cross one, to introduce the forceps and strip 
the loose black skin off, when he could snip it away at the bottom, and 
leave the white or rather red flesh underneath to generate a new skin and 
show the proper colouring for a god-child of General Washington. (152) 
The fantasy of manipulating and remaking the infant’s body suggests a desire to take over 
the role of the mother’s body in forming the child with a “new skin” in the husband’s 
image, a pre-Frankenstein attempt to replace maternity with masculine science. In this 
substitution of father for mother, though, Barrington also overleaps the immediate father 
for the abstract approval of the putative godfather, General Washington. The Irish 
Washington needs confirmation that biological reproduction follows the forms of social 
kinship and, more particularly, that marriage secures paternity, in order to make a shared 
surname into a blood tie.  
The persistence of blackness, which lasts down onto the very bones of the child, 
however, adds more of a complication to this narrative than as a sign of an extramarital 
sexuality. The doctor’s search for the “white or rather red” to be found within young 
Washington parrots and brutally redefines Buffon’s assertion, discussed earlier, that all 
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children are born “white, or rather red,” substituting the red skin of a newborn for the red 
flesh of a wound. However, while Buffon’s original assertion would make all newborns 
racially ambiguous, Barrington’s interpretation rests on a notion of blackness as 
fundamental and immutable. Thus, after his final cut into the child, the doctor announces 
a difference that permeates the body, declaring that “he could see the very bone, black 
also […] actually dyed in the grain” (152). The child’s difference runs so deep that it 
cannot be effaced. Yet what is interesting here is not that the child is banished from the 
putative line of Washingtons but that his blackness banishes him from genealogies more 
generally. While the reader is meant to understand that the biological father is the black 
valet from America, the medical conclusion is that the child is “either the devil or a lusus 
Naturœ,” (or freak of nature). He does not become the son of a black man; he becomes an 
imp whose origin is spontaneous and beyond human knowledge and yet whose body, as a 
sign of those origins, acts as a site of obsessive and brutal investigation.   
As the text describes it, then, the child’s blackness upsets established notions of 
genealogy as a whole. If a child of Washington would inherit property and as well as 
whiteness, the child of a practically or tacitly enslaved “servant” paradoxically inherits 
the inability to inherit. Not only is the young Washington denied full entry into the 
Washington family, the identity of his probable father is erased and denied; his blackness 
prevents him from being seen as a true son of Washington, but Washington’s pride 
prevents him admitting that his son might have another father. The child and his 
probable, biological father are thus ironically aligned only by the social refusal to grant 
any either of them family ties. The newborn George Washington, the child of an effective 
slave and the product of a relationship that cannot be socially acknowledged, becomes a 
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monstrous object that seems to be emerge from nowhere. His body and its genealogical 
markers are thereby made to bear the weight of a history that society cannot record. 
Much like the grotesque humor of “Skinning a Black Child,” the “Stealing a 
Baby” is, at first reading, white supremacy’s take on slapstick. First published in the 
Spirit of the Times in New York and later republished as part of an 1850 collection, 
“Stealing a Baby” is the first-person narration by a semi-autobiographical character, 
Madison Tensas or “the Louisiana Swamp Doctor,” who recalls being an overly earnest 
and slightly disreputable medical student and his courtship of the wealthy Lucy, a name 
borrowed from Lewis’s real-life romantic interest (Anderson 31). Obsessed with 
dissection, Madison steals a black infant cadaver in hopes of studying its anatomy in the 
comforts of his own home, an echo of the historical practices discussed above. The plan 
misfires, however, when his would-be fiancée, Lucy, involves him in an unexpected tryst 
that is then interrupted by her father. The hijinks culminate in the untimely emergence of 
the dead child, whose falls out the student’s coat in the moment when the couple tumbles 
the ground in front of the sweetheart’s protective father in an illicit birth that ruins 
Madison’s chances at marriage, family life, and access to Lucy’s wealth. The punchline is 
vile one, even in the context of an unabashedly vile story, hinging on the comic 
misattachment of childhood and family to a black body, when by the reasoning of the 
story, they should belong only to white one. The latter promises lineal futurity while the 
other, offering death at the most literal level, suspends the narrator in a state of perpetual 
bachelorhood. 
The intimacies that take shape around this prodigious birth of a black cadaver 
from the pocket of a white man end Madison’s attempt to become a patriarch in his own 
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right. Barred from a relationship with Lucy and disgraced among genteel society, 
Madison, as his older narrating self explains, fails to marry or have the legitimate 
children who could carry on his family line. Instead, in his theft of a dead child and its 
apparently spontaneous reemergence is that he enters a distorted parody of that kinship, 
in which property rights and the physicality of bodies form the explicit basis for 
connection, rather than the factors to be repressed or denied. Accordingly, the narrator 
recounts his theft as moment in which the infant places some hold upon him, rather than 
the opposite; Lewis writes, “I strove to depart, but something formed a bond of 
association between that dead nigger baby and myself, which held me to my place with 
my gaze riveted upon it” (154). This is not a scene of ethical recognition and certainly is 
not a humanizing interaction for the dead child, who remains attractive as an object of 
study and mutilation. Still, in that moment of desire, when Lewis’s narrator imagines 
himself in possession of the child body, there is a slippage into the similarly corporeal 
guardianship of the family. The medical student’s interest in the body causes him to treat 
it as “tenderly as if alive” (154) and his assertion of ownership remakes the corpse into an 
entity that he calls “my baby” (156).  
This form of unasked guardianship clearly has no benefit for the deceased infant 
and mimics much as anything the paternal roles used to sanction slave ownership. 
However, by placing such a socially unsacred body is placed in a “bond of association” 
with a white man striving to become a patriarch, the text also associates white 
domesticity with corporeality and death. By introducing a particularly material version of 
the body as admissible into domestic bonds of feeling, the child/corpse suggests a 
reinscription of the Tensas’s desire for the white Lucy into a similarly ghoulish interest in 
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co-opting bodies. In light of the student’s morbid tenderness to the child, an already semi-
necrophilic confession that, mid-kiss with his lover, he would sometimes examine her 
lips and wonder “whether, even in death, electricity by some peculiar adaptation might 
not be able to continue their bewitching suction” moves from the realm of self-
deprecating bookishness into monstrosity (153). Because he can enter something 
mirroring the forms of kinship with a body that is politically barred from such elevation, 
the effect is to recast his romantic relationship as possessing a dangerously similar 
physical element.  
This unbinding effect that juvenile flesh can have on the social configurations 
comes through most clearly in F.O.C. Darley’s illustration of the moment when the child 
tumbles into the street in front of Tensas’s would-be fiancée, her jealous father and the 
city marshal, entitled “Stealing a Nigger Baby” [see Figure 1 at end]. The image offers a 
caricature of an impossible birth; the medical student lies rocked onto his back with his 
feet up and askew while staring at the child that has appeared beside him. His hat, fallen 
back to his shoulders creates the appearance of feminine bonnet while a peculiar 
roundness to his chest hints a bosom. Meanwhile, in the long, thin object trailing out from 
between Tensas’ legs, perhaps a fold of clothing or a riding crop, there is also the 
suggestion of an umbilical cord forgotten in the after birth. It is as if, because his 
unacceptable selection of child has cut him off from the projected role of the patriarchal 
head of a household, Tensas has slipped into a monstrous form of femininity instead – a 
stance that, judging from his facial expression, horrifies no one so much as himself. 
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Illustration 1, “My cloak flew open…” 
 
Moreover, the fleshiness that is the prevailing quality of the dead child sprawled 
in the foreground – its body is the only skin revealed in the image other than the 
uncovered faces of the other figures and the details of its collapsed and chubby limbs, 
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with its tiny detailed hands and dimpled elbows bent at delicate angles, are presented 
with a more careful realism than the rest of the group – seems to have also carried over 
into Lucy. Though she is entirely covered, dark gloves give the appearance of hands the 
same shade as the child. Her broken parasol, snapped at the shaft, suggests a complexion 
whose fairness is no longer protected, while the shared posture of the two (head turned 
away from the viewer, one arm up and one down with cocked wrists) further aligns the 
pair. Even the symmetry of their two bodies in relation to the sprawled male figure 
suggests a paralleling of their respective roles in relation to him. The child’s undermining 
effect on a sentimental reading of the couple, which emerges in the text largely as a 
retrospective reevaluation, appears in the picture as a synchronous realignment of ties. 
The unplanned arrival of a black infant not only distracts the protagonist from his white, 
potential wife, but it simultaneously puts the values that she represents to the story in 
doubt. In both the text and illustration, the black infant, divided by race and death from 
its potential parent-figures, proves to be an ultimately inassimilable self and one whose 
inclusion becomes the undoing of the structures that seek to absorb it. 
Such texts recode black infancy as being not just outside of normative 
reproduction, but as an active threat to those genealogies, because the black infant, born 
without access to legally-enforced marriage, marks a space outside its reach and proves 
that life is ongoing there. This is in no way a utopian departure. In the context of Lewis’s 
Louisiana, the unexplained birth of a black child in close proximity to a white father-
figure suggests the sexual violence and rape underpinning slavery far more strongly than 
it promises any escape from official surveillance. Moreover, the identification of any sign 
of a growing African American population as a threat and the idea that a black subject is 
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so essentially a social danger, even before she develops the ability to think or act, justifies 
further violence against adults and children alike.  
 
Pip: An Aside 
The second half of this chapter moves to Susan Paul’s attempt to rewrite the prodigy as a 
viable life and even a source of liberation, but before I move on from the medicalized 
prodigy, I want to pause and tease out a little more what it means to be a figure who is 
pushed outside of genealogy and yet be used to define it. It is not obvious how or why 
social death, particularly such a complete social death as the all-but-stillborn prodigy, 
could construct the temporality of the social. Nor is it easy to shift from Lewis and 
Barrington’s deathly infants into fully living beings who nonetheless remain pushed out 
of history, because to be labeled a prodigy by medical discourse is to be excluded from 
subjectivity. The prodigy is a body to be examined, tested, or manipulated, but it is not a 
person, nor is it a character in any straightforward sense. This projection of blank flesh 
dovetails easily with the passive dependence of infancy, but can the prodigy outlive this 
infant exclusion? In other word, how does the framing of black childhood, or even more 
particularly of black infancy or black birth, extend to shape depictions of black lives 
more broadly?  
To circle back to Pip, the character with whom I began, Melville seems to offer a 
case of prodigy attained later in life. Pip’s age is never established, but Ishmael believes 
that there is an acute cause for his separation from the crew and status as a medical 
oddity: his abandonment at sea. There no diagetic evidence of a change in Pip’s actual 
behavior, but certainly after the crew decides that he is an incurable “idiot,” Pip knows 
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that a part of himself has been lost. Wandering the deck, he reminds the crew over and 
over that he is not a part of the ship, but has been banished to someplace elsewhere, 
repeatedly imploring sailors “who’s seen Pip? [….] Monsieurs, have ye seen one Pip?” 
(512) and demanding they recognize that “Pip’s missing” (500). The social alienation and 
self-alienation of his position thus becomes a symptom of delusional speech and further 
confirmation for the crew that Pip’s behavior reflects the pathological, rather than the 
personal.   
However, to present a before and after of Pip’s estrangment fails to capture how 
this social alienation also distances Pip from linear time. Part of his distance from his 
shipmates is that he must survive with a different kind history than they do. Introduced as 
being “prelusive of eternal time,” a Melvillian translation of the always already, Pip lives 
not just the proleptic time of a novel that continually foreshadowing its tragedy, but in a 
paradoxical preemption of those warnings. The narrator warns that the Pequod’s crew 
would go “to lay the world’s grievances before that bar from which not very many of 
them ever come back,” but, as for “Black Little Pip,” “he never did -- oh, no! he went 
before” (115). The syntax is slippery, allowing “he never did” to refer to the journey as 
much as to the return, such that Pip either does not join the crew in their voyage to death 
because he will have already drowned on the way or does not return from that encounter 
because he will have died and therefore preceded the surviving portion of the crew in 
their still eventual death. That both are true, because Pip both does and does not die 
before the rest of the Pequod, indicates how difficult it is to map a timeline of even Pip’s 
personal history, for in either case the contradiction of one who “never did” because he 
did “before” loops back to the subject who is precedes time. Pip thus provides us with the 
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negative construction of the always already, the already never, to a subject who born into 
social cancelation.  
 
Sanctifying the Prodigy 
The cluster of associations that I am tracing under the term “prodigy” is perhaps 
especially pernicious because it also works to translate individual achievement that might 
have been proof of African Americans’ humanity into signs of aberration. Like Ishmael’s 
conclusion that when Pip speaks “heaven’s sense” it must be thanks to his “insanity” 
rather than his wisdom (402), prodigious thinking trades on a skewed logic of 
exceptionality. The more extraordinary a black subject is the less representative she is of 
any larger potential, except the potential to be abnormal.46 Because history was and is 
often written as series of famous men, in the style of Carlyle’s heroes, the tendency to 
pathologize remarkable lives as flukes or oddities not only worked to dismiss those 
subjects but also dismissed the idea of African Americans having a broader connection to 
the past. Confronting and transforming the figure of the prodigy was therefore also an 
important means for black authors to rescript notions of collectivity and a collective past 
outside of racial essentialism.47 Extracting the prodigy from the realm of science or 
medicine offered an opportunity to reimagine the structure of social kinship at the same 
time that it allowed a humanizing of individual subjects. 
                                                           
46 See, for example, Stephen Best’s discussion of the public reception of the pianist known as Blind Tom in 
Fugitive Properties. Contemporary reviewers, he argues, treats Tom’s music as so strangely distanced from 
Tom himself that the musician appears only as an uncanny conduit for a thoroughly external gift. Thus, the 
beauty of the performance came to a measure of how strange the audience found its source. 
47 For a longer discussion of the racialization of the connections between individual and group identity, 
particularly as it affects black biography, see Sharon Holland’s “When Characters Lack Character: A 
Biomythography,” PMLA (2008). 
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 Though it is among the first African American biographies ever published, Susan 
Paul’s Memoir of James Jackson places very little weight on the qualities that 
conventionally distinguish a historical figure. Indeed, one of the most conspicuous 
features of Paul’s 1835 text Memoir of James Jackson is how little value the text places 
on fame, public accomplishment, or even narrative suspense. A glance at the full subtitle 
– “The Attentive and Obedient Scholar who Died in Boston, October 31, 1833, Aged Six 
Years and Eleven Months” – gives as good a summary of Paul’s hagiography as one 
could ask. This disregard for the trappings of plot or narrative development suits its 
subject: a brilliant and deeply Christian boy who died before he could do much of 
anything. Yet, in telling the story of such an apparently ahistorical subject as James 
Jackson, marginalized by his race, his age, and his illness, Susan Paul rescripts the role of 
the black prodigy to remake its historical discontinuity into an opportunity. By lingering 
not on the ways that James’s prodigy falls beneath the historical record, but rather how it 
exceeds the historical record, Paul reconfigures what types of genealogies are worth 
recording. The Memoir, instead, allows for a means of removing genealogy from the 
domains of both historical time and biology and redefines it as a spiritual relationship. 
Paul’s prodigy, in other words, emphasizes James’s elevation through the active efforts of 
his community, in order to show how the bonds of teaching and faith create a utopian 
practice capable of giving reprieve, if not full escape, from history. 
 Harkening back to Puritan stories of saintly child deaths, such as James Janeway’s 
A Token for Children (1671) or Cotton Mather’s appendix “A Token for Children of New 
England” (1700), the child hagiography was a tremendous popular and rigidly formulaic 
genre when the Memoir was first published. From the 1820s through the 1840s, the New 
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York-based American Tract Society alone released a series of more than a dozen such 
accounts of child deaths, at times reaching more than printing runs of more than ten 
thousand copies per year (Pasulka 57). Paul’s biography draws from an accordingly well-
defined set of religious conventions to mark its subject as one of the elect. James is 
commended for his devotion to authority, for his “constant desire to please” his teacher 
makes James “an assistant, by his example” in “the government of other children (92); 
his unusually retentive memory for hymns and scripture (74); and his love to hear the 
Bible read, even when his siblings grow restless (76). Peppered with scriptural excerpts 
and lyrics from hymns, the text is also creates an authorial persona who is far more 
interested in continuing tradition rather than personal originality. Furthermore, while 
James is exemplary for his intellect – Paul’s narrator reports that “during the first year 
which James attended school, he learned more than many children do in three” (83) – this 
scholastic genius is carefully funneled into the norms of childish goodness that is James’s 
true distinction. His memory regarding the rules serves his obedience, his curiosity fuels 
his questions about God, and his eloquence allows him to play “little preacher” to the 
other children (88). As Paul explains, James’s precociousness registers not as an early 
advance into adulthood but as a concentration of the virtues prescribed for childhood, 
declaring, for instance, that “we must be indulged in saying, we never saw a child who 
seemed so much like innocence itself” (93). James is remarkable precisely because he 
fulfills the role of the conventional child so perfectly. 
 Yet, as the publication history of The Memoir reflects, Paul’s placement of an 
individual and genuinely historical black child into these standardized forms of white 
childhood resonates with a much more radical effect. As Lois Brown, the scholar who 
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recovered The Memoir and verified its history, explains, Paul originally sought 
distribution through the relatively apolitical channels of the American Sunday School 
Union. Only after the Union refused, presumably for fear of controversy, did Paul agree 
to have the biography published through abolitionist channels. If, as Max Cavitch 
suggests, such literary rituals of mourning act as a moment of unification by “bolster[ing] 
the threatened family ties for which the dead child is also the symbol,” Paul’s addition of 
James to this genre canon therefore acts as a tacit insistence that the death of a black child 
should equally be a touchstone for bolstering a cross-racial U.S. community (144).48 
Thus, while the Preface names two audiences, its white and black readers, the opening of 
the Memoir itself combines them into a single body, addressing them familially as “My 
dear children” (69). By its form alone, the Memoir encourages this consolidation into a 
single family by presenting James’s legacy as a collective loss and a shared experience of 
grief. 
 However, Paul’s deployment of the child saint to describe a black child also 
aligns him with the prodigy narratives which I have discussed, threatening to reduce his 
genius to peculiarity and transform his final illness into a confirmation of his abnormality 
rather than his holiness. In order to prevent such narratives from isolating James, Paul 
proceeds with thorough replacement of the corporeal with the spiritual. For James, 
himself, this means a total silence regarding his physical body except for three moments 
in the text: first, as an aside mentioning his “dark skin,” when he is bullied for his race 
                                                           
48Another factor in the categorization of The Memoir as a primarily abolitionist text may well be what 
Cavitch terms the “antebellum crisis in the economic value of the child” (18). As Cavitch argues, the 
presence of enslaved and therefore commodified children in the U.S. forced even writers who were only 
explicitly discussing white children into a reconsideration of the links between property loss and child 
death – a crisis which the mourning of a child potentially eligible for slavery must certainly intensify. 
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(71); second, a brief mention that “sometimes, he was attacked by […] very wicked boys, 
and badly hurt” (87); and, finally, his death scene, which is the only occasion when his 
body receives prolonged discussion. By contrast to the rest of text, the description of 
James’s failing body, finally dying after convulsions and pain, both more prominent and 
more detailed: 
James still looked as if his heart was full of joy; but his eyes began to 
grow dim, his hands were cold, and in a few minutes all was calm; the 
glazed eyes of the dear child once more beamed forth with unspeakable 
delight, and he exclaimed, ‘This is God my Saviour; O Lord, this is Jesus.’ 
– His eyes closed, his heart ceased to beat, and all was still. James was 
dead. Nothing remained but a cold and lifeless lump of clay. But his spirit, 
with which he used to love God, was carried away by angels to heaven. 
(103) 
James’s heart, his hands, and his eyes provide the action in their alternating fading and 
revival, but their integration into a body, much less into James himself, appears only on 
the very threshold of death and still only in the oblique summations that “all was calm” 
and “all was still.” Even this vague collective of “all” is revealed to be a full body only 
after the departure of James to heaven – when “nothing remained but a cold and lifeless 
lump of clay” – and even in that moment, the Paul replaces the physical body with a 
symbol, proffering a symbol of materiality rather than materiality itself. James’s body, 
then, appears precisely in order to mark its inability to represent James himself.  
 Such a division between soul and flesh is hardly unusual, but in Paul’s hands, the 
division becomes a more pointed rebuke of the expert authority that physicians normally 
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held over black children. That, at the first sign of illness, Mrs. Jackson “immediately” 
sends for a doctor announces a degree of respectability and wealth, as well as affection 
(97). Upon his arrival, however, the doctor is examined by James, as to his spiritual 
health, rather than the reverse. Asking the physician if “you love God, my Saviour? 
[Paul’s emphasis]” and if “you know God my Saviour?,” James shifts the encounter to a 
realm in which he holds the authority and thereby changes the tenor of the doctor’s 
thinking. The physician’s response that James is “a happy child’ proves to be the only 
diagnosis he makes (102). Similarly, when physical disability appears in the text, in the 
form of a concluding poem “The Little Blind Boy” about a black child who is refused 
entrance to an all-white institution for the blind, it quickly transforms from a physical 
condition affecting him to a spiritual condition affecting white authorities. As the child 
speaker complains, school officials “cannot see / My soul through my skin” (107) and as 
his mother consoles him at the poem’s close, “many with eyes are far blinder than you” 
(108). Paul retains a language of stigma for disability, but she makes clear that that 
stigma should attach to a spiritual quality rather than a physical one. 
 This careful devaluation of the biological subject in preference for the spiritual 
subject further gives Paul the framework to make James the impetus for a qualitatively 
different kind of kinship, one removed from reproductive lines and focused on religious 
concordance. For instance, the affection and devotion of James’s relationship to his 
teacher, Paul’s own persona in the text, rivals and sometimes surpasses the strength of his 
relationship with his mother. When his mother commands James to grind coffee on the 
Sabbath, he refuses because his teacher has taught him otherwise, and after this only 
conflict between mother and child, James persuades his mother to agree. This remaking 
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of attachments follows an antiracist mission as well. Warning her young readers from 
disliking people for being black, Paul invokes the nuclear family in order to expand it:  
God has made them all, and loves all that are good, and so should we 
always have courage enough to love any body who is good. Would you 
love your sister or brother less because they had black or brown hair? or 
your father or mother because one had black eyes and the other blue eyes? 
No, I am sure you would not love them any the less. (71) 
Anchoring humanity in a mutual relationship to God, Paul begins an experiment of 
physical substitution with more immediate relative – swapping one hair color for another, 
turning one set of eyes black and the other blue – in a transformation that changes her 
readers’ families, piece by piece, into new bodies and challenging her readers to name the 
moment when they become strangers. This gradual transmutation separates the 
sentimental affection of family, not just from family resemblance but from any factor 
other than internal merit, for we are told to “love any body who is good.” That is to say, 
James is not simply the ultimate Christian for children to emulate. As a culmination of 
goodness, he deserves to be the pinnacle, Paul suggests, of the reader’s family 
attachment. 
 This sense that readers should feel closer to James because of his exceptional 
merit, rather than distanced from him, structures the larger relationship which Paul builds 
between James’s genius and his social world. As Brown notes, the Memoir directs away 
from such individual struggles as conversion or doubt and emphasizes instead how much 
James’s wisdom is the result of collective support: “Paul credits James’s ‘great many 
friends’ in that community for encouraging his Christian faith and his educational 
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progress. […] This exemplary child is a product of a virtuous community: region, class, 
and race both define and produce James Jackson’s identity” (39-40). James, for instance, 
is able to attend school early because unnamed “friends” persuade his mother to make a 
special application (73). What is perhaps even more remarkable about the kinship system 
that supports James, however, is that these friends have no clear status outside of 
friendship. They are not identified as either relatives or as belonging to a profession that 
would encourage this mentorship, such as teaching or religious ministry. Instead, their 
connection to James appears solely as the product of their benevolence and James’s own 
merit. Any determinedly realist reading of the Memoir would recognize that this 
friendships must have relied on existing systems or institutions, as factors like James’s 
relatively middle class standing and his family’s church membership must have been the 
conditions of possibility for these advocates to take interest in a then three- or four-year-
old child. However, Paul’s presentation of them as arriving both seemingly from nowhere 
and as the natural consequence of “the good behavior of James” allows the young reader 
the space to imagine kinship not as a predetermined or rigid genealogy, but as a malleable 
environment that they themselves can shape (73). 
 This is not to say that Paul had no interest in practical policy for reform. Indeed, 
the very fact that there was a school in Boston willing to instruct James at all was partly 
the product of ongoing activism by Paul outside of the Memoir, as well as by means of 
the text itself (Brown 11). However, her focus lies in fostering the social networks that 
enable practical change. As her preface frames it, the Memoir should spur readers to 
correct the neglect of African American, declaring that “these children of our brethren 
have too long been neglected. There is among them many a gem, and whose is the guilt 
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that they are not brought out from among the rubbish and polished?” (67). In other words, 
because James’s uniqueness stems from the attention which teachers and other adult role 
models have given him, his accomplishments establish the potential of other African 
American children, elevating rather than eclipsing them. For Paul, prodigy thus is the 
result of collective effort and social connection; far from being a freak or a fluke in the 
system, the prodigy is the best representative of the group as whole, because he or she is 
the sum of their assistance.  
 As such, the story of James Jackson opens out from the individualist conventions 
of most biographies to a sense of textuality as a source of connection instead of isolation. 
Paul manages this shift in part through an emphasis of literature as shared scripture, 
inserting a history of the Bible that also becomes a lesson for her readers in their shared 
history. Beginning with Adam and Eve, she recounts Christian history as a history of 
writing and preserving texts:  
God directed a man by the name of Moses, to write these things down in a 
book, so that the people could see how he had punished the disobedient 
men who lived in that age of the world. So Moses wrote all these things in 
a book, and the people whom we call Jews, kept this book in their temple. 
After this, other men who wrote what God directed them to. The people 
had their writings collected. This made what we call the Old Testament. 
There was no more writing for a long time, until our blessed Saviour came 
into the world. Then God commanded those men who were with him to 
write what the Saviour said, and what he did; so four of them wrote an 
account of these things. (75) 
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Scripture, in this account, exists to connect a present generation to one of the past, 
stretching across geography and race, as well as time based on the idea that one age 
should learn of and from another. Likewise, history pauses in the intermission between 
the testaments because, for Paul, history and text cannot be extracted from one another. 
Moving immediately into a portrait of James’s devotion to the Bible and an exhortation 
that her own readers should listen and read it with equal care, Paul tracks a continuity of 
texts from these Biblical origins through the life of James and into the lives of the readers 
meeting James and, through his story, also consuming this version of scripture.  
 Paul’s emphasis on James’s story as a means to connecting lives resonates in her 
formal choices as well. Nested in the account of the exceptional James are anecdotes of 
multiple other, more ordinary children, whose narratives only intersect with James’s in 
the loosest thematic sense. Nancy, a “little girl […] only four years” conquers her fear of 
the dark through her faith in God (82). Henry, a “poor little fellow,” is taught by his sister 
to fear black people without reason (72). Nameless children, too, populate the short 
narrative, providing educational anecdotes in their failures to learn their lessons (74), 
their attempts to convert family members (76-77), and their attention-seeking (87). Some 
echo James as models to be imitated, and others over examples to be avoided, but the 
cumulative effect is to surround his life with a cloud of parallel lives. His narrative, Paul 
suggests, can only be understand as part of a network of others, so that while his may be 
the central story, it remains fundamentally interwoven with and shaped by those around 
him and those reading about him. 
 Through such reconfigurations of history, the alternative genealogy around James 
also transforms his exclusion from national futurity into spiritual futurity. James’s family 
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ties are, from the outset of the text, fixed in a cyclical emergence from and return to the 
eternal time of heaven, rather than linear inheritance. Named for his late father, whose 
death when James was less than two years old spurred his early interest in Christianity, 
James imagines heaven as “his home in the skies,” locating his future destiny in his origin 
(99). Likewise when Paul’s preface advocates that the adults responsible for black 
children should “store the minds of the children committed to them with religious truth,” 
the return she promises is partly the earthly promise that, “in this life,” they will be 
“respected in society” (67). Its main benefit, however, is that “in the world to come, they 
shall be acknowledged as the heirs to life eternal” (67-8). By learning what James 
learned, they can join him as heirs in this inheritance, forming a family in defiance of the 
legal and social erasure in a utopian pedagogy. This spiritual futurity thus remains a bleak 
comfort and, arguably, an escapist one, premised on the reminder that even excluded 
children will eventually die and that the precocious child will do so sooner. 
 Despite this, to dismiss Paul’s vision as quietism is to miss the way that her 
relative mistrust of either reproductive or national futurity – that is, her unwillingness to 
distinguish genealogy as the only meaningful connection or historical progress as the 
only meaningful victory – opens new possibilities for activism in the present. By largely 
dismissing the types of political futurity put forward by liberal narratives of progress, 
Paul outlines a system of care for children that does not value them for their potential as 
future citizens or parents or national saviors, but as the people they already are. James’s 
death does not mean that his teacher or mother’s efforts were wasted. Rather, the 
Memoir’s recognition that his life is a history worth knowing confirms the need to 
educate and value black children and to treat them, regardless of whether they will be 
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allowed the opportunities to use those skills in adulthood. Almost exactly a century after 
Paul’s Memoir, Langston Hughes published an echo of the prodigy’s joint association 
with exclusion and escape in his 1937 poem “Genius Child.” The close of the poem asks 
the reader whether she can “love a monster / Of a frightening name?” only to conclude 
that “Nobody loves a genius child. / Kill him – and let his soul run wild” (9-10, 11-12). 
Like James, Hughes’s child is tragic, because his potential is so great that he cannot fit 
into his world and is therefore appears as a threat to it. Yet in both of their deaths there is 
something more than simple tragedy: there is a radical refusal to see growing up into an 
active member of society as an unambiguous victory.  
 The chance that death offers for these figures of the prodigy to “run wild” is thus 
more particular form of the many freedom-in-death tropes of the nineteenth century, 
because it so thoroughly decouples individual progress from social progress. If the 
original damnation of the prodigy is the removal from historical genealogies, Paul gives 
us a way to see that as a utopia on a small scale, investing value in a life that would never 
otherwise register in history. Indeed, without Paul’s text, the only other archival trace of 
him is a brief mention in a local newspaper that correctly records the date and location of 
his death but provides him with the wrong first name, calling him “George Jackson” 
(Brown 58). There seems to be nothing else, and it would be surprising if there were. Yet 
to the extent that she also shapes James’s life into a repetition of the dead children of 
color that fill the worlds of medicine, Paul allows us to recognize in those populations of 
bodies something beyond their abjection and disconnection. If we have lost the way to 
access the memory of these prodigies, Paul reminds us that historical legacy is not the 
best measure of a life, nor connection to the present the only connectedness that matters.  
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Pip, Again: Reproducing Prodigies 
In the end, then, is there any use left for Pip? If he is a repetition on a well-worn theme, 
the takeaway may not be to dismiss Pip as stereotype, but rather to avoid taking his 
apparent isolation in Moby Dick at Ishmael’s word. Once we know that Pip is not such a 
singular figure in antebellum culture, others like him emerge throughout the narrative as 
well. Indeed, children of color pervade Melville’s novel in figurative and literal forms, 
and they do so at some of the most critical moments of kinship formation. The queer 
bond between Ishmael and Queequeg has, for instance, long been something of a critical 
commonplace for Melville’s description of the two laying in bed as a “cosy, loving pair” 
(51) and of Queequeg embracing Ishmael as if he were “his wife” (24). Less remarked on 
is that Ishmael’s bond with Queequeg is cemented by the symbol of a dead and disabled 
black child, in for the form of Queequeg’s idol Yojo.  
First confronted by the statue, Ishmael interprets it as something very like 
antebellum medicine’s idea of the prodigy. Seeing Queequeg take Yojo from his bag, 
Ishmael describes it as “a curious little deformed image with a hunch on its back, and 
exactly the color of a three days’ old Congo baby” and, having heard that Queequeg sold 
taxidermied human heads, believes at first that the statue is “a real baby preserved in 
some similar manner” (22). This initial image seems deliberately grotesque, reflecting 
Ishmael’s early fear of Queequeg’s racial difference, but elements of this first vision echo 
in descriptions of Yojo, after Ishmael realizes it is wooden and even with after Ishmael 
and Queequeg become close. Thus, Yojo remains oddly childish as Queequeg’s “little 
negro” (22) or his “innocent little idol” (51) or resting “cross[ed between] his arms on his 
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breast” as Queequeg tests his coffin for size (462).  Yojo plays the part of the uncanny 
child most importantly, however, in allowing Queequeg and Ishmael to bond over caring 
for him during the rituals of feeding and kissing before bed (51). Yojo thus becomes 
child-like enough for Ishmael’s participation to register not just as the religious 
syncretism that is the explicit in the text but also as a form of alternative family feeling – 
one able to register the “heart’s honeymoon” that follows the shared attention to Yojo as 
meaningful relationship, even without the possibility of other reproduction (51). 
 If the deathly child of color is used as a supplement for genealogical reproduction 
in Queequeg and Ishmael’s relationship, it also proves to be the point of departure for 
Melville’s vision of an environment outside of historical genealogies of imperial 
conquest. Nantucket, the center of the U.S. whaling industry and proxy home for 
Melville’s characters, appears as a heterotopian space paralleling white empire in a less 
devastating form. It has “conquered the watery world like so many Alexanders” and yet 
seems to occupy a territory outside the dominion of Anglo-American empire. Melville 
declares, “let American add Mexico to Texas, and pile Cuba upon Canada; let the English 
overswarm all India [….]; two thirds of this terraqueous globe are the Nantucket’s” (61). 
This apparent escape from imperialist expansion, however, in the history that Ishmael 
provides, exists only through the tragedy of its Native American discoverers: 
Look now at the wondrous traditional story of how this island was settled 
by red-men. […] In olden times an eagle swooped down upon the New 
England coast, and carried off an infant Indian in his talons. With loud 
lament the parents saw their child borne out of sight over the wide waters. 
They resolved to follow the same direction. Setting out in their canoes, 
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after a perilous passage they discovered the island, and there they found an 
empty ivory casket, – the poor little Indian’s skeleton. (60) 
This christening of the island through the death of an indigenous child makes way for the 
silent substitution in Ishmael’s explanations: the people of the supposedly extra-imperial 
Nantucket are no longer Native Americans. Somewhere in the history, but unmarked in 
Ishmael’s telling, these original inhabitants are replaced by its current Anglo-Americans 
residents. Instead, Nantucket’s origin story does the work, fairly heavy-handedly, of 
naturalizing this dispossession by founding what would have been the Wampanoag claim 
to the island on the end of a genealogy. The death of the heir who would have carried the 
Indian claim into the future allows Ishmael a fantasy of Nantucket as a space in which 
territory works differently and where Anglo-American presence does not represent the 
same imperial expansion as elsewhere, even though it is enabled by Indian death just the 
same.  
 Pip’s presence on the ship thus stands in to remind us of the lives that have been 
left out of the narrative. However, he is not merely a passive symbol. Instead. Pip also 
hints at his own bitter awareness of that, much as the corpse-like Yojo provides the 
catalyst for Ishmael’s bond with Queequeg, the ship’s sense of kinship is directly figured 
by the image of black kinship under erasure. In one of his most famous experiment with 
perspective, Melville assigns each of the chief officers a different reading of the doubloon 
that Ahab hammers to the mast as the reward for the man who spots the white whale and 
that “one and all the mariners revered […] as the White Whale’s talisman” binding them 
together in their quest (416). Each analysis is revealing of the viewer – Starbuck sees 
God, Ahab finds ego, etc. – but Pip, encompassing all of these interpretations in his chant 
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that “I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look,’” offers the final reading of 
the doubloon as marking a form of canceled genealogy. After renaming the doubloon as 
“the ship’s navel” and complaining that the whole crew was determined to “unscrew” 
that navel, he shifts his attention to the mast supporting it. Pip, alone in his focus on the 
structure behind the doubloon, recalls a memory of his childhood: “my father, in old 
Tolland county, cut down a pine tree once and found a silver ring grown over in it; some 
old darkey’s wedding ring. How did it get there?” (420).  
Pip’s initial vision of the doubloon as navel and therefore as the place of primal 
incubation recasts the oath that the crew swore over it from nihilistic vengeance into a 
birth. Yet, if the crew has been born as a new social body, they seem equally bent on 
dissolving that fellowship and “unscrew[ing that] navel,” because their unity is based on 
the shared desire to kill Moby Dick and claim the doubloon for themselves. This birth, 
then, is strongly anti-reproductive one, seated not only in homosociality but also in what 
almost must be called a pre-Freudian death drive. Pip’s shift to marriage, the most 
conventional vehicle for reproduction, hinges on the shared exclusion of racialized 
marriage from genealogy. The token of “some old darkey’s wedding ring,” overgrown in 
a tree trunk with all its meaning lost, is the ultimate symbol of the relationship that will 
not enter history. So little history attaches to that marriage that the only way that Pip has 
to identify the wedding ring as having belonged to a person of color is that the ring and 
the marriage it represented has been abandoned and forgotten.  
Unlike the rest of the crew, Pip has some access to the traces left this kinship, but 
it is only at the cost of his only exclusion and abjection for, even among the Pequod’s 
crew of isolatoes, the prodigy remains on the outside. If the vision of black infancy as an 
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exception from reproductive history and futurity allows Melville to make it a means to 
rendering other types of non-normative kinship legible, these broadened horizons 
reinforce the abjection and exclusion of those bodies. By the novel’s logic, to have 
written Yojo as a living child, rather than as a block of wood in the form of a child’s 
corpse, would have driven Ishmael and Queequeg apart, because caring for him would 
require a reinvestment in future-oriented family that, for Melville, is inextricable from 
straightness. Similarly, while Melville’s crew are made free by abandoning futurity for 
the present, Pip has no such chance. Trapped with a living body and drowned soul, Pip 
remains the sign of, not a participant in, the crew’s refused future. 
Prodigy thus holds a double-edged power as proof of a life that is constantly 
alienated by racial policing but yet that proves the limits of that policing. This doubleness 
is perhaps also inherent in its attachment to childhood, for if infancy has been a means of 
connecting kinship and history, it is because childhood’s position between generations 
and its association with an ahistorical innocence have allowed it to become a symbol of 
both continuity and discontinuity. Hence, Giorgio Agamben argues for a connection 
between ghosts and children as “belonging neither to the signifiers of diachrony nor to 
those of synchrony” and therefore “appear[ing] as the signifiers of the same signifying 
opposition between the two worlds which constitutes the potential for a social system” 
(84). In other words, the dead subject and the not-yet-socialized subject share a position 
as being neither quite signs of time passing or of time being frozen; births and deaths 
might seem to signal the change brought by time, but they repeat continually and 
endlessly. Prodigies may seem isolated, but they appear over and over, and through that 
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repetition, they not only reaffirm white genealogy but also persistently remind that there 
is life, and kinship, beyond the white institutions of family. 
Tempting as it is, then, to seize on children as the way to reject kinship that is 
dependent on its historicity and with it the genealogical fixations of white patriarchy or to 
announce as Lee Edelman does, “fuck the social order and the Child in whose name 
we’re collectively terrorized” in order to say “fuck the whole network of Symbolic 
relations and the future that serves as its prop,” the symbolic associations of the black 
child are neither straightforward nor necessarily straight (29). José Muñoz’s response to 
Edelman that not all children are “the sovereign princes of futurity” reminds us that any 
viable counter to genealogy must take into account that those figures used to prop up 
genealogy can also be those who suffer from its exclusions (95). Recognizing the 
character Pip as both part of an ongoing mode of alienation for black subjects and as an 
inroads into recalling lost histories and the alternative possibilities they offered provides a 
way to think about how the attempts to break out of normative kinship can sometimes 
reiterate the very kind of exclusions that they seek to escape. The nexus formed by 
childhood, blackness, and the many strands of inheritance certainly is an essential site to 
consider reimaging kinship, but as Paul’s work shows, the most productive means to that 
goal may lie in recognizing related suffering and thereby reimaging the image of prodigy 
itself. 
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The Children of Malthus: Overpopulation, Resolution, and Reform in Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Dred 
 
As [British enclosure] progressed northward, the demand for labor in the great towns absorbed 
the surplus population; but when it came into the extreme Highlands, this refuge was wanting. 
Emigration to America now became the resource; and the surplus population were induced to this 
by means such as the Colonization Society now recommends and approves for promoting 
emigration to Liberia.  
 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Sunny Memories of Foreign Lands (1854), p. 303 
 
In the years immediately after the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Harriet Beecher 
Stowe found herself subject to two apparently unrelated strands of public criticism. The 
first was controversy over her novel’s end, which exiles several of its surviving black 
protagonists to Liberia. The second, now obscure, controversy arose during Stowe’s 1853 
speaking tour of Britain and Ireland promoting the antislavery movement and her novel. 
That scandal centered on the fact that, despite her dedication to liberation in the U.S., 
many of Stowe’s British patrons were themselves implicated in the ongoing violence of 
enclosure and the Highland Clearances. Her memoir of the trip, Sunny Memories of 
Foreign Lands, provoked especial ire for its chapter-long endorsement of the Duchess of 
Sutherland, an aristocrat whose family had spearheaded the enclosure movement and who 
had hosted Stowe with an elaborate hospitality during her tour, culminating in the gift of 
a gold bracelet shaped like a shackle (Newman 29). Remarkably, for a text written to 
answer a public outcry already circulating in British and U.S. newspapers, Sunny 
Memories’ defense of the Highland Clearances turns back to the site of her earlier 
critique to argue that the Clearances are the product of the same inexorable laws that had 
spurred colonization in Liberia. In a chain of equivalence that suggests that the U.S. is to 
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Scotland what Liberia is to the U.S. Still more strangely, the common factor for Stowe 
between these two displacements is a distinctly Malthusian conception of “surplus 
population” spilling beyond the nation. Surplus population has reproduced at a rate that 
national borders cannot contain.  
 It is not necessarily surprising that Stowe’s vision of Scotland turns on ideas of 
population – Karl Marx was only one of many critics of Sutherland who accused her of 
the specific crime of Malthusianism.49 Yet, why do these ideas of a population 
reproducing unsustainably evoke Liberia as a necessary term for explaining ideas that 
long-predated that nation? Moreover, what frame of reference allowed Stowe to equate 
the U.S. with the site of her failed ending to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, while likening the U.S. 
to Scotland in the same breath? One answer, I argue, can be found in the novel that 
followed her British tour, Stowe’s 1856 Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp. 
Although Dred has seen a surge of critical interest for its ambivalent endorsement of 
violent resistance, the novel’s foundational interest in population and in particularly 
Malthusian ideas of birth and reproduction has gone largely overlooked. However, by 
attending to the influence of Thomas Robert Malthus’s 1798 Essay on the Principle of 
Population in the text, I argue that we can recognize Dred as a substantial revision of 
Uncle Tom’s depictions of both reproduction and narrative resolution. Borrowing from 
Malthus’s conviction that the domestic sphere is inseparable from the political world but 
                                                           
49 Karl Marx, “The Duchess of Sutherland and Slavery.” [February 8-9, 1853] Dispatches for the 
New York Tribune: Selected Journalism of Karl Marx, ed. James Ledbetter. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2007), 113-119, 116. 
Donald McLeod’s parodic response to Sunny Memories, Gloomy Memories in the Highlands of 
Scotland (1857), echoes Marx in its condemnation of the “monstrous sophistry” that allowed 
Sutherland to espouse a “desire to liberties and blessings upon the American slaves, which they 
so sternly and Malthusian-like deny to their own people” (112).  
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formed a significant source of the nation’s problems, Stowe challenges the reform 
novel’s drift towards the reproductive futurity of marriage plots and their implicit reliance 
on settler colonialism. Instead, Dred offers an experiment in thinking about populations 
that have run out of colonies to which to escape and about families that are the vehicles 
for political violence. 
 Stowe’s refusal to let reproduction form the horizons of the novel has especial 
significance for the long-standing difficulty of reconciling Stowe’s moments of 
radicalism with her novels’ tendency towards much more conservative endings. Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin has famously come under scrutiny for the ease with which the radical 
potential present in the midpoint of the text deflates into a comparatively placid ending, 
in which white readers are left “feeling right” while black characters are neatly banished 
to heaven or to the Liberian colonization project. In Martin Delany and Frederick 
Douglass’s final published exchange about the value of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, nearly the 
only point of agreement between the two is the error of the colonization plot.50 As one 
contemporary African American reader summarized the close of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 
“Uncle Tom must be killed, George Harris exiled! Heaven for dead Negroes! Liberia for 
living mulattoes. Neither can live on the American continent.”51 The novel’s resolution 
thus seems to uphold a white-only U.S. as the reward for white abolitionists, such that, as 
Isabella Furth argues, Liberian colonization “serves as a means of purging a retrograde 
                                                           
50 Martin Delany, “Mrs. Stowe’s Position” and Franklin Douglass, “The Letter of M.R. Delany,” 
Frederick Douglass’ Paper (May 6, 1853): 1. Both are available on Uncle Tom’s Cabin & 
American Culture, University of Virginia, 2012. Web.  
51 Quoted in Isabella Furth, “Manifest Destiny, Manifest Domesticity, and the Leaven of 
Whiteness in Uncle Tom’s Cabin,” Arizona Quarterly 55 no. 2 (Summer 1999): 31-55, 45. 
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element from the American utopia.”52 Rather than positing a solution to racial violence, 
Stowe offers her readers the appearance of closure by instead proposing a removal of 
raced bodies from the field of that violence.  
The intensity of the criticism for this reliance on Liberia to solve the problems of 
the U.S. may well have come as a surprise to Stowe, because the ending that she gives 
George and Eliza is perhaps the most conventional and traditionally satisfying one 
available to the novel; they marry and raise children in a supposedly undeveloped land 
secluded from the political problems of the novel. Liberia, in that framing, emerges as a 
prop for a marriage plot that even Stowe recognizes as insufficient to the narrative. Only 
after showing the impossibility of a stable home in these places, does the plot raise the 
prospect of Liberia; before projecting their move to Liberia, Stowe displaces the family 
from Canada to France and, after political turmoil, from France back to the U.S. (608). 
The plot’s basic structure, too, seems to suffer from the inadequacy of a conventionally 
novelistic ending, in which characters meet good fortune through individual merit 
without any larger systemic change, to address the impossibly systemic nature of U.S. 
racial violence. Noting Stowe’s movement to “two fictional codas and one non-fictional 
chapter” clustered at the end of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Christopher Diller observes that it is 
“almost as if she did not know where or how to conclude her story” (27).  
The promise of a peaceful domesticity fails to cohere in the face of a political 
system that does not recognize the integrity of black families. This critique of marriage 
plot is made explicitly by several African American authors of the period. Harriet Jacob’s 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (1861) famously ends with the declaration “Reader, 
                                                           
52 Furth, “Manifest Destiny,” 48. 
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my story ends in freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage” and that she still does 
“not sit with [her] children in a home of [her] own” because what freedom she has is 
insufficient for security. Similarly, in his 1850 Narrative of the Life and Adventures of 
Henry Bibb, Bibb offers regret for the domesticity he was able to find under slavery only 
contributed to the slave system’s numbers, writing that “if ever there was any one act of 
my life while a slave, that I have to lament over, it is that of being a father and a husband 
of slaves. I have the satisfaction of knowing that I am only the father of one slave” (44). 
Within the area of the U.S., the impossibility of the marriage plot as a resolution for black 
families was a well-established point. 
For the children of George and Eliza to signal the promise of an escape from 
oppression, Stowe cannot just establish a new household. She must imagine some space 
in which that household could be plausibly distanced from the public sphere, a move 
which, as Mark Rifkin has argued, historically relies on  an imperialist vision of the 
world as empty space.53 Stowe’s syllogistic alignment of Scotland, Liberia, and the U.S. 
however reveals a concerned awareness that Britain was treating the U.S. in the same 
way that the U.S. was using Africa – as a means of resolution for the displaced bodies 
that result from a “surplus population,” regardless of whether the other space has already 
been populated. 54 The particular conditions through which Stowe would have 
encountered Malthusianism – the resident of a settler-colonial nation observing a wave of 
                                                           
53 Mark Rifkin, Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American 
Renaissance. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2014).  
54 Before Marx took up the term, the phrase “surplus population” was common shorthand for the 
terms of Malthusian debate. For instance, Dickens’s 1843 A Christmas Carol uses Ebenezer 
Scrooge’s complaint that charity that only promotes “surplus population” to cue readers to 
Scrooge’s Malthusianism (Christianson 80).  
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immigration to her country at the same time that U.S. continental expansion was slowing 
– registers in her particular interest in the putative elsewhere that British Malthusians 
(though not Malthus himself) saw as a solution to population problems. As such, the 
actual text of Essay of Population is in many ways less important than the history of its 
U.S. reception. In particular, I argue that the marriage plot relies upon an imperialist 
imaginary of open space that is impossible in Stowe’s Malthusian world. The liberal 
vision of family as starting in a new space outside of existing politics breaks down with 
Stowe’s awareness of colonial space as an already occupied area. 
 This geopolitical imaginary thus has major implications for narrative form. 
However, it also substantially alters the role of children in Stowe’s novels. Critical 
interpretation of childhood in U.S. literature, particularly nineteenth-century literature, 
has focused predominantly on depictions of white children as a source of utopian 
innocence, even as they attend to the subjects excluded by that construction.55 At the 
same time, a similar and related focus has also grown up around the character of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s Little Eva as the defining template of literary childhood of the period, 
with occasional comparison to the minstrelsy of Topsy, her enslaved counterpart in Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin (1852). But how might the conversation change if attention shifted from 
Stowe’s first novel to her second, Dred: A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp (1856), and 
the archetypal child shifted from Eva to the slightly older and far less innocent Nina? 
                                                           
55 Most notably, Robin Bernstein has suggested that idealized child purity, coded as white, is the 
defining trait of antebellum literature’s depiction of childhood; she writes, “by the mid-nineteenth 
century, sentimental culture had woven childhood and innocence together wholly. Childhood was 
then understood not as innocent but as innocence itself” (4). See, additionally, Lauren Berlant, 
Kathryn Bond Stockton, and Lee Edelman for broader theoretical readings of child innocence as a 
pernicious form of utopianism and Anna Mae Duane, Viviana Zelizer, and Karen J. Sánchez-
Eppler for more detailed examinations of such qualities in the nineteenth century.  
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Rather than sentimentalism, I argue that the relevant lens for understanding the children 
of Dred is actually closer to Malthusianism and influenced by Stowe’s time in Scotland, 
bringing not utopic relief but an intensification and multiplication of whatever problems 
the marriage plot might seek to solve.  
The stakes of this recentering from Eva to Nina therefore go beyond either a 
thought experiment in the disciplinary formation of child studies or another rereading of 
Dred as an isolated text. While I am interested in both of those goals, my priority is that 
reconsidering the ways that children can animate political novels can also reorder our 
understanding of how nineteenth-century plots are able to encapsulate social problems. 
The child seen by sentimentalism and the child seen by proponents of Malthusianism 
prompt dramatically different orientations towards history. The former’s insistence on 
childhood as a separation from the social order of the “adult” world establishes the basis 
for liberal individualism’s singular forgetfulness of the past by suggesting that each new 
individual arises from a vacuum. The latter, as grim and potentially dehumanizing as it 
can be, is able to imagine birth as the index of an accumulating time. In short, it lets us 
see children not as retreats into either domestic bliss or sentimental catharsis, but 
products of and participants in their social world.  
Where Uncle Tom’s Cabin sought to accomplish this by falling back onto a 
trajectory out of the national into the settler colonial, Dred takes on the far more difficult 
business of finding resolution when the household carries its politics with it. By 
presenting childhood as a product of inequality, Stowe prevents the founding of any new 
family from serving as a substitute for the systemic, legal problems of Dred. This failed 
departure from the reach of slavery into domestic bliss is, I argue, the moment when an 
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unlikely strand of Malthusianism creeps into Stowe’s work, allowing her to see childhood 
ongoing imbrication in slavery and to critique the novelistic endings that she herself had 
employed. If Malthusianism is premised on the interpretation of reproduction as having a 
dystopian bent, then the establishment of a new family is no longer an opening in the 
political sphere but a continuation and intensification of national decline. In the case of 
Dred, the U.S. relation to Malthusianism sets her characters on an impossible search for 
new land on which to build new families, in hopes of reaching that now nonexistent space 
beyond politics. Finding none, they spiral inwards towards the impossibly crowded 
wilderness of the swamp at the center of the novel. Through the site of this dense life, 
Stowe captures a different role for the child, recasting birth not as a departure from 
systemic history but as a continuation and crystallization of it. 
 
Malthus and the Americas 
If Stowe had been born in Britain, rather simply a repeat visitor, turning to Malthus as a 
key for understanding her work would be a relatively familiar critical move. It is 
increasingly common for scholars to recognize the influence of Malthus’s theory of an 
inevitable overpopulation over British literature in the nineteenth century. These critics, 
including Lauren Cameron, Philip Connell, and Emily Steinlight, have mapped a 
persistent and sometimes antipathetic influence on how British authors imagined political 
economy, poverty, animality, and biopolitics more generally, pointing to both the 
personal connections between Malthus and the literary community as well as to the 
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saturation of Malthus’s ideas in public discourse.56 However, no comparable body of 
criticism exists in U.S. literary studies.57 This absence is not for lack of early U.S. 
readers. In their recent study, The New Worlds of Thomas Robert Malthus, Alison 
Bashford and Joyce Chaplin push for a more global understanding of Malhus as central to 
nineteenth-century understandings of empire.58 As George Johnson Cady demonstrates, 
many of the first pieces of politic economic writing in the U.S. make reference to 
Malthus, and a number of influential thinkers – such as Matthew Carey, Alexander H. 
Everett, and George Tucker, along with many others – wrote essays responding directly 
to Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population. Conversely, Malthus’s ideas had their 
own American roots. Malthus’s interest in the effect that marriage has on rates of 
reproduction drew much of its inspiration from Benjamin Franklin’s 1755 essay on 
population growth in the Americas, Observations on the Increase of Mankind (Eustace 7) 
and Malthus’s 1807 edition of Essay on Population repeatedly cites Franklin as source 
and interlocutor.  
 Critical inattention in Malthus’s place in early American literature is instead more 
likely prompted by the unstable standing of the Essay on Population among U.S. readers. 
Malthusian ideas circulated quickly and widely among political elites like Thomas 
                                                           
56 See, for instance, Lauren Campbell’s “Mary Shelley’s Malthusian Objections in The Last Man,” 
Nineteenth-Century 67 no. 2 (September 2012): 177-203; Philip Connell’s “Wordsworth, Malthus, and the 
1805 Prelude,” Essays in Criticism 50 (2000): 242-267; Dallin Lewis, “Prophesying the Present: Shelley’s 
Critique of Malthus in A Defense of Poetry,” European Romantic Review 25 no. 5 (2014): 575-590; 
Maureen Noelle McLane, “Literate Species: Populations, ‘Humanities,’ and Frankenstein,” ELH 63 no. 4 
(1996): 959-988; and Emily Steinlight’s “Hardy’s Unnecessary Lives: The Novel as Surplus,” Novel 47 no. 
2 (June 2014):224-241.  
57Rare essays have taken up the question – Beryl Rowland’s “Sitting up with a Corpse: Malthus according 
to Melville in ‘Poor Man’s Pudding and Rich Man’s Crumbs,” Journal of American Studies 6 no. 1 (April 
1972):69-83, for example, offers one such analysis – but there has been nothing approaching the sustained 
attention shown in British studies, particularly after the end of the eighteenth century.  
58 Alison Bashford and Joyce Chaplin, The New Worlds of Thomas Robert Malthus: Rereading the 
‘Principle of Population,’ (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).  
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Jefferson (Jefferson 526) and John Adams (Adams 206), both of whom discuss it in their 
personal correspondence.59 For more casual readers, too, periodicals such as the 
Richmond Enquirer ran essays summarizing and debating Malthusian principles (Eustace 
13-4) and, by 1809, the first U.S. imprint of Essay on Population had appeared in 
Washington DC (Eustace 15). Yet, as historian Nicole Eustace argues, the considerable 
interest among Americans had more to do with celebrating the high birthrates of Anglo 
settlers in the U.S. than in worrying about the misery that Malthus ascribed to those 
births. As she observes, “often, when Americans did offer any approval of Malthus, it 
was only to applaud his exact and methodical accounting of American population 
strength, not to agree with his argument that future increases should be curtailed” (17).  
Malthus, in other words, was more significant for many early American as either a 
convenient antagonist for patriotic political economists or, in more hurried readings, as a 
source of pride and publicity for the country’s growth, without regard for Malthus’s 
larger claims. 
 By the time of Malthus’s death in 1834, popular awareness of his Essay on 
Population was thus hinged on quite different reading of the text than the concerns about 
scarcity that drove British readers and that largely drive modern interpretations. Such 
readings often produced Malthus as a European foil for the heady optimism of U.S. 
settler colonialism, praising American fertility. For instance, when The Cincinnati Mirror 
published a column in 1835 announcing Malthus’s death, they approach his work with a 
                                                           
59 Though Adams does not disagree with the content of Malthus’s arguments, he was somewhat cynical 
about their novelty, declaring in a letter to John Taylor, “that the first want of man is his dinner, and the 
second his girl, were truths well known to every democrat and aristocrat long before the great philosopher 
Malthus arose to think he enlightened the world by the discovery” (516).  
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typically askew understanding of his argument. The unnamed author recommends 
Malthus as “the ablest expounder” of political economy and is confident that his ideas 
will already be familiar to the newspaper’s readers, declaring that “everybody knows 
something of his peculiar doctrines in regard to population” (“Death of Malthus”). The 
substance of what that something is, however, is also quickly put in doubt, because for 
the author, the heart of Malthus’s argument was neither poverty, nor misery, but children 
and the freedom to have them. The author’s summary of Malthus’s work – that “the 
rearing up of children was about the worst sort of business which could be pursued; and 
that their increase would at some day call upon government to interpose checks” – 
provokes a tangent that occupies the rest of the column, which returns to Malthus only in 
its final sentence. Bragging that Ohio is unbeatable for its number of “flaxen-headed, 
chubby-headed yonkers,” the column turns from Malthus to a rhapsodic image of sailing 
down the river and seeing that “in front of almost every cabin […] a swarm of children” 
radiating “contentment and affection.” For the columnist, these children evidentially 
mark the true, titular “Death of Malthus” by supposedly demonstrating the ultimate 
failure of his ideas. 
 This reading of Malthus is somewhat glib – joking, for example, about the 
apparent hypocrisy of Malthus himself having fathered nine children – but its dismissal 
of Malthusian population theory as irrelevant in the U.S. is not so superficial as it first 
seems. Indeed, the text of Essay on Population has its own conflicted relationship with 
the Americas that shaped this U.S. response, predicated on still uncertain status that the 
newly-independent U.S. held to the British geographic imaginary. If The Cincinnati 
Mirror seems unimpressed by Malthus’s predictions that rising populations were a 
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danger rather than a strength, its blithe pride in the children of its western territories 
emerges from a mythology of settler colonialism that Malthus himself helped to 
reinforce, even as he doubted how long-lived its exceptionalism would be. The U.S. 
reaction to Malthus, as a result, was always mediated by its textual status as evidence and 
application in Essay on Population, as well as by the U.S. geopolitical standing as former 
colony and ongoing empire.60   
 As a system that edges towards an equilibrium between births and starvation, 
Malthus’s population theory traces a historical process tending towards a state close to 
stasis, arguing that the poor of Britain already live in this harshly balanced state of 
necessary scarcity in which greater resources would only lead to greater need. Attempts 
to alleviate their hunger must fail, he argues, because “the transfer of three shillings and 
sixpence a day to every labourer would not increase the quantity of meat in the country. 
There is not at present enough for all to have a decent share” (94). In his view, Britain’s 
population has grown to the edge of what it can sustain and any attempt at relieving the 
resulting suffering causes these classes to produce still more children and therefore still 
more need.61 While granting the possibility that food supplies might increase and calling 
for some measures to promote agriculture, Malthus’s conclusion is that no such reform 
                                                           
60 For an example of the way that Malthus’s use of early U.S. demographics as evidence could 
inspire pride, see The North American Review’s 1822 article “An Inquiry concerning the power of 
Increase in the Numbers of Mankind,” which declares that “it was not, however, until the 
publication of the American censuses, that the world was enabled to judge with any degree of 
accuracy, in how short a period this doubling could be accomplished. […] Most of the writers 
who have attempted to answer Mr. Malthus, at least those whose works have lived long enough to 
cross the Atlantic, have been content to acquiesce in the truth of the geometrical increase” (289). 
61 He writes of the English Poor Laws that their “obvious” effect is “to increase the population 
without increasing the food for its support. A poor man may marry with little or no prospect of 
being able to support a family in independence” (97). 
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could ever be sufficient. He writes, for instance, that “the demand for an increase quantity 
of subsistence is, with few exceptions, constant everywhere, yet we see how slowly it is 
answered in all those countries that have been long occupied” (100). Teleologies of 
progress bottom out in this state of a need that is “constant” and amelioration that comes 
“slowly,” if at all. Nations “long occupied” reach what is essentially a saturation point, 
unable to change the condition of a significant portion of their population.   
 However, because he stations Britain at this late stage of population growth, 
Malthus turns to the Americans as a form of control, imaging the Anglo settlers of the 
U.S. as roughly analogous to some earlier, as yet unpopulated western Europe. Census 
data from 1740s New Jersey is set alongside that of England and France to suggest the 
latent reproductive potential of those nations, if they were not already under the stress of 
their existing population. U.S. population figures also form the basis for half of his most 
famous formulation62 – the notion that population increases exponentially: 
In the United States of America, where the means of subsistence have 
been more ample, the manners of the people more pure, and consequently 
the checks to early marriage fewer, than in any of the modern states of 
Europe, the population has been found to double itself in twenty-five 
years. This ratio of increase, though short of the utmost power of 
population, yet as the result of actual experience, we will take as our rule, 
and say, that population, when unchecked, goes on doubling itself every 
twenty-five years or increases in a geometrical ratio. (74) 
                                                           
62 Though Malthus cites another demographer, Richard Price, for the data behind this rate, the 
assertion that U.S. populations doubled every twenty-five years appears earlier in Franklin’s 
“Observations on the Increase of Mankind” (Franklin 9). 
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Malthus centers U.S. reproduction as the nearest available approximation of ideal human 
fertility, substituting its rate of population increase as the universal rate of increase. 
However, in the same moment that Malthus founds his theories upon U.S. data, he 
distances those settlers from the effects of his models. It is precisely because he asserts 
that land is available and unoccupied, despite his acknowledgements elsewhere of Native 
American populations, and that settlers are “more pure” – essentially, that the checks of 
misery do not apply or apply much less – that he can set up the U.S. as the normative 
model for human reproduction. His arguments therefore echo myths of American 
exceptionalism, presenting “the English North American colonies” not only as making 
“by far the most rapid progress” compared with contemporary colonies held by other 
European nation, but as being “probably without parallel in history” for its increase in 
number” (105). Malthus establishes the U.S. as the exception through which he proves 
the rule. 
Although his rhetoric overlaps with the most chauvinistic strands of U.S. 
nationalism, Essay on Population makes clear that a decline into poverty and bare 
survival remains inevitable. In a work designed in large part as a counter to the utopian 
narratives of progress put forward by William Godwin and Marquis de Condorcet, 
Malthus is similarly cynical about imperial expansion as a means of avoiding the poverty 
of Europe. Hence, as much as he praises it above non-British colonies, Malthus makes 
clear that a U.S. decline into the same poverty and bare survival is inevitabile. Disputing 
philosopher’s Richard Price’s belief that American democracy made the U.S. into a 
special case, Malthus argues that “even civil liberty, all powerful as it is, will not create 
fresh land” and observers can be “perfectly sure” that the unparalleled population growth 
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he claims “will not long continue” (197). What appears exceptionalist in Malthus is 
quickly reframed as evidence that the U.S. is on the same trajectory as other nations, 
albeit at a different stage, and that nothing can be done to depart from this path towards 
misery. As he writes, “the situation of new colonies, well governed, is a bloom of youth 
that no efforts can arrest” (198). Thus, settler colonialism may stave off misery from the 
settlers, but the growth that Price saw as proof of a bright future, Malthus took as 
evidence that a future decline was inevitable.   
 What difference is made for U.S. readers of Malthus, therefore, is not a question 
of final results but matter of temporal orientation. Where for Britain, Malthus’s writing 
suggested an endless continuance of a suffering that was already present and mundane, 
for the U.S., the coming of Malthusian conditions appeared as imminent catastrophe. For 
British readers Essay on Population predicts the impossibility of reform, promising that 
whatever policies might be put in place, the current situation of the country would be the 
perpetual situation of the country. For U.S. readers invested in Manifest Destiny, 
however, the core of Malthus was that their time as an alternative to and improvement on 
Europe was running out. As soon as they were unable to colonize further, the misery 
associated with the “Old World” would come for the New. Preempting Frederick 
Turner’s “frontier thesis,” the pro-slavery academic Thomas R. Dew proclaimed as early 
1836 that “the time must come when the powerfully elastic spring of our rapidly 
increasing numbers shall fill up our wide spread territory with a dense population – when 
the great safety valve of the west will be closed against us […] then will come the great 
and fearful pressure upon the engine,” threating mobocracy and an end to private 
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property (19).63 What had been a critique of the Poor Laws, in other words, took on the 
air of the apocalyptic, as the coming applicability of Malthusianism to the U.S. came to 
signify a secular end of days for the nation. 
 The debates that sprang up around population theory were accordingly slanted 
towards concerns, or even outright fears, about the nature of that terminal stage of 
history. Even many Malthusian opponents, most prominently the political economist 
Henry C. Carey, took Malthus’s vision of an eventual scarcity caused by over-population 
as possible, arguing less with its content than its immediacy. As a result, anti-Malthusian 
writings could take on their own strand of apocalyptic language, but with the greater 
sense of distance and therefore complacency about that future. Carey writes, for instance, 
that “the time may arrive when the world will be so fully occupied that there will not be 
even room, but we may safely leave that distant future to the benevolent care of the 
Deity” (77). Similarly, a column for the North American Review entitled “An Inquiry 
Concerning the Power of Increase in the Numbers of Mankind” declares Malthus’s basic 
tenets of population to be “undeniable” but mockingly likens policy decisions based on 
those tenets to a “speculatist in natural philosophy” demonstrating that “the sun was 
gradually but surely expending its stock of light and heat” and therefore recommending 
“the instant necessity of economizing with the utmost care our fuel and oil” (396). While 
these scholars did also seek to counter the grounds of Malthus’s arguments, a large part 
of their response was to defer his version of the future to some more distant horizon. 
                                                           
63 For additional discussion of Dew’s Malthusian pessimism, see Hodgson, “Malthus and 
American Slavery,” 760-761. 
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 In contrast to its original application, U.S. writers therefore took up Malthusian 
analysis not to justify the present as inevitable but to argue for a deliberate management 
of how this future, stable population would be composed. As Dennis Hodgson argues, 
Malthusianism played a significant role in the U.S. debates over slavery, offering pro-
slavery advocates evidence in favor of plantation-based paternalism as the only viable 
system for managing population. At the same time, as Hodgson demonstrates, anti-
slavery writers used Malthus to portray slavery as forcing white populations to struggle 
for increasingly scarce resources against a purportedly faster-growing black population. 
For critics of immigration, too, this competitive population model supported a depiction 
of imperial expansion in the West under threat from the Irish, Scottish, and Southern 
European populations settling west as well. In fact, one of the most famous such 
pamphlets, A Plea for the West (1835), was published by Stowe’s father, Lyman Beecher. 
While Beecher does not cite Malthus directly and does retain the possibility of a utopian 
nation, his assertion that “the West is filling up as by ocean waves; and […] the capital of 
the East and of Europe hold competition for her acceptance and use” retains a sense of 
finite territory and inevitably explosive populations (30-31). For writers like Beecher, the 
chief relevance of Malthus in the nation is as an exhortation to seek racial, ethnic, and 
religious homogeneity in the U.S. lest this coming scarcity threaten white Protestantism’s 
hold on national resources.   
 
What Stowe Learned from Scotland 
The popularity of citing Malthus by both pro- and anti-slavery advocates during the 
debate over slavery had cast Stowe as a tacit interlocutor of his population theory from 
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the first publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. In an 1858 article titled “The Problem of Free 
Society” published in The Southern Literary Messenger, for example, readers are equally 
warned away from “the darkest fictions of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe” and encouraged 
towards “the splendid work of Malthus on Population,” signifying Stowe and Malthus’s 
shared status as central figureheads for the intellectual debate over abolition. Yet, the 
article also gestures obliquely to a more complex connection. In the midst a discussion of 
the suffering of the British working classes, the editorial pauses to take a swipe at one of 
Stowe’s supporters, declaring “that very Duchess of Sutherland, the patroness of Mrs. 
Stowe, and writer of a Pharisaical appeal to the ladies of America on the subject of 
slavery, has ejected for that purpose hundreds of her tenants.” Thus, in rehearsing an old 
argument that British laborers deserved more sympathy than American slaves, the article 
makes a similarly common accusation of hypocrisy within the abolitionist movement. 
 To understand the full import of this aside, though, requires readers to be aware of 
the controversy that had broken out over Stowe’s time in Scotland. As mentioned, U.S. 
readers might have learned of the scandal partly through the writings of Karl Marx, who 
objected to the convergence of the anti-slavery movement and the forcible enclosure of 
common lands.64 In his 1853 New York Tribune column “The Duchess of Sutherland and 
Slavery” critiquing Stowe for her choice of host, Marx describes the shift from the 
community-based practices of Scottish crofters to an abusive tenancy system, declaring 
“the person who stood at the head of this economic revolution was a female Mehemet 
                                                           
64 In a footnote in Capital, Marx suggests he was among the first to bring the contradiction to the 
U.S. public, writing that he “gave the facts about the Sutherland slaves in The New York Tribune” 
(892), and though other papers, such as The New York Observer and The Liberator also reported 
the stories, Marx’s column does appear to be one of the earliest such articles in the U.S. press.  
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Ali, who had well digested her Malthus – the Countess of Sutherland” (116). Complaints 
against the friendship between Sutherland and Stowe intensified with Stowe’s publication 
of Sunny Memories, which explicitly contests accusations of cruelty in the press and 
judges the whole arrangement as an “almost sublime instance of the benevolent 
employment of superior wealth” (313). This markedly favorable approach to the 
Sutherland estate’s policies is also underscored by Stowe’s explanation of the 
demographic changes that enclosure brought in a passage that is one of her clearest 
nonfiction references to population theories and suggests the influences that her friend’s 
“well digested” Malthusianism found a ready audience. Sunny Memories also generated 
the comparison between Liberia and Scotland that provided my epigraph. Stowe’s history 
of Scottish overpopulation finding outlets in the United States mirrors Malthus’s analysis 
of Scotland from the third edition of Essay on Population, which claims that “half of the 
surplus births in Scotland is drawn off in emigrations” (504).65 Moreover, her attention to 
balancing of “surplus population” against the “resource” of available land, whether in 
America or Britain, aligns her framework for understanding this process as a natural flow 
of bodies in mass with the collective bodies that Armstrong identifies with Malthus. 
 More crucial for understanding Stowe’s literature, though, is her attempt to 
translate between Scottish emigration to the U.S. and the potential for African American 
emigration to Liberia. By the time she wrote this passage, Stowe had already publically 
recanted her apparent support for Liberian colonization as well as her decision to end 
                                                           
65 Before Marx took up the term, the phrase “surplus population” was common shorthand for the 
terms of Malthusian debate. For instance, Dickins’s 1843 A Christmas Carol presents Ebenezer 
Scrooge muttering about how charity only promotes a “surplus population” as a way to cue 
readers that Scrooge’s heartlessness is a product of his Malthusianism (Christianson 80).  
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Uncle Tom’s Cabin with its invocation.66 Records of the American and Foreign Anti-
Slavery Society in New York a year earlier report that Stowe wrote to them claiming her 
dislike for the American Colonization society, the primary force in deporting African 
Americans to Liberia (Powell 123). The minutes of this meeting also include a personal 
testimony from an acquaintance of Stowe’s that “Mrs. Stowe had told him that if she 
were to write ‘Uncle Tom’ again, she would not send George Harris to Liberia” (qtd. in 
Powell 123). While the comparison might thus suggest an oblique criticism of 
Sutherland, Stowe’s recasting of both migrations make them appear less as engineered 
events than as inevitable, natural flows; the displaced population that cannot be 
“absorbed” within the nation overflows the borders of the nation.  
 Because Stowe has so little interest in individual action, whether on the part of the 
Sutherland estate and the American Colonization Society or by the Scottish farmers and 
the African Americans those bodies sought to remove, her portrait of these settler 
expansions has a marked lack of utopianism. There is no hint that removal to the U.S. 
will start a new society for Scottish farmers, nor that Liberia will prove to be a promised 
land for African Americans. In fact, rather than isolating these settler colonies as 
exceptional spaces or escapes from the pressure of enclosure or slavery and anti-black 
violence, her emphasis lies in the ways that Scottish settlement in the U.S. or African 
American settlement in Liberia are, in fact, the ongoing results of these systems. 
Compared with George’s apocalyptic vision of the Liberian colony in Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
                                                           
66 I here follow the distinction made by Martin Delaney and others between “colonization,” 
signifying a coercive and white-led removal of African Americans to Africa, and “emigration,” a 
voluntary and black-led renunciation of the U.S. The distinction does, however, break down 
somewhat in my discussion of Malthusian framings of these processes, as notion of individual 
agency gives way to aggregate forces. 
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as the field for “another era to arise” and sign of a coming “hour of universal peace and 
brotherhood” (611), this later Liberia is almost incidental, as if the “surplus population” 
drifted naturally to any place perceived as more empty.  
Rather than offering emigration as an oppositional way of life or a true 
alternative, Stowe frames these departures as continuations, albeit in different forms and 
different spaces, of the systems at work in the original nation. This is the difference made 
by the U.S.’s standing as settler colonial standing; it cannot serve precisely as counterpart 
to either Britain or Liberia because, as Stowe’s recursive analogy – the U.S. is Britain’s 
Liberia, and therefore Liberia serves as the equivalent of U.S. for the U.S. – 
demonstrates, it overlaps each position. This overlap therefore does not and cannot place 
the peoples of the U.S. and Liberia in any truly common footing, for its triangulation also 
erases the genocide still at work in clearing the Americas for the U.S. However, for 
Stowe, the comparison does seem to offer a reminder that if Britain can treat the U.S. as 
merely an outlet for excess population, treating Liberia as a tidy space of resolution fails 
to account for the ways that migrant populations raise new issues of their own or for the 
lives already in progress there.   
 
The Crowds of Dred  
While public backlash against the Liberian colonization plot of Uncle Tom’s Cabin alone 
might have been enough to ensure that her second novel Dred would take a different 
approach, Stowe’s brush with Malthusianism registers in Dred’s attention to the social 
and narrative problems created by too many births. Even from the distance of plot 
summary, Dred is an over-crowded novel. At the text’s opening, the novel’s center appears to 
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be a fairly conventional coming-of-age story, in which the motherless protagonist Nina 
Gordon must mature from the thoughtless flirtations that have resulted in her simultaneous 
engagements with three different men into the Christian and heterosexual maturity of 
marriage. The narrative quickly branches out, however, to the struggles of her enslaved half-
brother Harry, who is desperately trying to keep the plantation afloat to protect his sister and 
to prevent all of the plantation slaves from going to auction, while also trying to preserve his 
marriage with the naïvely perfect Lisette. After Nina’s love interest, the aspiring lawyer and 
idealistic abolitionist Edward Clayton arrives, the novel adds his struggles with the legal 
system to its plot lines, along with the characters of his parents and sister. Running alongside 
the family plots of the Gordons and the Claytons is a plot strand devoted the difficulties of a 
poor, white family squatting on the edge of the Gordon family. Over the scope of the 
narrative, Stowe also takes up two trials based on real events and a religious controversy, 
each centering on characters not yet mentioned. Beside all this is the connecting thread 
offered by the figure of Dred, an escaped slave, mystic, and son of Denmark Vesey who lives 
in the swamp near the Gordon planation and preaches to bring about divine justice by active 
revolution.  
 Dred’s presence in the text and the centrality that the novel’s title gives his 
otherwise peripheral role has drawn a number of critics to note how immediate the 
prospect of apocalypse appears throughout Dred and how inextricable Stowe’s 
eschatology is from her abolitionism. Claudia Stokes describes the plot of Dred as 
enacting the “fulfilment of biblical prophecy” and as a considerable escalation of Stowe’s 
millennialism, in that “where Uncle Tom’s Cabin only foretells the imminent destruction 
of American civilization, Dred dramaticizes such an event, as slavery unleashes chaos 
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and lawlessness” (104). Samuel Otter concurs, declaring that “Stowe in Dred tells a 
different kind of story than she had in Uncle Tom’s Cabin” because, as he explains, “in 
Dred’s swamp, facts are saturated with figures and the nation is on the verge of 
apocalypse” (35). Dred’s oracular position seems clear, given his frequent declamations 
such as “the day of vengeance must come” (518), but the parallel that Otter raises 
between “facts saturated with figures” and the apocalypse helps to suggest why the 
statistical imagination of population would mesh so closely with the mystic warnings of 
eschatology. No single individual success, or individual martyrdom can hope to be 
sufficient for the mass imagination of the novel; the cosmological ending that is promised 
by Dred, but always deferred, represents the only scale on which resolution could even be 
posited. 
 That is to say, in the comparison inevitable to criticism about Dred, that character 
functions very differently than in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Where that novel’s logic of 
salvation by messianic sacrifice – in which the goodness of Eva and Tom make their 
sacrifices sufficient to organize the novel’s emotional weight around their loss – employs 
characters as archetypes so that their singular fate also signals larger social changes, that 
metonymic chain is altogether messier in Dred, because the crowd of characters too be 
represented and redeemed is always swelling. As one otherwise sympathetic review 
published in The National Era in 1856 complained, “there is no one character that runs 
through the whole book, like Uncle Tom” (162). The lack of a clear central protagonist to 
whom readers can cling registers in modern criticism as well. In his explanation of the 
greater success of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Lawrence Buell largely attributes Dred’s 
problems to its more contradictory characters: Harry is too “torn by self-division” to be 
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properly heroic, “Eva’s adolescent quasi-analogue Nina Gordon remains so long a 
frivolous belle that her transfiguration into serious-minded plantation head seems 
unconvincing,” and Clayton is “compromised” by his “impracticality and quixoticism”  
as well as by his association with “Nina’s wobbliness” (242). In other words, all of the 
characters evoke clear types, but none can quite embody that type fully enough to 
become the almost metaphysical icons that the Eva, Tom, and Legree were. Collective 
identities in Dred, whether of femininity or Christianity or even human evil are always 
multiplying and extending in too many directions, for one character to embody so many 
lives. 
One way to explain this shift is to frame it, as Buell does, as an increasing interest 
in realism and in the collision of that realism of with romance (242).What, though, does 
might the “wobbliness” that disqualifies Nina from Eva’s role as national saint and 
scapegoat tell us about the novel’s multiplying body of characters, its persistent interest 
in finding an end that can satisfy our interest in them all, or its continual frustration of 
those hopes? What does the failure of the central child’s innocence, the complication of a 
girl who has clear sexual desire and is a few years too old for that desire to be 
overlooked, reveal about Stowe’s narrative project? Unlike the tidy allegories of Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin that trade on infant utopianism and its underlying promise that domesticity 
can rescue politics, Dred is resolutely committed to endings that exceed the marriage plot 
and to avoid treating childhood as a source of closure. A sweeping system of apocalypse 
looms over the text, because the individualist resolutions of private romance only add to 
the problem of a system that feeds off reproduction. Amid the sprawling expanses of 
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flawed characters, the birth of another child only recapitulates the injuries structuring 
Stowe’s domesticities. 
 Nowhere is this Malthusian influence stronger than in the plot that unfolds on the 
borders of both the plantations and the swamps, in Stowe’s depiction of the poor families 
squatting at the outskirts of the Gordon property. These families are, like the slaves that 
Stowe describes, alternatively caricatured and pitied as the excess of the slave system, 
shown as perpetually unable to find wage labor in a slavery-based system and always at 
risk of falling into slavery themselves – a point that Stowe makes quite directly, having 
Nina’s aunt declare that “There is n't any help for them, unless, as I said before, they were 
made slaves; and then they could be kept decent” (150). The basic argument that slavery 
injured white labor was a common one among the more openly anti-black critics of 
slavery (Foner 59-65), and although she never paints these poor whites as the single or 
even the central object of slavery’s harm, Stowe’s willingness to adopt this line of 
argument veers unsurprisingly close to its racism. What this attention to these squatters 
do allow, however, is to provide a very near analogue to the displacement of Scottish 
farmers that she discusses in Sunny Memories and thereby serve as a proxy through 
which Stowe refines her earlier endorsement of that “progress.”  
 Thus, while the conditions that create this population are distinctly U.S.-centered, 
the language with which the land-holding plantation owners discuss them echoes nothing 
so closely as Malthusian disregard. These opinions, voiced most often by Nina’s uncle, 
John Gordon, and her two aunts, Maria Gordon and Mrs. Nesbit, frame poor whites as an 
impossibly entrenched demographic problem, for which reform is impossible. 
Annihilation is, as John Gordon declares, the only answer: 
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“It’s perfectly insufferable, what we proprietors have to bear from this 
tribe of creatures!” he said. “There ought to be hunting-parties got up to 
chase them down, and exterminate ‘em, just as we do rats. It would be a 
kindness to them; the only thing you can do for them is kill them. As for 
charity, or that kind of thing, you might as well throw victuals into the 
hollow logs as try to feed ‘em. The government ought to pass laws – we 
will have laws, somehow or other, – and get them out of the state.” (251) 
As a “tribe of creatures” and an infestation of “rats,” the poor, for John Gordon, have 
moved past the perceived moral failing like idleness, alcoholism, and dishonesty often 
used to rationalize their class to become both animalized and intrinsically plural. They 
are, as Aunt Nesbit put it, a “whole race” onto themselves (151). Mass violence in form 
of John Gordon’s wish to “exterminate ‘em” or mass displacement in the equally violent 
but more vague desires for “laws, somehow or other” to police them out of the state 
become the only answer with a scale large enough to answer for Gordon’s framing of the 
problem on the level of population (251). 
 This rejection of charity is quickly undone by the power of sympathy, to an 
extent. Nina’s kindness to the children of a nearby family, Fanny and Teddy Cripps, is 
repeatedly held up as a sign of her developing goodness, and she becomes a model for 
Fanny, in particular, after the death of the children’s mother (297-298). Even her Uncle 
John immediately retreats from his position when he sees starving squatters face-to-face 
with an ambiguously worded declaration that “if people are going to starve, they mustn’t 
come on to my place to do it. I don’t mind what I don’t see – I wouldn’t mind if the 
whole litter of ‘em was drowned to-morrow; but, hang it, I can’t stand it if I know it!” 
133 
 
(258). Stowe partly plays off the selfishness of this charity, in which blissful ignorance is 
presented as preferable to aid, by making John into a somewhat buffoonish character, 
blustering but soft-hearted and comically terrified of his wife, who in turn develops some 
minor willingness to give food to the squatting family (289).   
However, Dred remains deeply suspicious of the ability of this downward flowing 
benevolence to offer any meaningful counter to the systemic problems of either poor 
whites or enslaved peoples. After giving food and shelter to the family he had intended to 
evict, John laments that “there must be some place for them in the world” (254), echoing 
the family’s own explanation that they squat because they “an’t got nowhere else to be” 
but “have to got be somewhere,” but more importantly acknowledging the inadequacy of 
his piecemeal offerings (252). They may be coming to his house for dinner, but they have 
no place to stay. Instead, their reliance on John’s goodness is immediately revealed as 
vulnerability, not a utopian hospitality. John continues his sympathy for the squatters by 
indignantly wondering, “why can’t we pass a law to take them all in with our niggers, and 
then they’d have some one to take care of them.” His proposal of white slavery, though 
repugnant to Stowe for both racist and abolitionist reasons, is also the closest that she 
comes to a systemic recommendation (254). Its menace lies partly in its sense of being an 
inevitable possibility. As well intentioned as it might have been, even Nina’s attention to 
the Cripps is, first, premised on their ability to claim relation to a class above their own 
by right of their mother’s having been a Peyton and therefore “one of the most celebrated 
families in Virginia,” a reputation zealously guarded by the children’s enslaved guardian 
Tiff (131). Moreover, Nina’s attention and tutoring in “proper” class behavior cannot 
actually do anything to “save” the children; their only means to escape poverty and an 
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increasingly abusive father and stepmother is a literal escape orchestrated by Tiff away 
from the South. In other words, their environment determined their situation in a way that 
neither education nor individual action could change. Departure is the only option.  
 In fact, for all that Nina’s relatives voice a hyper-violent strand of population 
control, Stowe herself adopts many the demographic logics underpinning their thought. 
In her persuasive reading of Dred, Holly Jackson argues that the text driven towards 
thinking of groups that extend beyond the nuclear family. Noting that one of the plot’s 
closing gestures is, after Nina dies abruptly, to settle Clayton in a platonic threesome with 
his sister and her friend, Jackson suggests that Stowe’s true group ideal “a more group-
oriented affinity, […] denying special significance to relationships that guarantee the 
reproductive futurity of the social order, the traditional maneuver of the marriage plot” 
(85). The groups that Jackson traces are largely positive, but her description of Stowe’s 
tension between her “pronounced strain of genealogical determinism” and her “desire to 
dethrone the family” need not only produce only the affirmative bonds of what Jackson 
terms “a nonkin model of political community” (77). Instead, this insistent focus on a 
relatedness that exceeds the personal attachments of family also hews closely to models 
of population, in which reproduction is no longer the sign of transcendent intimacy so 
much as an almost mechanistically determined byproduct.   
 
The Family Life of Population 
Reading Stowe through this lens of population does not erase the importance of 
domesticity in Dred, but it does highlight the frightening or even predatory relationships 
that can underwrite the nuclear family. Scarcity makes especially clear that the family is a 
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system of distributing resources, and that its members may not benefit equally. The 
children of these impoverished families take on an accordingly threatening air, oscillating 
between piteous and monstrous. Their lack of education renders them, in the words of 
Harry, to be “wild white children” (155), while at other times, they are “scared, cowering 
children […] with features wasted and pinched blue with famine” (252). The burden that 
their birth represents to the family unit is also made surprisingly clear in Stowe’s portraits 
of infancy as animalistic or even cruel. When, for instance, John Gordon confronts his 
squatters, one of his first sights is of a “miserable, haggard woman, with large, wild eyes, 
sunken cheeks […] and long, lean hands, like bird’s-claws,” whose suffering is 
compounded by nursing: “at her skinny breast an emaciated infant was hanging, pushing, 
with its little skeleton hands, as if to force the nourishment which nature no longer gave” 
(251). The blurred boundary between animacy and death of “little skeleton hands” trying 
to draw food from a starving woman presents maternity as an almost gothic torment made 
all the more unsettling by the reversal of an infant actively at work “hanging, pushing” 
upon the passive body of its mother.  
 Even in more traditionally sentimental scenes, in which children might be 
expected to be a locus of sympathy, Stowe decenters them, emphasizing instead the pain 
that they themselves can generate. In a portrait of the dying Susan Peyton, who had fallen 
from the genteel poverty of Nina Gordon into more dire straits by her marriage to John 
Cripps, for example, Stowe recirculates the language of sympathy without quite including 
her child:   
 The poor, frail creature in the bed seemed to be in one of those helpless 
hours of life’s voyage, when all its waves and billows are breaking over 
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the soul; and while the little new-comer was blindly rooting and striving at 
her breast, she had gathered the worn counterpane over her face, and the 
bed was shaken by her sobbings. (127)  
Because she once held higher class status, Susan is accorded a more humanity and clearer 
sense of interiority than the “haggard woman” John encountered; in place of “hands, like 
bird’s-claws,” she has a “soul” as well as a name (251). In the midst of this highly 
conventional language of sympathetic relation, though, in which readers are invited to 
recognize “one of those helpless hours of life’s voyage” as an experience they might have 
endured themselves, Peyton’s child is markedly excluded. Its label as a “new-comer” 
frames the infant as an intruder, while its thoughtless “rooting and striving” against the 
body of a weeping woman emphasizes the animal side of infancy. Where the reader can 
feel for Susan’s pain, the unnamed child shows no sign that it can and seems driven only 
by selfish survival.67  
 Stowe’s borderline demonization of infancy allows her to extrapolate a critique of 
the harms of compulsory heterosexuality from Malthusian reproduction. Susan suffers 
partly from the negligent cruelty of her spouse but also directly as a result of her children. 
Though hungry herself, she routinely gives up her meals to feed them, an act 
simultaneously naturalized and made sinister by Stowe’s explanation that the children, 
Fanny and Teddy, had “stood hungrily regarding her, as children will regard what is put 
on to a sick mother’s plate” (137). They stand watching her, as they might watch her 
                                                           
67 This notion of a child, even an infant, without a natural connection to her or his mother’s pain 
challenges a common antebellum belief that that infant affect is instinctively aligned with what 
the mother is feeling. See Chapter 1 for instances of this belief and a longer discussion of its 
implications. 
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food, in a slippage between being a mother and being consumed that is intensified by the 
detail that a “sick mother’s plate” is under particular scrutiny, apparently because she is a 
weaker target. Their relationship, though framed as far healthier than that with their 
father, resembles parasitism far more than an ideal of maternal martyrdom, especially 
because Susan so explicitly regrets her role in the family. Her greatest emotional 
connection with her children comes when she hails the future adult version of Fanny, 
begging her daughter to find a different life than her own: “go away! go away, child! O, I 
wish I had never been born! I wish you had never been born, nor Teddy, nor the baby! 
It’s all nothing but trouble and sorrow! Fanny, don’t you ever marry! Mind what I tell 
you!” (127). Domesticity and, in particular, the reproductive burden of so unwanted 
births – Fanny’s, Teddy’s, the baby’s – have destroyed Susan so thoroughly that her last 
words about the comfort of Jesus can only partially mitigate that her second to last words, 
“give me rest – please do!” plead for the quiet privacy of death (142).  
 The lives of the Cripps family have a tenuous value in the overarching antislavery 
mission of Dred, threatening to divert the course of the narrative from an abolitionism 
based in the natural rights of black characters like Harry and Dred into a murkier 
argument about the injuries that slavery inflicts on white labor.68 Yet, while their 
presence and the hazy presence of the other families like them may not do much to 
illuminate slavery directly, they do fundamentally change the status of the family and 
romance plots driving the Gordons and Claytons. By insisting on the material labor 
                                                           
68 Although, I do not address it here, Dred has long been understood as practicing a particularly 
legal and rights-oriented form of sentimentalism. For a classic discussion of this interplay 
between feeling and law, see Gregg D. Crane’s “Dangerous Sentiments: Sympathy, Rights, and 
Revolution in Stowe’s Antislavery Novels.” Nineteenth-Century Literature. 51.2 (Sept. 1996): 
176-204. 
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underpinning childhood, Stowe’s frighteningly selfish infants set the possibility of an 
angelic child at a slant and, as I will argue in the next section, the failure of Susan’s 
death, Christian as it was, to elevate, redeem or affect her children in any way other than 
abandonment cues the reader early in the novel to doubt just what heroic death can 
accomplish in a novel with more interest in the aggregate than the individual.  
  
Marriage Plot and the Malthusian Child 
One effect of the conventional marriage plot more broadly has been to regulate when 
children crop up in the narrative, pushing them from the main body of the novel to either 
end of the text. Children appear more frequently at beginning when the protagonist is a 
child herself or at the end, as proof and epilogue of a successfully established marriage. 
The point itself is an old one. Henry James’s 1888 “Art of Fiction” defines the basic 
cliché of the “happy ending” as a parceling out of “prizes, pensions, husbands, wives, 
babies, […] and cheerful remarks” (382). Progeny, alongside property, has been one of 
the most popular currencies with which novels reward their protagonists and mark the 
happy resolution of plot. Exceptions abound, of course. Seduction plots, such as The 
Scarlet Letter or Adam Bede, generate the most mid-narrative children, but the scandal of 
those children and their function in the novel is that their untimeliness proves a deviation 
from the marriage plot proper; the very appearance of such a child proves that the path to 
marriage has gone wrong. Likewise, for sentimental novels like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, the 
tragic redemptive force of the angelic, typically feminine child who dies mid-narrative is 
that because she dies without having matured into parenthood, the untimeliness of her 
death endows her with the transcendent authority of spiritual guardian. In the case of Eva, 
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for instance, Gillian Brown has argued that Eva’s saintliness emerges from the uncanny 
maturity of a girl who “emblematizes the virtues of motherhood as well as of childhood,” 
so that by her death, “Eva is the child who is the mother to the woman” (519). Such child 
saints die without reaching the closure of their own children because their sanctity 
depends on a sense that they have exceeded a normative sense of age and development.  
For the more mundane and “deserving” protagonist, however, passing from being 
a child to having children marks the successful development of subjectivity and its 
accompanying agency. One of the most widespread readings of this movement from 
childhood to childbearing in U.S. literature has focused on individualist development, 
reading the protagonist’s decision to marry as a break from an unhealthy form of 
domesticity and the establishment of a new, more individualist model of kinship. As 
Cindy Weinstein has argued, the initial youth of the main character stages a scene of 
dependence and inherited scandal from which she is redeemed by the individual agency 
of liberal romance, contrasting that final expression of will with what she terms “the pain 
and disaster of the consanguineous family” of her youth (130). For female protagonists 
especially, the expression of consent contained in the marriage plot proves the highest 
form of freedom available to them and the greatest proof that they have chosen their adult 
life, even as it presents heterosexual marriage as the exclusive and inevitable option. 
Gretchen Murphy, too, observes a particularly compact version of this pattern in her 
description of sentimental fiction’s tendency for siblings-by-adoption to become romantic 
partners.  For Murphy, this incestuous strain highlights the importance of the shift 
between a household of birth and a household of choice, arguing that “when the couples 
turn from siblings into lovers, they create a new social fiction that replaces an imperfect 
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one imposed by a previous generation’s choices. Their horizontal bonds represent a 
democratic, bourgeois resistance to symbolic patriarchal power” (354). In other words, 
the shift to marriage also marks a new orientation towards power that promises an escape 
from the weight of the past, while retrospectively proving that the child-protagonist at the 
novel’s opening had always possessed the seeds of that individuality. 
 To read the marriage plot as an answer to the initial, childish dependency of the 
protagonist, though, also introduces a certain circularity: the philosophical problems of 
childhood are apparently solved through the promise of more children. This second 
generation may represent the offspring of a purportedly more democratic, bourgeois 
family structure, but the basic challenges raised by child dependency to liberal 
individualism remains. A number of critics, including Cindy Weinstein and Lauren 
Berlant, have noted that this seeming inevitability of the heterosexual romance as being 
both proof of many female protagonists’ agency and their only option in life, staging the 
imposition of a norm as a celebration of private choice. But this circularity also tempers 
the relationship of children to the larger social body as well. Nancy Armstrong observes 
that, on one hand, the tendency of British Victorian novels to unfold through cyclical 
waves of childhood allows for a mediation between isolated lives and the predictable 
repetitions of a community:  
The figure of reproduction obviously lends itself to a linear developmental 
narrative, where an individual start off as less than a full and independent 
individual and progresses, as Moll, Jane Eyre, Pip, and other protagonists 
do, to a social level where his or her individuality can be socially 
recognized and sanctioned. To signal this achievement, the story cannot 
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stop there but must reproduce itself. Moll writes her story; Jane has a child 
and writes her story; Pip vicariously reproduces himself through Biddy 
and Joe. (109) 
The exceptionalist logic that seems to underpin such plots’ promise to extract the course 
of a singular and particularly remarkable life softens in this closing gesture towards a 
future beyond the end of that life. By turning to reproduction, Armstrong argues, such 
novels reframe the trajectory towards marriage from concern merely over individualist 
consent into a leaning towards community. By ending Great Expectations with a 
miniature, second Pip – whom the narrating Pip recognizes with a start as “I again!” 
(Dickens 430) – the focus moves towards how stories like Pip’s recur and form a 
predictable network of similar lives. In this sense, childhood is a sign of communal 
continuity, marking the similar lives running parallel to and sequentially from the life of 
the protagonist.  
 Literary children, particularly that happy second generation, thus serve a two-fold 
and contradictory role: their innocence promises that the protagonist has successfully 
broken from the historical specters of bad kinship, and their futurity guarantees that this 
historical break will continue to resonate throughout their community. They demonstrate 
that the protagonist has made a life of her own, but they also guarantee that the effects of 
that life extend beyond her death. To put a finer point on the matter, such children act as 
the critical relays between the private and public spheres of the nineteenth-century novel, 
allowing a happy collective future to be extrapolated from the happily domestic end of a 
single life. Their ability to stand in as proxy resolution for the political problems of the 
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narrative relies on the continued vision of childhood as zone of idyllic escape; without 
innocence, childhood offers no departure from either history or politics.  
 My discussion thus far has taken a non-intuitive route towards an observation 
routinely made about both British and American novels of the period, namely that the 
political stakes of reform novels are often twinned with plots about heterosexual romance 
and the successful culmination of those romances are taken as a resolution-by-proxy for 
the reform, or revolution, left undone in the narrative; the marriage plot preempts and 
replaces the political plot.69  As with any truism, there has been a good deal of discussion 
about the limitations of such a model. In this case, the pushback has centered around the 
model’s reliance on a separation between the political and the private. As scholars 
including Patricia Yaeger, Rosemarie Bodenheimer, and Barbara Leah Harman have 
argued, domesticity is by no means an apolitical space, and a shift in setting from factory 
to heath can sometimes represent not a retreat from the political so much as politics by 
another means. I heartily agree with these stipulations. However, rethinking this narrative 
tick with attention to the narrative function played by children and by their role as a 
synecdochal representation of a larger social solution left beyond the horizon of the novel 
allows for a stronger understanding of what type of childhood is necessary to support this 
interpretation. More importantly, it allows for an analysis of how the alternative models 
of childhood circulating in the period create different types of plot resolution and 
irresolution – particularly given that these childhoods are often reserved for children of 
color, queer children, and poor children. Just as recognizing the politics that can inhere in 
                                                           
69 For a foundational discussion of this trope, see Ruth Yeazell’s “Why Political Novels Have 
Heroines: Sybil, Mary Barton, and Felix Holt,” Novel 18.2 (Winter 1985) 126-144. 
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some versions of domestic life shows critique in novels whose endings otherwise appear 
timid or even reactionary, acknowledging that not all portraits of children feature 
innocence or futurity can help us reread the conventional ending of a new birth in a way 
that is both more historically accurate and more politically useful.     
 Specifically, the child’s ability to stand in as proxy resolution for the political 
problems of the narrative relies on a vision of childhood innocence and domestic 
exceptionality that never inhere in Malthusianism. Far from the “infant citizen” ideal 
described by Lauren Berlant as being “not yet bruised by history,” the child in 
Malthusianism represents a continuation and intensification of the political problems that 
preceded its birth (Queen of America 6). As Armstrong argues, Malthus’s focus on 
human desire in the aggregate takes a sharply contrary view of the reproductive drive 
common at the end of a novel; as she writes, under Malthusian frameworks, 
“reproduction ceases to rely on a linear progressive narrative and begins to observe the 
logic of repetition” (115). Distinguishing between the successive logic of reproduction 
and the impersonal amorphousness of repetition, Armstrong reads Malthus as dissolving 
the correlation between private and public satisfaction, describing his Essay on the 
Principle of Population as an “assault on the novelistic assumption that individual 
gratification on a mass scale would lead to collective well-being” (128). I noted earlier 
the inability of Dred to find archetypes – one perfect Little Eva or saintly Uncle Tom – 
whose suffering can stand in for the redemption of the other characters. A similar excess 
appears on the scale of the family. No birth can be messianic enough to signal resolution 
for Dred’s political romances because birth is itself a political event, thus decoupling 
romance from resolution. 
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 Indeed, though it is intensified and made visible by poverty, the dysfunction of 
the impoverished Cripps family extends throughout all of the families of the text. The 
intra-family conflicts of the Cripps, all struggling for a share of the same pool of too little 
food, are echoed in the Gordon family, despite their very different material 
circumstances. While the Cripps’ hunger allows for a concrete demonstration of the costs 
that children exert on adults, the same set of pressures emerge in similarly damaging 
ways in the Gordon household in order to provide Nina with childhood. By making 
obvious the forces necessary to produce children like Nina – the human costs of white 
girlhood – Stowe repositions the symbolic force of white girlhood. In her reading of 
Eva’s role in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Hortense Spillers argues that the structuring logic 
behind Eva’s death is a patriarchal compulsion to punish the girl for her desires that is 
then extended into the body of Tom (“Changing the Letter” 176-202). Dred proceeds by 
an inverted logic, dramatizing the destruction of black bodies necessary before a white 
girlhood can even be imagined. By thus building the production of white childhood into 
the historical trajectory of slavery, Stowe prevents childhood from serving as a substitute 
for resolution; the white children of Dred are part of the problem and no source of 
utopian relief.  
 
The Production of White Girlhood 
This mistrust of reproduction on the large scale also filters into the individual childhoods 
of Dred. With a name that makes her link to girlhood almost allegorical, Nina has a very 
decided aversion to becoming an adult, despite her late-teenaged years, showing a 
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reluctance to marry that aligns her with Susan Peyton’s warnings.70 Though the text 
opens with her having accrued three engagements, marriage remains unappealing and 
confining to Nina, who declares, “I think it’s a very serious thing, this being married. It’s 
dreadful! I don’t want to be a woman grown. I wish I could always be a girl, and live just 
as I have lived, and have plenty more girls come and see me, and have fun.” (118). The 
erotics of this wish to remain in girlhood, surrounded by girls and steeped in fun, hinge 
on the pleasure of unproductiveness and stasis – the luxury to “live just as I have lived.” 
Where heterosexuality leads towards maturity, labor, and seriousness, the experience of 
childhood permits a sense of sexuality without constraints or burdens. Like the otherwise 
unspeakable desire that Spillers locates in Eva’s wanting of Tom (191), Nina’s 
immaturity allows her a free-floating aura of sex not yet funneled towards family or 
home. Unlike Eva, though, the other characters of Dred seem well aware of these 
desires.71 As her then fiancé Clayton remarks, “Nina isn’t a woman; she is a child - a gay, 
beautiful, unformed child” (59). Nina’s childishness is not contrary to her sexuality but is 
part of its allure. 
However, much as childhood is not excluded from the sexual desires of adults, 
Stowe’s child characters are, from birth, interwoven into the systems of inequality that 
she depicts. Millie, the enslaved woman largely responsible for raising Nina explains that 
she has endured the sale of her fourteen children with the profit going to raise the 
                                                           
70 Nina’s biological age is not clearly marked in the text. At its opening, Clayton refers to her as 
eighteen (61). However, by the time of her death, which comes after some three or four months in 
the time of the plot, the narrator refers to her as seventeen (460).  
71 As a college friend of Clayton describes her on one occasion, Nina is “a spicy little puss” (384) 
and, on another, she appears full of mysterious animation: “She’s alive, every inch of her! she 
puts me in mind of a sweet-briar bush, winking and blinking, full of dew-drops, full of roses, and 
brisk little thorns, beside! Ah, she’ll keep him awake!” (391). 
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children Nina’s Aunt Harriet. For Millie, the production of angelic-seeming white girls is 
already reliant on the hidden sacrifice of black children. As she says of Nina’s cousin and 
counterpart, “when Miss Susy came home from boarding-school, she was a pretty girl; 
but I didn’t look on her very kind, I tell you, ‘cause three of my chil’en had been sold to 
keep her at school” (236). The equation is as direct as it is brutal; three black girls must 
be erased for every white girl who enters the scene. 
Millie’s loss is extreme, but it is not unique, for Nina’s childhood is revealed to be 
yet another repetition in a cycle of such sacrifices. Nina’s joyful carelessness about 
money is subsidized by her mixed-race brother Harry, who having been charged by their 
dying father to act as guardian for his sister, has kept her out of bankruptcy by repeatedly 
using his own freedom-money to pay her bills. His continued enslavement is, by the most 
literal accounting, the cost of her continued innocence, a fact that Harry himself is aware 
of and tries to tell Nina, declaring “Love you? You have always held my heart in your 
hand! That has always been the clasp on my chain” (199). As the case of Harry shows, 
the violence of these family ties extends beyond the physical into the affective. Millie 
shows immediate and sustained resistance to the sale of her children, but for a character 
like Harry, raised to conflate family and slavery by his father/owner, his investment – 
again, a literal, as well as affective one – in maintaining Nina’s childhood on 
conventional terms costs him his freedom, a fact that her eventual death has no 
redemptive power to counter.  
 The power that white childhood does exert in Dred instead proves to be the power 
of extending slavery outside the institutions of enforcement, demonstrated most directly 
again by the Cripp household. Temporarily abandoned by their father after the death of 
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Susan, the still functionally enslaved Tiff takes charge of rearing Teddy and Fanny, 
acting as both parents while directing the children adopt the manners of his former, 
higher-status owners, the Peytons. This parentage proves Tiff’s affection for the children, 
his social awareness, and his considerable talent for adopting society’s various roles, as 
well as undermining the essentialism of these roles; as Jackson describes it, “Fanny learns 
to be a white upper-class lady from a gender-bending black man” (81). Yet the forms that 
Tiff’s household takes recapitulates slavery, seemingly because slavery shapes the only 
attachments that he can imagine to the children. As Stowe describes the home that he owns, it 
is both a perfect, secluded happy family and a crystallization of slavery: “the interior of the 
poor cottage bore its wonted air of quaint, sylvan refinement; and Tiff went on with his 
old dream of imagining it as an ancestral residence, of which his young master and 
mistress were the head, and himself their whole retinue” (499). In fact, it is because their 
home is removed from institutions of slavery, which would have otherwise put Mr. 
Cripps in charge, that Tiff is able to recreate this fantasy of aristocratic Southern family.  
To reduce this “dream” to false consciousness alone would patronize a character 
who, while often cloyingly subservient and caricatured, also maintains his own secret 
connections with Dred (514) and successfully escapes with the children to the swamps 
and onto to the North. Instead, Tiff occupies a more complicated stance, in which his 
expressions of devotion to Teddy and Fanny are both important markers in his own 
identity. Labeled during their time in New York as part of the collective of “Tiff and his 
children,” Fanny and Teddy are the family that Tiff made for himself, but because those 
family forms emerged in slavery, they never entirely depart from it. Even after the group 
resettles in Canada, the language that Tiff uses to show his pride in a grown Fanny is that 
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she socializes with families that are “e’enamost up to old Virginny” (676). He has 
successfully taught her to be as good, or almost as good, as slaveholders. Thus, while 
critic Tess Chakkalakal turns to the enslaved marriages Dred for an example of family 
relationships formed without the state – arguing that “a marriage between slaves provided 
Stowe with the necessary terms to articulate the condition of an ideal marriage” because 
they are shown “existing apart from the law” (33) – vertical family relationships between 
guardians and children become a site where slavery can persist in new, extralegal forms. 
 
The Spaces of Resolution 
Stowe’s attention to the potential of children to embody and reenact oppression warps the 
geography of Dred into new shapes and spaces, and it provides us alternative ways of 
interpreting her concluding move to convention. Martha Schoolman’s reading of the 
novel’s recursion to the central swamp of the title as a place of refuge and resistance 
urges critics not to understand the Great Dismal Swamp as what she calls the “ultimately 
normative project” of reinvesting in the nation, because the swamp is not straightforward 
national though it lies within national boundaries (170). Instead proposing a dialectic 
pattern of internal reform spurred by the pressure of revolutionary violence, Schoolman 
argues that Dred “triangulates the fantasy of a resistant region – the imaginary free place 
on the map – with the political drama unfolding in 1856” (170). Through depictions of 
maroonage, Schoolman suggests that Stowe and other white abolitionists attempt to 
reconfigure the dynamics of their movement and build stronger interracial alliances 
outside the hierarchies of the U.S. Still, what I want to suggest is that Stowe’s vision of 
this withdrawal and the further withdrawal to Canada that awaits the swamp’s residents 
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does not so fully shed the structures of the nation, because for her, this movement 
towards a sheltering wilderness still follows the scripts of settler colonialism. In 
particular, they preserve the family structure that makes settler colonialism possible.  
 For Stowe, the dream of departing from the state in order to protect the family 
retains its ties to both empire and the marriage plot. The promise of the swamp is as 
explicitly literary, as it is political. Hannibal, an escaped slave who becomes a leader 
among Dred’s men, for instance, joins the ranks of Stowe’s literate slaves but though he 
has a Bible, his reading of choice is instead Robinson Crusoe, because the marronage 
novel avoids him a glimpse of liberty that Bible apparently cannot. Reading it, he 
imagines a precursor of his marronage:  
There he yearned after the wild freedom of the desolate island. He placed 
his wife and children, in imagination, in the little barricaded abode of 
Robinson. He hunted and made coats of skin, and gathered strange fruits 
from trees with unknown names, and felt himself a free man. (639) 
Stowe does not discourage or discount Hannibal’s dream, but she does dwell on parallels 
between her version of marronage and the colonialist departure from Europe to the 
Americas. The swamp provides that “wild freedom” but also tracks to the fantasies of 
empty land that inspired Defoe. Moreover, Hannibal’s desire is not just to be the man 
alone in nature, but the family alone. The domestic ideal of a “little barricaded abode,” 
closed off from intrusion, runs so closely parallel to the portrait of the home as a sphere 
without politics so thoroughly challenged throughout the novel that it is hard to imagine 
this dream without considerably footnoting what it means to export family in this way.   
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In her much-cited essay, “Manifest Domesticity,” Amy Kaplan challenges critics 
to remember the centrality of “women’s work” on home in defining and expanding 
national boundaries. Stowe’s move to consider the domestic even in exile performs a 
comparable maneuver in reemphasizing that because politics structure domesticity, 
escape to a new home in a new space may export politics with it. Thus, as novel finally 
embracing the cliché of the marriage plot, with Fanny’s long-lost aunt returning to 
bestow Canadian land enough for the various characters to form a new settlement and 
wealth enough for Fanny’s happy wedding to a family friend - a reversal so artificial and 
unlikely that Stowe herself marks its literariness, pronouncing the inheritance “so 
romantic a nature, that, had we not ascertained it as a positive fact, we should hesitate to 
insert it in our veracious narrative” – attention turns not to what is resolved but what is 
remains the same (671). The final words of the novel, showing of a proud Tiff “trundling 
a little wicker wagon, which cradled a fair, pearly, little Miss Fanny, whom he informed 
all beholders was ‘de very sperit of de Peytons’” return us to Tiff’s role in Virginia 
pushing the original Miss Fanny and Miss Susan before her (678). The hauntings of the 
slave-holding Peytons lingers in the ambivalent repetition of white infancy.  
 As interested as Dred is in institutions, whether law, religion, or government, 
Stowe therefore suggests that leaving these structures behind is not enough, when slavery 
and racism have also saturated the narratives available for that departure. The making of 
a new family in the wilderness is itself a continuity of historical processes rather than a 
break in them and, if anything, threatens a hastening of collective misery that multiplies 
the social forms that it seeks to escape. The birth of a new Fanny in Canada only gives 
the spirit of the Peytons a foothold in new territory. Though it is a project that the novel 
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never fully accomplishes, by re-embedding childhood in the systems of the past, Dred 
pushes for a reexamination what it might mean to step outside the nation without the 
shield or confinement of imperial domesticity, to encounter the crowded world without 
reproducing it. 
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Outgrowing the Body: Contract Law, Child Labor, and the Coming-of-age 
Narrative of Harriet Wilson’s Our Nig  
 
“When an infant’s contract is in its nature beneficial to him, it binds him in infancy and at 
age: when prejudicial, it is absolutely void from the beginning.” 
Leech v. Agnew, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 7 Pa. 21: 1847 Pa LEXIS 195 
 
 
Cynthia Barns entered the public record in 1822, when she was seven years old. 
Described as the child of a dead father and a mother “who is poor and exposed to want 
and distress and has no one to take proper care of her,” Barns represented a problem to 
the town of Pomfret, Connecticut. While it was clear that someone had to take care of 
her, it was an open question who in the community would do so. Pomfret lacked the 
institutions – orphanages, children’s homes, or juvenile prisons – that would have stepped 
in had Barns lived in a bigger city or a later decade. Instead, the town deployed an earlier 
tool for managing unattached children, opting to indenture her to a Samuel Richmond and 
his wife. In exchange for the promise that Barns would serve them “faithfully and 
dutifully” until the age of eighteen and a one-time sum of twenty-five dollars, the 
document contracts the Richmonds to care for Barns’s needs in the present, by 
“furnish[ing] her in sickness and health with proper food, physic and clothing suitable for 
every day ware and suitably for Lord’s day with suitable Lodging and washing” and to 
train her for the future in “the business of housewifery & pinning & knitting & sewing.” 
As a precursor of the welfare state, indentures of this kind functioned as an explicit 
suturing of a subject into social structures from which they were otherwise excluded – 
Barns was understandably considered unable to find a profession on her own, and her 
mother was considered too poor to act as a guardian.  
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 The resulting document looks strange from the perspective of contemporary 
divisions of public and private. Barns is held to be too young to enter into the market 
herself and, so, must be placed within a family, yet her physical labor is still presented as 
a marketable object available as compensation for her care. Similarly, the wages that 
Barns receives come in the form of goods and services that are often seen as falling 
outside of the sphere of employment; she receives no money during her apprenticeship 
but does have a promise that her physical needs will be met. Barns’s indenture comes 
close to being a privatized system of welfare, but her status as both a laboring body 
available for contract and a subject in need of protection from the market creates a more 
fundamental complication to ideas of private and public. Indenture subsidizes her 
eventual entry into the workplace through a limited exposure to the same, projecting a 
future of work that is paid for by the same labor that the text excludes from the public 
sphere.  
 Despite its paradoxes, the indenture of Cynthia Barnes was an utterly generic 
transaction for that period in New England: first, because apprenticeship was a common 
means for managing supposedly indigent children (Tomlins 275), but also because the 
text itself relies on a long tradition of conventions about what it means to be and possess 
an apprentice. Although the document itself is handwritten, its form follows the scripts of 
printed indentures of the day, listing the parties involved, then the term, then the duties of 
the apprentice, the reciprocal duties of the master and mistress, and finally a standardized 
concluding oath. When I say, then, that the indenture was a generic document, to all 
appearances, its genre is that of the contract. Two parties have come to a potentially 
mutually-beneficial arrangement, sanctioned and enforceable by law. But, and it takes no 
154 
 
special close-reading to see this, the norms of contract just as absolutely do not apply to 
Barns. The nominal role of the indenture is to substitute for Barns’s inability to consent to 
contract, and it is not at all clear that she is even a party to this agreement. Her signature 
does not appear and the introduction lists “Select men” of the town who are making 
arrangements on Barns’s behalf. Regardless of these limitations on Barns’s consent, 
recognized even in the indenture binding him, the document nevertheless maintains the 
basic forms of contract and appears as if Barns’s consent can be safely stipulated without 
its actual inclusion. Cynthia Barns, as we know her through this document, thus appears 
as a curious inversion of market tendencies to emphasize the will and privatize the body. 
 Beyond its role as a not-quite-contract, though, Barns’s indenture relies on 
another and equally recognizable genre, that of the coming-of-age narrative. Spanning the 
girl’s life from seven to eighteen, the indenture sets out to imagine how she will progress 
from an impoverished and fatherless child to a skilled worker, equipped with personal 
property (on turning eighteen, Barns will also receive  “two good suits of Cloths” and a 
Bible) and an ability to work for herself in making clothing. The resemblance is more 
than more than incidental. As this chapter will argue, the logic of indenture like Barns’s 
relies on its narrative power to imagine this development of a child considered to be 
outside the social world to an adult with a place in it. While my first chapter touches on 
the explicitly coercive aspect of these documents by noting their use as a tool of the 
juvenile prison system, this chapter takes up the productive potential of apprenticeship’s 
estrangement from the rules of contract and from the market more broadly. The indenture 
of Cynthia Barns is a functional text meant to provide for her survival, but as such it is 
also a theorization of the relationship between her body needs and her projected value as 
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an economic agent that is made possibly only by her age. What would it mean to take 
indenture’s particular articulation of body, capital, and will as a potentially useful 
challenge to operations of contract, or to take the child apprentice as a key model for 
reconceptualizing the workforce more broadly? 
 This centering of the indenture as a means of understanding how individuals fit 
into economic systems is, I argue, one of the principal tasks of a novel focused on a child 
whose life echoes that of Cynthia Barns: Harriet Wilson’s 1859 novel Our Nig, or, 
Sketches from the Life of a Free Black. Our Nig focuses on the life of Alfrado more 
commonly called Frado, a young black girl in Massachusetts who, despite living in a 
nominally free state, works in bondage for a white family until she reaches adulthood. 
Wilson herself had been indentured as a child due to family poverty in New Hampshire 
about a decade after Barns was bound as an apprentice, and though Our Nig has been 
shaped by indenture, Frado’s captivity has been largely read as a close analogue of 
slavery rather than a distinct system.72 Similarly, though the autobiographical quality of 
the text is widely acknowledged, Our Nig is more often read as an intersection between 
sentimentalism and the slave narrative than as a participant in the coming-of-age 
narrative herself. I do not mean to suggest that the critical tendency to minimize the 
important of age in the structure of Our Nig is negligent or even entirely wrong. 
However, I do want to attend the generic expectations that this reveals about the 
bildungsroman. Frado is difficult to slot into the traditional role of a character who has 
come of age because the conclusion of the novel leaves no sense of Frado becoming 
reconciled with the social order or having an established place within it. By Our Nig’s 
                                                           
72 See Hapke, Labor’s Text: The Worker in American Fiction (2001) for one such reading.   
156 
 
end and during the close of her adulthood alone, Frado has left the Bellmonts, worked at 
sewing, learned to manufacture bonnets, returned to the Bellmonts, left again, married, 
had a child, been abandoned by her husband, and gone into business as a seller of hair 
serum. As the text closes, Frado begins to write her narrative after having been forced to 
place her son with the Poor House and with no prospects of escaping the institution 
herself except – and, here, Wilson juggles character and author – through the sale of the 
novel.  
One reason that indenture has received relatively little attention in Our Nig is that 
the idea of such an arrangement only enters the text through retrospection and, even then, 
is presented almost explicitly as fictitious. Late in her time with the Bellmonts, when she 
is approximately sixteen or seventeen, Frado considers her chances at either escaping 
from or killing the abusive Mrs. Bellmont, whom she refers to as “Mrs. B.” With 
practical concerns and the intervention of an “overruling Providence” preventing these 
options, however, Frado “finally decide[s] to stay contentedly through her period of 
service, which would expire when she was eighteen years of age” (60). This set “period 
of service” is mentioned causally, as though it has been an established feature in Frado’s 
life for the entire text. In fact, it is the only reference to any formal constraints on her 
labor, appearing to reference a contract whose existence Wilson has already made 
improbable. The moment when this arrangement might have been made, when Frado’s 
mother, Mag, first leaves her at the Bellmonts, Mag lies to both child and family, 
claiming that she will return for her child after an errand. Frado, for her part, continues to 
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believe that her mother will return for the first full year of her time with the Bellmonts, 
only gradually realizing her condition.73  
Wilson’s exclusion of the indenture when it might be expected to appear and her 
reference to it when indenture was on the verge of being irrelevant, as I argue, forces a 
different reading of Frado’s consent, but on a more basic level, it also reshapes the basic 
trajectory of the text. Wilson makes it impossible to see apprenticeship as foundational to 
Frado’s development and, moreover, establishes that linear development might not be the 
way to understand Frado’s life. To the extent that indenture shapes Frado’s life, it does so 
in looping, unpredictable directions. Rather than following a conventional progression to 
property-holding adulthood, Our Nig undoes the associations between aging, class, and 
race to reread maturity as an index of power and therefore a change that, for Frado, 
cannot be linear.  
 The structure of Our Nig, as well as the historic lives of the antebellum children 
eligible for indenture, prompts us to think about what it would mean to narrate a life that 
does not take a simple arc towards market-based freedom, but that remains in flux, 
repeats, or stagnates. At stake is the long-standing difficulty that that the coming of age 
genre as a whole has had in encompassing the lives of dispossessed people. While it is 
common enough to encounter novels that begin with the young and poor, few end with 
such heroes. The proof of maturation tends instead towards the accumulation of capital 
and the stability that this capital can bring. The buoyant upward mobility of Horatio 
                                                           
73 I differ here from Barbara A. White’s reading. In her analysis of the autobiographical content of Our Nig, 
White considers Frado’s limited education and her social context and concludes that the girl’s indenture 
was likely real. My emphasis instead focuses on how artificial such an indenture appears within the 
narrative itself.  
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Alger’s boy-protagonists are archetypal for such mobility, and while the end result tends 
towards the safely limited wealth of middle class life rather than unchecked luxuriance, 
property – in the form of stable wages, an established home, and basic comfort – 
demonstrate that a struggling protagonist has “made it” at last. As Jed Esty has written, 
the coming-of-age narrative has long operated as “the genre of progress” whether in 
showing that society can change to accommodate new member or, more often, that young 
misfits can successfully warp themselves into the shapes demanded by society (409). 
Unstable lives, in which no one profession ever lasts very long and no single home is 
permanent, along with overly stable lives, in which the same factory job lasts from 
puberty until death and one’s hometown remains home, have less of a place in this canon 
of upward mobility. For a genre defined by progress, Frado’s movement from captivity in 
a private home to a precarious life constantly under threat from slavers and destitution 
does not automatically register as plot. 
 If the traditions of the coming-of-age narrative dictate that a growing body be 
paired with a rising social position and accumulating capital, Wilson borrows from the 
discourses of indenture to create a text in which the temporalities of the body and capital 
at odds. Part of this analysis is born from the very real connections between indenture and 
poverty after 1800, but it is also born from the more abstract negotiation of the child body 
that indenture represented in period. Beginning the rise of early industrialization when 
Wilson experienced indenture, the legal definition of consent for child workers was 
subject to constant revision as courts attempted to balance a version of freedom based in 
liberal contract against the belief that childhood was imperfectly rational and only 
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partially autonomous.74 In the process, the child worker became an instance in which 
legal persona could not be cleanly abstracted from material body and thereby troubled the 
line between social and corporeal versions of personhood. Yet in a time when contract 
was increasingly privatizing the physical needs of the youngest child workers, Wilson’s 
return to older systems of indenture pushes against an erasure of the body. Instead, her 
work turns on the need for legal acknowledgement of the corporeal effect of labor. I 
argue that reading Our Nig through the lens of indenture law provides us with a vision of 
the child body under contract as a suspended and partial object that also signals their 
suspended and partial acquiescence to the social order. Rather than just another familiar 
critique of contract, Wilson, I want to suggest, borrows from indenture to formulate a 
different legal topos with a division between public and private that is not dependent on 
the course of bourgeois life.  
 I begin with an analysis of the legal reasoning behind indenture and its 
convergence with the coming-of-age form, after I which I move to an overview of 
Wilson’s triangulation of age, labor, and the body in her novel. In this section, I argue 
that the interplay between multiple definitions of maturity are critical to defining Frado’s 
place within the Bellmont family. In the overlapping set of social, chronological, and 
physical changes that mark progression into the adult sphere, Wilson challenges the 
naturalization of any single conception of development and instead turns attention the 
coercive potential of these trajectories. I turn then to indenture’s own narrative 
tendencies, tracking how first how apprenticeship contracts projected future integration 
                                                           
74 See James Schmidt’s “Restless Movements Characteristic of Childhood” (2005) for a historical overview 
of these legal changes.  
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into the adult world and second how they nonetheless retained a counterintuitive privacy 
around children in the present. By seizing on indenture’s dual interpretation of the child 
body as a preeemptive signal of adult legibility in the public sphere and as a site where 
law fails to take full purchase, Wilson leverages infancy to image the possibility of a will 
that exceeds contract. In its turn to an abstract infant body, indenture law posits the 
existence of a body that it does not seek to define. It therefore registers materiality and, 
more specifically, material embodiment, but it does not attempt to outline that body or to 
define its relationship with the self. Indenture, thus, offers Wilson a legal vocabulary to 
describe the physical effects of labor and poverty while leaving Frado a measure of 
personal privacy. Rather than merely a source of greater vulnerability, then, Frado’s 
childhood offers her a position of remove and an opportunity to recast her coming-of-age 
away from assimilation. 
 
Indenture as Bildungsroman 
Infancy has not always meant the stage of very young life that it suggests now. For legal 
writers throughout the nineteenth century, infancy instead named a much longer stage of 
special status under the law. An early alternative for the category of the “minor,” “infant” 
was generally used to classify subjects under the age of either eighteen or twenty-one 
years old as holding different rights and duties than adult subjects.75 Yet, by modern 
categories of age and even by the term’s informal use at the time, the legal writing that 
                                                           
75 British common law established the threshold at twenty-one, setting the standard precedent for U.S. law 
(Blackstone 451). Some state laws, however, did create slightly different definitions. As an 1891 law 
dictionary notes, while infancy is generally categorized without reference to sex, Illinois legislated in 1864 
that female infancy would held to end at the age of eighteen (Bouvier and Rawle 793). Similar 
differentiations occur in Pennsylvania laws from the 1830s regarding the indenture of minors in the custody 
of the states; see chapter one for this discussion.   
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emerges from this convention – in which phrases such as “infant females, at the age of 
sixteen” or “if the infant be a farmer” were commonplace76 – feels like catachresis. The 
insistence that a twenty-year-old has less in common with a twenty-two-year-old than 
with a toddler or that an infant might sometimes stand, plow a field, or speak Latin 
likewise seem almost bizarrely disproportionate. The disjuncture of these images arises in 
part from the implied binary between infant and adult, in which maturity arrives all at 
once, but it also stems from a more basic break in how the law conceives of age. While 
“infancy” used informally summons up the deeply physical dependency of a subject 
unable to walk or perhaps even to sit unsupported, the parameters of legal infancy 
attempt to approach the details of the child body as largely irrelevant to its classification. 
 Instead, what nominally determines maturity or its absence under the law is the 
ability to be heard in the public sphere. Infant in this sense draws on the word’s origins, 
“in-fans” or non-speaking, to name an imposed silence, a declaration that the speech of a 
minor could not properly be recognized in court as the sign of intention or testimony 
(“Infant”). Thus, in the realm of law, a stage more commonly aligned with biological 
development came to index a set of absent or cancelled voices. Though practical nuances 
always existed and state laws made provision for younger marriage or younger criminal 
responsibility, the speech of a twenty-year-old witness was theoretically grouped first 
with that of a three-year-old, no matter how physically different their capabilities might 
be. The uniform silence imposed on these varied bodies, however, also points to a failure 
by the law to abstract civic identities before adulthood, so that even in legal infancy, the 
                                                           
76 I have taken these particular usages from James Kent’s 1832 Commentaries on American Law, vol. II, 
pg. 227 and William B. Wedgwood’s 1867 The Government and Laws of the United States, p. 143. 
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body lingers. In the constructed silence of child subjects, the law traces the outline of a 
physicality that it was reluctant to acknowledge more directly.  
 Although legal infancy is a status apparently uninterested in distinguishing the 
body of a newborn from that of a post-pubescent, its rationale relies on the perceived 
weaknesses of the child body. William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, a 1760s treatise on British common law and the central source text for 
antebellum law, distinguishes infancy from adulthood in criminal cases lies in the 
difference between will and act. A crime must represent both a “vicious will” and a 
“vicious act,” but infants cannot comprehend their actions well enough to be responsible 
for them. Blackstone writes, “where there is no discernment, there is no choice; and 
where there is no choice, there can be no act of the will, […] he therefore, that has no 
understanding, can have no will to guide his conduct” (21). Classifying infancy alongside 
“idiocy, lunacy, and intoxication,” he therefore determines that the physical actions of 
children cannot be understood as representative of their minds. Instead, children were 
held to be bodies acting without will, or without will that was officially legible. Thus, the 
silence prescribed to infancy arises from their excessive embodiment. In these instances 
when “the will does not join with the act,” Blackstone seeks to establish why children 
should be spared from criminal responsibility and the harshest of criminal punishments 
(21).77 However, this interpretation also provides the logic by which children were 
                                                           
77 His argument that child criminals have historically been treated as a distinct class from adults does, 
however, includes a number of exceptions and finely parsed distinctions that, much like the current U.S. 
system, rests in large part on whether the court believes the child to have adult understanding or active 
malice. For instance, although the age of majority for Blackstone is generally twenty-one, he records the 
burning of a thirteen-year-old girl for “killing her mistress” and the hanging of a ten-year-old boy for 
murder on the grounds that he attempted to hide the body and thus showed guilt (23). 
163 
 
excluded from a host of civil actions. As a group, he suggests, children were too bodily 
for the law to view their actions or their speech as a product of intent. 
 Though I explore the role of the body in child criminality in my first chapter, 
Blackstone’s discussion of the relationship between children and the law also offers a 
different direction into the civil law and, in particular, to the question of contract. In a 
pronouncement that would persist in U.S. law throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
Blackstone determines that, because children’s speech is not correlated with rational will, 
they may not generally enter into contract. He offers one exception: 
It is generally true, than [sic] an infant can make no other contract that will 
bind him: yet he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, 
apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; and, likewise for his good 
teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself, afterwards. 
(Book 1, Part 2, 465) 
Essentially, children are not answerable for the contracts they make, but they are 
answerable to any apprenticeship contracts they may enter. Indenture contracts constitute 
a space of crossover between the child as a dependent body and as a potentially 
independent agent, or between infant and subject. While children are considered too 
irrationally physical for other agreements, they may enter an exchange of their freedom 
for in return for bodily necessities. Though they cannot make decisions about properties 
or incomes, infants may decide who will provide for their bodies. Moreover, they can 
decide who will provide for their development into adulthood by providing “good 
teaching and instruction” that would eventually equip them with independent reason; they 
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can provisionally enter into a contract, provided that it promises the training that would 
make their future selves able to enter contracts.  
 Blackstone’s vision of the indenture as the only contract amenable to childhood 
thus falls into a form common to literary narrations of childhood, that of prolepsis. 
Blackstone’s infant can consent to an indenture because its end result is an adult able to 
judge the process as worthwhile and therefore offer consent retrospectively. The 
maintenance of the child body is similarly able to bear a momentary scrutiny of the law if 
this maintenance points towards an adulthood with no such bodily encumberments. In 
other words, an indenture is valid if it offers a trajectory along which the child subject 
can develop into adulthood and, on the strength of that presumptive adulthood, the child 
earns a temporary ability to speak in the public sphere. 
  As several literary critics have argued, just such prolepsis guides the 
bildungsroman.78 In his study of the coming-of-age narrative and twentieth century 
human rights law, Joseph Slaughter contends that, as a genre, bildungsromans promise a 
resolution obvious from their outset, because that the protagonist will gradually 
assimilate into the social order of adulthood and thereby naturalize that order as 
inevitable. Slaughter frames the bildungsroman as a utopian individualism, which 
provide “an idealistic scenario for the human personality to become the sovereign 
guarantor of its own development” while also prescribing the form that this individual 
sovereignty will take (103). Franco Moretti’s Way of the World imagines a similarly 
                                                           
78 I here treat the term bildungsroman as a subset of larger genre of the coming-of-age narrative, 
characterized by a closer relationship with canonical novel form, European class structures, and interest in 
individualism. While it has been the subject of the most intense critical discussion and is therefore 
important for describing how age has been theorized within literature, I prefer coming-of-age narrative to 
classify the primary texts of my chapter because they are less constrained by these conventions.  
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stacked deck, arguing that the structure of the British bildungsroman relies on an 
adulthood predestined to reach its fullest individual expression in the social world already 
surrounding it such that: “self development and integration are complementary and 
convergent trajectories, and at their point of encounter and equilibrium lies that full and 
double epiphany of meaning that is ‘maturity’” (18-19). The suspense of the story lies 
less in the arrival of a pre-determined adulthood than in the resolution of how the 
peculiarities of the private self will be revealed to have their own niche in social order.  
 The faith shown in both indenture and the coming-of-age narratives that the 
private subject will inevitably reconcile with the social order has long been part of liberal 
individualism’s promise that individual success will be seamlessly integrated into the 
greater good. However, this presumption that personal trajectories of growth will 
naturally come into accord with one another also relies on and reinforces a shared 
reliance on the biological as a guarantor that not only is maturity coming, but that it 
comes in uniform ways.79 If Blackstone considers subjects under twenty-one to be too 
bodily to have a recognizable will, he also treats the physical development of the body as  
both a marker of development towards adult disembodiment and as proof that this second 
growth towards citizenship is unavoidable. For instance, the physical changes of puberty, 
for Blackstone, signal the arrival of a new kind of criminal responsibility but they also 
cast the coming of that responsibility as a natural process (22). Similarly, the momentum 
of the bildungsroman is partly borrowed from the biological trajectory towards physical, 
                                                           
79 Much as the child provides a site at which the body cannot be cleanly separated from the subject in 
antebellum thought, the physical and social coming of age of the child also offers a point at which 
individualism crosses into its own variety of species thinking. For example, Ralph Waldo Emerson crosses 
into a botanical account of human life, noting that “we fancy men are individuals; so are pumpkins; but 
every pumpkin in the field goes through every point of pumpkin history” (246).  
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chronological adulthood. The developing body provides the medium through which a 
host of less material changes are captured and expressed.  
 That not all bodies were permitted to mature into transparency, whether because 
they were marked by race, gender, class, or any other measure of difference, therefore 
acts as another way of explaining that not all subjects were eligible for a trajectory 
towards civic maturity. This exclusion has longed been paired with a matching limitation 
in the protagonists eligible for a coming-of-narrative, as it has most conventionally been 
defined, who may sometimes be female but is rarely a person of color or, perhaps still 
more rarely, someone who begins life as a poor worker and who remains that way.80 The 
promise that all measures of development will be in accord – that the growing body 
subtends a developing mind and that developing mind, in turn, demands an accordingly 
increased social standing with an attendant increase in wealth – interprets the child body, 
much like indenture interprets the child’s consent, as only the manifest sign of a longer 
teleology towards a capitalist and civically capable maturity. By largely avoiding 
protagonists who are not upwardly mobile, coming-of-age narratives are able to preserve 
this sense of developmental synchronicity.  
 However, though indenture contract takes the same formal logic to the coming-of-
age narrative, they have historically extended to encompass a much wider set of subjects. 
Apprenticeship was a common enough start in the early and mid-eighteenth century for 
affluent tradesmen, merchants, and the male bourgeois more generally. Through the early 
                                                           
80 See Franco Moretti’s preface to the second edition of Way of the World for a longer discussion of the 
bildungsroman’s tendency to avoid poor or working-class protagonists. Note also that although I list these 
categories of gender, race, and class mobility as distinct, they are certainly interrelated, as Harriet Wilson 
makes clear.  
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nineteenth century, as I will discuss, apprenticeship gradually moved closer to this model 
and away from any association with personal or economic development, even as its form 
continued to rely on that proleptic development. In other words, where the traditions of 
the coming-of-age narrative largely exclude the subjects who would have been excluded 
from full adulthood, the indenture contract came to use closely related forms to imagine 
the maturation of precisely those subjects predominantly left out of literature. For such 
subjects, indentures map a trajectory towards a civic incorporation that is not truly 
available to them, marking infancy as teleological but without defining its arc. This 
prompts the question I ask in my next section, whether attending to the details structures 
of child contract can also provide us with a less limited reading of the coming-of-age 
narrative in Wilson’s work.  
 
Aging into Labor 
As I have already suggested, the uncertain resolution of Our Nig makes it more difficult 
to read the text as a traditional coming-of-age narrative. Another, more commonly noted 
obstacle is the unconventional opening, which begins not with the birth of the protagonist 
but with a compassionate account of her mother’s life. From its opening, Our Nig 
denaturalizes how the course of a life is defined and the milestones by which its progress 
should be noted. In her reading of Wilson, P. Gabrielle Foreman notes that this formal 
trajectory of Frado’s life eschews the generic dictates of both its immediate generic 
sources: the sentimental and slave narratives. Foreman rightly, I think, argues that Wilson 
substitutes these orderly movements from either exile-to-belonging or captivity-to-
freedom with a cyclically repeating relationship to money, electing “economic 
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determination as a principal definer of narrative and personal development” (58). Within 
the cyclical maternities connecting Mag to Frado to George that form Foreman’s focus, 
however, is also a remarkable awareness of Frado’s individual development. Wilson’s 
attention to the development of her protagonist is strikingly meticulous, noting explicitly 
Frado’s age at six (11), seven (18), nine (23), fourteen (35), and eighteen (64), as well as 
including enough temporal markers to fill in many of the gaps. This section takes up this 
carefully plotted growth with the problem of Frado’s fictitiously contracted childhood as 
a forcibly realignment of typical coming-of-age trajectories of individual growth into a 
hierarchy of stagnations in social age following the lines of class.  
Alongside her careful records of Frado’s age, Wilson also tracks much more 
contingent social markers of maturity; in her writing, age is far more than a matter of 
chronology. Frado’s youth – she is six at her arrival to the Bellmonts – is never isolated 
from her race, but rather dictates the lines along which her race would be used to control 
her. Where a white child would have had greater recourse against abusive indenture, Mrs. 
B. explicitly invokes Frado’s relative immobility after her daughter Mary first objects to 
having a Black resident in her home: 
“I don’t mind the nigger in the child. I should like a dozen better than 
one,” replied her mother. “If I could make her do my work in a few years, 
I would keep her. I have so much trouble with the girls I hire, I am almost 
persuaded if I have one to train up my way from a child, I shall be able to 
keep them for awhile. I am tired of changing every few months.” (16) 
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The shaky alignment of “the nigger” and “the child,” though it likely refers most directly 
to the putative whiteness of Frado’s mother,81 also points to the conflicting ideologies at 
work between age and race. When Frado’s blackness is reinscribed as childish, she 
transforms from a perceived threat to white domesticity to a hyperdomestic object that 
Mrs. B. can amass by the dozen. This objectification draws a line between the racially 
unmarked but clearly more privileged hired “girls” whom Mrs. B. had failed to retain 
because they possess freedom of movement and the unprotected Frado who is trapped 
under her power. 
In this bifurcation between types of child labor, we can glimpse the material side 
of a cultural ideology that Robin Bernstein has established, in which the basic 
underpinnings of what made a child worthy of protection were themselves permeated by 
race. As Bernstein explains, white children were granted special status through a focus on 
their sensitivity to pain, while black children were excluded from that status and their 
ability to feel pain denied. She writes, “pain became a wedge that split one idea – 
childhood innocence – diverging paths that produced opposing meaning in black and 
white” (36). These twinned constructions of childhood then crucially frame the 
relationship between children and labor along the lines of race, dividing between a self-
possessed white child whose labor has at least the potential to grant personhood and a 
black child alienated from the humanizing pain that would articulate bodily action to 
personal interiority.  
                                                           
81 Wilson indicates that Frado thought of her mother as white. However, Foreman has usefully troubled the 
conventional acceptance of Mag’s whiteness by pointed to the relatively heavy burden of proof which 
female whiteness historically bore under law (60-65). 
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To write the laboring Frado, then, Wilson must contend with a discourse that 
would dissociate the strength evinced by Frado’s work from her personal development, in 
order to keep her from emerging into the world as a fully recognizable person. As Mrs. B. 
declares from the outset, the position that Frado holds is precisely contingent upon the 
child retaining her youth, such that when her son suggests that the six-year-old Frado will 
quickly outgrow the small attic assigned her, Mrs. B. coldly explains that “when she 
does, she’ll outgrow the house” (17). Her later declaration that, if Frado is not utterly 
subjugated, she might arrive “in the parlor, as smart as our own girls” reveals the cultural 
logic behind this ultimatum. Frado’s growth threatens to make her far too close to the 
non-working status of the white children of the house and, so, to exclude her from the 
adult space of the parlor, she must be confined as a laboring child within the domestic 
space of the attic (50). As the white child who is always the nearest point of comparison, 
Mary Bellmont’s maturity mandates a careful exclusion of Frado from the routines of 
female socialization – Mrs. B.’s removing Frado from school at the age of nine (23), 
forcing her “to do the work of a boy” (30), and cutting her hair short (38) – lest she 
infringe upon Mary’s claim to domestic control. In this way, Frado’s social status 
supplants her biological age, and, in order to maintain her bondage, Mrs. B. must 
perpetually exile her from the trajectory to adulthood. 
Yet, this exclusion cloaks the intimate dependence of Mary’s growth upon 
Frado’s stagnation, for, under the orchestration of Mrs. B., not only is Frado alienated 
from her labor but her labor is appropriated specifically to underwrite the developmental 
arc of the white Mary. Mary, who is heavily identified with her mother, finally enters 
adulthood through usurpation of the work actually done by Frado, as she “was installed 
171 
 
housekeeper – in name merely, for Nig was the only moving power in the house” (35). 
Though both domestic knowledge and actual work are Frado’s, Mary “affect[s] great 
responsibility” and lays claim to still greater maturity for this knowledge and this work 
by noisily and violently performing her authority over Frado (35). In other words, she 
takes her place as head of the household, a place socially marked as that of a properly 
adult woman, only through a form of proxy maturity actually generated by Frado’s 
presence. 
 What immediately appears as twisted and absurd about this arrangement, in which 
an unusually immature child can lay claim to adulthood through the mature behavior of 
another child, is that the legal fictions of contract theory have been mapped onto the 
pseudo-biological realm of child development. In other words, there is nothing at all 
unusual in a story of one person appropriating the labor of another to advance her social 
standing; even beyond the bounds of capitalism, this is the everyday operation of power. 
That this extraction should happen cleanly, that the body should give up its labor 
pristinely and give that labor as an object of exchange to another, non-working body is 
the ordinary prerogative of capitalist labor. For Mary to be self-satisfied in commanding 
someone else to do the work of an adult woman, marks the nonsensicality of this 
disembodied model of labor in the form of a spoiled child. Neither Frado’s labor, nor the 
attainment of female majority associated with it, can be rented from her body nor be 
appropriated as a token of exchange. It is, in this sense, fitting that Frado’s imagined 
indenture is little more or less than the seizure of her childhood, a fiction of frozen 
development that she must somehow outgrow. 
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 Yet the precise status of this maturing body remains carefully kept out of the 
frame of the novel. As Cynthia Davis has argued, Wilson’s emphasize on the pain that 
Frado experiences is also designed to refute the commonplace sexualization of the black 
female body, and no doubt this contributes to Wilson’s avoidance of long physical 
descriptions of Frado, particularly as she reaches puberty. There is another factor at stake, 
though, in this attention to development while hesitating to talk about the developing 
body directly. It is clear from the recurrent beatings that Frado endures that the flesh is a 
source of overwhelmingly oppressive discipline, and much of Mrs. Bellmont’s refusals to 
let Frado cry (56) seem designed to reduce the girl to a body alone. Where the pathos of a 
physically vulnerable child was a typical, or to follow Anna Mae Duane’s arguments, 
even a definitional feature of antebellum literary children, the image of a black girl’s 
body in pain also evokes the potential of a dehumanizing voyeurism. Saidiya Hartman’s 
reminder of “the instability of the scene of suffering,” in which sympathy promises white 
readers that they have an asymmetrical level of access of the interiorities black subjects, 
suggests that Wilson cannot premise Frado’s childhood on her body alone. Instead, as I 
argue, the legal framings of indenture provide her with an alternative route to represent 
child embodiment without making it into a tool of either control or surveillance. 
 
Records of Indenture 
The historical traces that indentures leave about children reflect their ambivalence about 
such subjects in the public record. For instance, in 1834, a Pennsylvanian child named 
Mariah Elizabeth Perry was entered into a labor contract with one Humphrey Dillon, a 
man whose profession is not named in her indenture but whom contemporary records 
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indicate was an innkeeper in Bedford county.82 The contract, signed by Dillon and two 
county officials titled “overseers of the Poor” and witnessed by two justices of the peace, 
identifies Perry as a “female of color” and states that she is henceforth bound to work for 
Dillon, his heirs, and his agents. In exchange, she is promised “sufficient meat, drinks, 
apparel, lodging, and washing” as well as “the customary freedom dues to the amount of 
at least twelve dollars” at the time of release. That indenture was set to run from the date 
of the contract – May 28th, 1834 – until October 3rd, 1850, a date which the contract text 
notes as an aside will also mark her being eighteen years old. Barring the calculation 
implicit in these dates and the ambiguous sign that Perry’s own signature is not among 
the marks on the contract,83 no other aspect of the contract indicates that the laborer in 
question is a two-year-old child with all of the productive potential of a two-year-old 
child. Instead, the indenture’s portrait is very little about Perry as she is, using the 
majority of its some two hundred words to describe who this child will be: an unfree 
laborer, a consumer of certain resources, and an eventually free woman with twelve 
dollars to her name.  
The indenture’s relative unconcern with Perry as she was at the time of signing 
echoes the complicated relationship that historian Holly Brewer traces between childhood 
and contract. As Brewer argues, the gradual elimination of minors from civic rights 
throughout seventeenth and eighteenth century Britain helped to outline a world in which 
                                                           
82 History of Bedford, Somerset, and Fulton Counties 251 
83 Although child signatures or marks are sometimes included in indentures, there was no requirement at 
that time in Pennsylvania that the child consent to the contract; as Pennsylvania’s compilation of state law, 
Purdon’s Digest states reports in 1853, “it is not necessary that the infant should join in the indenture” (39). 
That law had changed by 1860 to require infant consent and participation in the contract, though the law’s 
application to indentures from Poor Houses and Houses of Refuge is far from clear (Township and Local 
Laws 309). 
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all other subjects were increasingly held as equal participants as the ability to consent, 
withheld from minors, came to overrule questions of wealth or rank. This elevation of 
consent as the true qualification for civic participation, rather than inherited rank, played 
a critical role in the early American preference for contract over status, to borrow 
Brewer’s terms, as the defining structure of social relations. Perry’s entry into contract 
presumes that, as little as she is able to be an economic agent at the time, her entry into 
adulthood will be sufficient to grant her that freedom. In other words, the indenture 
structures Perry’s life as a division between youthful constraint and the individual 
freedom of adulthood.84   
 That this last image of maturity and of Perry setting off with the twelve dollars of 
her freedom dues has a stronger presence in the document than Perry’s reality at the time 
of writing, an unprotected toddler whose bound into a system that was singularly poor at 
enforcing its promises, points to the concentrated futurity of the text – a futurity that 
encompasses both the ongoing future of a growing body in need of regular food and care 
and the future perfect of the emergent adult Perry. As a result, though it minimizes 
Perry’s status as physically dependent child to treat her as a pure agent of labor, the 
indenture also attempts to manage her bodily integration into adulthood. Her body’s 
future physical needs are explicitly built into the future adult, eligible for freedom from 
                                                           
84 Given her precarity as a very young child of color in the care of the state, Perry would have risked being 
made part of a still worse contract. Under a parallel justification pairing freedom with maturity (as well as a 
parallel desire to extract additional labor), Pennsylvania’s provisions for gradual emancipation named 
twenty-eight as the age when enslaved persons would be released. Impoverished black children quickly 
came to adopt that age as the new standard, rather than the prior ages of majority (eighteen for female 
laborers and twenty-one for male).  
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bondage. Although the adult emerging from this contract is framed as a fully independent 
agent on the market, she retains an explicit history of a much more embodied self.85  
The difference between an indenture for apprenticeship and the contract ideally 
imagined by law is thus a difference in how the two agreements register the temporality 
of the body. Contract has historically been understood along two primary axes: first, as a 
“pure” (i.e., disembodied) exchange between the wills of two rational subject and, 
second, as projection from present intent to future action. As Thomas Hobbes’s 
foundational theory of contract in Leviathan (1651), it relies accordingly on a syntax of 
intent: 
Signes of Contract, are either Expresse, or by Inference. Expresse, are 
words spoken with understanding of what they signifie: And such words 
are either of the time Present, or Past; as, I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I 
have Granted, I will that this be yours: Or of the future; as, I will Give, I 
will Grant: which words of the future, are called PROMISE. (90) 
This “promise” thus rests on a chain beginning with the understanding and will of the 
contract writer – Hobbes continues on to gloss “signs by inference” as any implication of 
the text that “sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor” (90) - and extending into an 
imagined future. The future tense of contract in Hobbes’s account, though, carries a 
stronger weight than the futurity of common speech. While informal statements about a 
plan bear no obligation or, in Hobbes’s terms, transfer no right, setting down a future in 
contract enshrines it:  
                                                           
85 Although provisions for the upkeep of workers did appear for in adult indentures, the substation of such 
bare supplies as food and drink for wages or land was more associated with child apprenticeship (Tomlins 
242) 
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In Contracts, the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time 
Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future: because all 
Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore he that 
promiseth onley, because he hath already received the benefit for which he 
promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should pass: for 
unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other 
would not have performed his part first. (91) 
Contract, in this reading, works to stabilize two variables, the difference between two 
individual wills and the space between present and future. It acts as a “mutuall 
translation” between two understandings and two sets of interests, as well as guaranteeing 
that acts will have the agreed upon consequences. It binds two subjects to a common 
narrative of benefits to be given and received in a certain order. 
Child indentures complicates this attempt at a shared projection because, though 
Hobbes accounts for the instability of time and the need to reconcile two views of the 
world, he takes for granted that the individuals themselves will be stable. Indenture, on 
the other hand, sets out to take a subject and transform her into a new, or significantly 
changed subject. As a result, even though standards differed greatly by state and era 
whether minors should sign these contracts themselves, the legal standard applied was 
that the contract would not be binding on the child if it does not benefit their 
development.86 Where Hobbes’s view of contract assumes that the necessary translation 
                                                           
86 James Kent’s Commentaries on American Laws (1832) notes, for instance, that an infant “may bind 
himself as an apprentice, it being an act manifestly for his benefit” (242). Similarly, indentures could be 
dissolved by the court system if they lacked education for the apprentice; see Butler v. Hubbard, 22 Mass. 
250 (1827) for one such ruling. 
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is from one agent of contract to another, indenture takes up the additional task of 
mediating between infant and adult subject, or between the child that Perry is and the 
adult that she will become. If the contract fails to be an agreement that the adult 
eventually emerging from the indenture would have agreed to, then it is potentially void, 
because it fails to translate between the child immediately party to the contract and their 
adult self capable of sanctioning the contract. A good contract, he argues, is one that 
makes the child’s consent continuous with the adult’s will.  
To demonstrate their benefit to the child subject, indentures provide their own 
version of a coming-of-age narrative, setting out a projection of how the child’s life will 
unfold. For example, the 1817 indenture of Isaac Pennell Jr., a boy living in Radnor PA 
who was most likely about twelve at the time of signing,87  explains his apprenticeship in 
terms of exchange between Pennell’s labor and his master Joseph Dunn’s investment in 
Pennell’s future life. Pennell, we are told, will “[Dunn’s] secrets keep, his lawful 
commands everywhere readily obey,” nor will he travel without permission, marry, or 
any other way damage Dunn’s household. In return, Pennell will be granted professional 
standing by being “taught or instructed […] in the trade or mystery of a farmer.” 
Pennell’s promised road to adulthood is, like Perry’s, enabled by provisions for food and 
shelter, but unlike Perry, he is also promised schooling in increments of “two months a 
year.” The adult Pennell projected to exit the indenture will be a man with schooling, a 
trade, as well as “two good suits of Clothes.” All in all, this later portrait is far more 
                                                           
87 Though his age is not given explicitly, the specificity of his term of service – “Nine years three month[s] 
and twenty days” – suggests that it has been set based on the time to his majority, mostly likely to his 
twenty-first birthday. 
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complete than the child Pennell’s, because as a farmer and property-owner, he possesses 
qualities that can be recognized by the law; the earlier Pennell possessed only infancy. 
 More critically, though, the indenture must also manage continuity of Pennell as a 
subject, even as it promises these changes. While the adult Pennell is given most 
description in the document, the contract is nonetheless structured around his infant 
counterpart. While Pennell did leave an official mark of consent on the contract with a 
slightly lop-sided “x,” even if he had not, the adults authorizing the contract on his behalf 
– in this case, his father, Isaac Pennell Sr. – would have been able to do so only by merit 
of his status as an infant. For the indenture to have purchase and for that “X” to receive a 
socially-agreed upon meaning, it must mediate between these two stages, tracing the arc 
of Pennell’s physical development into an arc towards consent. 
 The curve of aging towards a pre-set adulthood also worked to cover greater gaps 
than that shown between Pennell Jr. and Pennell Sr. As an early function of the welfare 
state, indentures also imagined continuities from children positioned further outside the 
social order that the contracts supported. Oliver Gautier, another boy who had lived not 
far from Isaac Pennell, was indentured in 1785 to a local merchant with the proviso that 
he was “a Minor and a Stranger here.” He, too, leaves a mark alongside the signatures of 
the adult officials, but the consent he musters is clearly under constraint even within the 
document itself. Gautier’s co-signers, two “Justices of the Peace” and six men identified 
as “Managers of the House of Employment,” are identified as the active agents of the 
indenture; it is they who, according to the text, “have put Oliver Gautier” into his 
apprenticeship in a convergent policing of poverty and displaced youth. In this context, 
Gautier’s mark does not register as his will, because there is no pretense that he could 
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have refused – particularly because without the literacy promised by the apprenticeship, 
his addition to the document reflects nothing about his understanding of the document. 
Instead, the mark stands in only to testify to Gautier’s physical presence. It tells us that he 
was there and little else.  
 The coupling work that the indenture does to link this “Minor and Stranger” with 
an uninterpretable sign to the socialized adult self with full signature is a process of 
norming a potentially deviant subject. Apprenticeship might give Gautier a place to 
belong, but it also clearly works to fit him into a preexisting slot. The coercion inscribed 
in Gautier’s contract makes more explicit what was also true of Pennell’s indenture to 
become a farmer. As pre-printed forms with spaces left for names, gendered pronouns, 
the details of profession and degree of education, they are, quite literally, fill-in-the-blank 
interpretations of maturity, with little other room for variation in the coming-of-age. 
Under indenture, Gautier must work to mature out of his status as infant “stranger” in a 
way that Pennell perhaps need not, but the distance between the two indentures is a 
matter of degree rather than a fundamental difference. Both were maturity that emerged 
from a contractual form that recognized bodily need as a legitimate basis from which to 
accord obligation. 
However, by the time that Wilson experienced indenture, and certainly by the 
time that she wrote Our Nig, the reality of apprenticeships had begun to change. Children 
had long been players in the economic world as apprenticed laborers, but the structure of 
apprenticeship was legally defined at a distance from the unvarnished exchange of wage-
labor. For example, as late as the 1820s, courts in Massachusetts ruled that apprentices 
were entitled to receive education beyond their immediate job training and even due 
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continued support when injury made them unable to continue to work (Schmidt 322). 
These pseudo-familial labor relationships presented their child workers as subject to a 
contract made between two adult parties, requiring no agency be devolved onto the 
children themselves. As social historian Vivian Zelizer observes, though, increasing 
industrialization during the antebellum period created demand for an alternative model of 
child labor (59). Unlike the longer term and, at least putatively, more skilled positions 
available to apprentices, factory owners required an influx of untrained and relatively 
mobile workforce of children, making it more difficult to retain paternal oversight of 
contract and leading to a greater court recognition of children as economic agents able to 
negotiate contracts for themselves.   
With this revision came a shifting and heterogeneous set of attempts to redefine 
the private sphere of children into something closer to that of traditional wage labor. 
While it was traditional for indentures to stipulate simply that the needs of apprentices 
would be provided for as they arose, a series of transitional indentures began to push 
towards privatizing those needs back to the child. An early example is the 1818 indenture 
of William Chapin to a Philadelphia engraver. In this document, the pre-printed 
obligations to “procure and provide for him sufficient meat, drink, lodging, washing for 
an apprentice” have been crossed out and in the space where educational obligations were 
normally written in, the indenture instead promises that the engraver will pay “thirty 
dollars per annum, which payments are to be considered in lieu of Board, lodging, & 
wearing apparel.” Chapin’s indenture is an early instance of the coming shift to wages, 
devolving the responsibility for Chapin’s everyday care back onto the boy himself but 
promising that cash can make up the difference. As a result, the indenture (or wage 
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contract presented as indenture) declines to make Chapin’s physical life a part of his 
employment, banishing those concerns from public record. 
Chapin’s indenture is an unusually extreme example, as well as one that seems to 
have ignored court requirement that apprenticeships include schooling. However, it was 
one of many indentures that increasingly in the 1820s and 1830s sought to remove 
physical upkeep from the sphere of the contract. The indentures of Charles Parker in 
1829 Philadelphia and Edward Magee in 1835 Norristown, Pennsylvania each retain 
some of the standard obligations of care, but add a wage into the indenture. Along with 
the conventional list of “sufficient meat, drink, mending lodging and washing,” Magee is 
to receive twenty-five dollars quarterly as a carpenter’s apprentice. Meanwhile Parker is 
to receive lodging, board, and seventeen dollars per year for work in the same trade, but 
his claims to clothing and washing have been crossed out on the form.88 Henry Risley, a 
joiner’s apprentice in Connecticut, entered a similar situation in which he was promised 
both the rights associated with indenture – in his case, “board Lodging washing & Phisic 
[sic]” – but also promised thirty-three dollars a year and the promise of a raise to forty 
dollars a year when he turns fifteen. The change is partially attributable to the simple 
spike in demand for child workers that industrialism spurred and in some cases may been 
truly beneficial to them, but these transitional documents also suggest the incoherence of 
a changing ideology.  
One particularly remarkable example of this burgeoning shift is the 1814 
indenture of Amial Camp, a boy bound into shoemaking in New Haven, Connecticut. 
Unlike the other wage-inflected indentures we have considered, for which adaptations to 
                                                           
88 In Magee’s indenture, the provision for mending has been added by hand, and the others are pre-printed. 
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apprenticeship are wedged into pre-printed forms, Camp’s indenture is entirely 
handwritten and leaves its authors with more space to experiment. The circumstances are 
typical. Camp is a seventeen-year-old “miner [sic]” under the guardianship of a man of 
unclear relation and, according to this document, has been bound to serve until twenty-
one. What is unusual is that none of the promises of education, lodging, etc. are included 
in the indenture. Instead, Camp is promised that “he is to Receive after the Rate of 
Twenty Dollars the first year, twenty-five Dollars from Nineteen to Twenty & Thirty 
Dollars from Twenty one.” What looks like another case of wage labor shoehorned into 
apprenticeship, however, quickly turns to something else in its next prescription: “Each 
payment is to be pay’d in Clothing as the Boy may want.” Camp’s potential wages are 
thus recategorized into older categories of care, or alternatively, the income that Camp 
will receive must come in the currency of fabric rather than cash. 
There is real practical weight to this promise, and in lingering on it, I do not mean 
to suggest otherwise. By placing a specific value on his annual clothing allowance, 
Camp’s indenture may have given him a stronger position from which to demand warmer 
or generally higher-quality goods. Similarly, the man indenturing him might have 
benefitted both from making his costs for the several years more predictable than those of 
a more conventiona apprenticeship and from avoiding the difficult task of finding the 
cash that would have been necessary for a wage laborer. Nevertheless, a strange divide 
lingers in the instruction that “payment is to be pay’d in Clothing as the Boy may want.” 
Even accepting a currency conversion from money to goods, how does the subjunctive of 
“as the Boy may want” register against the explicitly defined values of clothing Camp has 
been promised? Is this a matter of providing him shoes rather than a coat if he has the one 
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but not the other, or if Camp has the clothing he needs, a question of not providing him 
extra clothes at all? More to the point, if Camp somehow had all his clothing stolen or 
somehow destroyed and needed more than the promised twenty or twenty-five dollars 
could buy, would it still be his master’s responsibility to clothe him?  
The answer for this last question, in particular, matters because it forms the 
division between apprenticeship and wage-labor; in one, the extra cost would be 
structured into the employment agreement, and in the other, the burden providing for 
what “the Boy may want” remains more fundamentally with the boy himself. Camp’s 
indenture leans towards the latter option, but the point is never fully clarified. Instead, the 
document suggests the degree to which the physical needs of children were in flux 
between the private and public sphere. The intrinsically unstable nature of the indenture, 
already designed to register non-public subjects through their potential to grow into a 
civic status, began to make apprentices even less visible.  
 
Our Nig and the Semi-public Body 
As industrialization continued to accelerate, the move to privatize the child body 
increased as well, until, as I have mentioned, contracts for child labor outside of 
apprenticeship became normal. However, this shift to wage-labor occurred unevenly, 
with white children moving rapidly into these new positions and apprenticeships 
disproportionately remaining with poor, black children, namely, the children who would 
be less eligible for court protection (Reiner 131). It is true that larger-scale industrialists 
may have found greater profit in a more mobile workforce of white children, whose high 
turnover made workplace abuses more difficult for the law to restrain. However, for child 
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workers who fell outside of the comparatively sheltered status of whiteness and therefore 
at a distance from even these meager legal comforts, the more permanent status of 
apprentice gave employers both stability and a workforce who could not easily protest 
their conditions, a situation that Xiomara Sanatamarina has described as the “pernicious 
ways in which ‘free’ labor could racially immobilize all black workers” (76). Where 
white child laborers might have suffered from their new designation as a relatively 
disposable workforce, black apprentices were given no illusion of the social mobility 
which indenture once promised. In lieu of narratives of development, apprenticeship 
acted in practice as a bare exchange of labor for moment-to-moment survival.   
 However, as Wilson makes clear, the apprenticeship that Frado claims for herself 
is not only diegetically unlikely but also increasingly anachronistic. Nothing about 
Frado’s young life suggests that she received the care promised by these older indentures. 
However, the nature of her complaints however - which that her clothing is “poor and 
scanty” and does not include “Sunday attire” (38), that her schooling was stopped at the 
age of nine (23), and that her lodgings were dark and “unfinished” (17) – shadow all the 
central provisions of more robust apprenticeships. Similarly, the gifts that Frado receives 
on her departure from the Bellmonts, in lieu of wages, reflect the traditional set of 
clothes, cash, and a bible that indentures had once promised apprentices but in 
diminished form; she receives a “silver half dollar” and “one decent dress, without any 
superfluous accompaniments” from the Bellmonts and a Bible from a more sympathetic 
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Bellmont daughter (65).89 The true demonstration of Frado’s legal reasoning, though, 
comes after she has turned eighteen and left the Bellmont family to work for neighboring 
families. After working through the summer, Frado becomes too “thoroughly sick” to 
continue. Because she has been left unable to afford medicine or even a room for herself, 
Frado falls back on the only social ties that she has left, the Bellmonts.  
 This claim of intimacy is clearly a matter of last resort for Frado and explicitly 
outside the bounds of even the most generous indenture. Still the reasoning that Wilson 
offers to explain why her former capturers should take in her adult self draws from the 
notion that employing indentured labor creates a responsibility for physical needs. As 
Frado puts it, she was reluctant to ask “yet she felt sure they owed her a shelter and 
attention, when disabled” (67). The commonsense impulse that the Bellmonts “owed” her 
and continued to owe her a basic physical welfare, despite her departure form their 
household, seems to stem from Wilson’s ability to invoke indenture, rather than wage 
labor, as the basis for labor agreements. Frado’s impulse is to say that her illness cannot 
be privatized, which is to say that it cannot be reduced to her own personal burden, 
because her health had been a part of her projected agreement with the Bellmonts. This 
argument hinges on the assertion that the employers of children must take on 
responsibility not just for wages but for food, clothing, and medicine. Wilson sanctions 
this belief by generalizing it to the town, noting that after a second period of Frado being 
unable to work, “all felt that the place where her declining health began, should be the 
place of relief; so they applied once more for a shelter” from the Bellmonts (67).  
                                                           
89 Compare these gifts, for instance, with the indenture with which I began this chapter. In its reasonably 
generous provisions, Cynthia Barnes is promised “two good suits of Cloths proper and suitable for such 
person and a Bible.” 
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Such an assignment of responsibility echoes the basic tendency of apprenticeship 
to find a family able to bear the otherwise public cost of supporting a community 
member, but the tendency to narrativize the physical toil of labor also reflects the 
temporal difference that indenture makes. Contract registers a moment of agreement and 
flattens the process of labor extraction back to that moment, but indenture evolves in 
order to narrate a continuity between the child who enters an apprenticeship and the legal 
adult who emerges. Indenture thus is able to track longer-term physical effects and is able 
to register when physical cost of an agreement continues past the end of the agreement 
itself. Frado’s “declining health began” with identifiable agents, and they continue to bear 
responsibility despite the nominal close of the apprenticeship. It is here that the use of 
indenture law to critique the terms of adult labor more broadly begins to emrge. Although 
Frado sets out in the market after turning eighteen as an apparently free contract labor, 
her experience of work is interwoven with an accumulating cost to her health. She 
repeatedly sets out in new trades, only to repeatedly become too disabled to continue in 
them. With each iteration, Wilson returns to the notion that the Bellmonts are still 
ultimately the ones to be blamed. 
As the rest of Frado’s life unfolds, these revisions to the relationship between 
worker and employer begin to resonate with a reimagination of the proto-welfare system 
more broadly. As Frado’s disabilities leave her intermittently unable to work, she moves 
from the Bellmonts to the town-subsidized care of two women to what the text’s 
appendix, a series of testimonials endorsing the author’s virtue, calls the “County House” 
(100), and is eventually forced to place her son, George, in the same institution while 
selling hair dye (79). From her own indenture to her need to place George in parallel 
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circumstances, Frado is continually forced to reckon with the public nature of her daily 
survival. This is not to say that the same is not true for people like the Bellmonts, who 
just as clearly rely on the labor provided by Frado’s indenture. Frado is, in fact, quite 
cutting about notion that any of this assistance is selflessly given, describing one family 
that her adult self stays with as having “principle enough to be willing to earn the money 
a charitable public disburses” (67). Frado is also upfront about the misery of her needs 
being so explicitly a part of the public sphere, complaining of “the unpleasant charities of 
the public” and stating her determination to be self-supporting (68).  
Although Frado sets out in the market with every intention of participating in a 
free contract labor, her experience of work is interwoven with an accumulating cost to 
her health. The urge to be productive is harmful for Frado, because as Wilson writes, she 
so often tried to work as if she were the disembodied laborer of liberal theory, so that 
“many times her hands wrought when her body was in pain; but the hope that she might 
yet help herself, impelled her on” (68). The damage builds, until she is unable to work at 
all and must rely on the town to pay for her treatment. For Wilson, the source of the harm 
is work itself, noting that “Frado was anxious to keep up her reputation for efficiency, 
and often pressed far beyond prudence” until “she entirely gave up work, and confessed 
herself thoroughly sick” (65). Frado thus experiences labor as fundamentally tied to her 
experience of her body and as having effects of far longer duration than conventional 
contract could register. Instead of her contracts operating as a fleeting sale of her labor, 
Frado’s work appears to linger in the pain that she experiences. Wilson takes care to 
narrate what she terms Frado’s “weary sickness” as having a history of its own (67). 
Though it intensifies after every job she undertakes, following a particularly acute attack, 
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Mrs. B. tries to blame the whole of Frado’s condition on her most recent employer. 
Responding to a doctor’s description of Frado as “all broken down,” Mrs. B. responds 
“Yes, it was at Mrs. Moore’s […] all this was done,” only to be corrected by the 
physician that “it was commenced longer ago” (66). The status of the Bellmonts as the 
origin point of Frado’s illness, of being what Wilson writes was “the place where her 
declining health began,” anchors Frado’s disability as a continuation of her early 
mistreatment. 
 The difference made by reading these episodes through indenture is two-fold. 
First, the narrative force of indenture in its ability to bridge between a present apprentice 
enables Wilson’s understanding of labor as something that shapes a subject and can 
linger with them far beyond the time of the labor itself. Second and perhaps more 
importantly, the recognition that work could result in such long-term and intimate 
changes to the worker also resurrects indenture’s previous assertions that physical care 
was a basic tenet of employment. What Frado receives from the town is only what she 
first demands from the Bellmonts – food, lodging, and medicine – all of which formed 
the basic expectations of apprentice masters. As Wilson describes it, when the Bellmonts 
refuse to take in Frado a second time, there is “one only resource; the public must pay the 
expence [sic]” (67). The failing that Frado’s town is compensating for, as a result, moves 
from a presumptive failure of Frado’s part to an inadequacy of Frado’s employers, a 
reframing that is even more forceful given that the Bellmonts’ indenture was part of this 
welfare system from the beginning. 
 The deprivatization of the apprentice’s body that is necessary for this shift may 
seem like one more way of controlling and dehumanizing subjects like Frado, but a return 
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to Wilson’s legal framings changes the significance of physical references. As I described 
in the first section of this chapter, corporeality was allowed an acknowledgment in 
indenture that it could not receive in standard contract law. However, the nature of that 
indentured body is far from a straightforward object. Recall, for instance, the possibility 
of the sixteen-year-old infant plowman classed beside the toddler as equally 
incapacitated. What indenture records of the body is only the most indirect and notional 
reference; the flesh is recorded as a trace, not as an object eligible for scrutiny. The heft 
of indenture law is that the actions of the infant body cannot be separated from legal 
agreements, but that the two also cannot never be equated. In my final section, I will 
consider the converse of the semi-public status of the apprentice body, arguing as Wilson 
revises contract theory to make references to the bodily a valid public concern, she also 
writes a new privacy around the will. In this inversion, the growth into an adult world and 
the acceptance of public support does not require reconciliation or agreement. 
 
Wilson and the Semi-private Will 
In addition to her departure from the Bellmonts, one other narrative feature announces 
Frado’s coming of age. A famous feature of Wilson’s narrative is the decision to write 
from Frado’s perspective while almost entirely using the third-person narration. This 
voice breaks in three places. Twice, a first-person pronoun appears in the paratext, as 
parts of the first and second chapter titles, but the only fully in-text use comes at the 
opening of the next-to-last chapter. In her reading of this inconsistent narrator, 
Santamarina argues that the distance that the adult Frado takes from her younger self 
reflects the extent to which “the black worker’s labor generates his or her subjectivity as 
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a form of objectification” (76).  I do not depart from this reading wholly, for I believe 
that it captures something important about the alienating condition of Frado’s captivity 
that causes her to describe herself as an “automaton” in her labor (54). I do, though, also 
want to retain the extent to which this distance places Frado outside of the realm of adult 
knowledge and adult control. The crucial point when the first-person pronoun appears in 
the body of the text corresponds not to a change in her labor conditions but rather to the 
arrival of her twenty-first birthday and the accompanying immersion in adulthood (70).90 
It is, in other words, both an isolation that causes her pain and a privacy that provides the 
space for her will to exceed its environment. 
 By defending the public’s obligation to acknowledge Frado’s bodily needs, 
Wilson threatens to put the status of her protagonist’s will dangerously in doubt. The 
inseparability of Frado’s consent from her physical condition, appearing in this instance 
as an obligation of age, has, to be sure, an entrapping effect; her consent is always 
extracted under the duress of her bodily needs. That is, if her contract to the Bellmonts is 
false, she nonetheless seems to have to accept its terms, deciding to remain “contentedly” 
until she reach eighteen, in part, because she questions her ability to survive if she does 
not do so – a decision, in other words, so predicated on indirect physical duress that it is 
difficult to muster as evidence of any definite agency (60). Priscilla Wald has expressed 
related skepticism about preserving autonomy in a character under such continual threat, 
writing that “Frado is possessed, internalizing a prescripted identity, through which the 
Bellmont family break the mischievous child in spirit as well as body.” In Wald’s 
                                                           
90 In reading the opening of Chapter 12 as Frado’s twenty-first birthday, I differ from Foreman’s 
construction of the novel’s chronology, but do so on the grounds that Wilson declares it to have been “three 
years of weary sickness” since her departure from the Bellmonts at the age of eighteen (67). 
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reading, this overwriting of Frado is so pervasive that “her one gesture toward active 
resistance is itself authored by Mr. Bellmont” (165), who worries that she is “looking 
sick” and “cannot endure beatings” anymore and thereby inspires her to resist Mrs. B.’s 
attempt at whipping her (Wilson 58). Wald suggests that even though Frado is the one 
who stands up to Mrs. Bellmont and refuses to do work if she is beaten, the gesture is 
complicated by the fact that she is also obeying Mr. Bellmont’s warnings. 
The undercutting of this successful moment of defiance which should, by 
convention, signal the entrance of Frado into the sphere of adult independence – after 
which she seems only “like one who feels the stirring of free and independent thoughts 
[emphasis mine]” – could indeed be a sign of Frado’s erasure by her abuse, as Wald 
suggests (58). Yet, the tenuousness of an otherwise highly typical coming-of-age scene, 
when viewed in perspective of the text as a whole, offers another, more resistant reading. 
The scene invites us to mistake it for the absolute first awakening of proper willpower in 
Frado and, when taken as such, truly does produce a bleak outlook for her personhood. 
However, what the scene’s very typicality invites us to forget is the ways that Frado’s 
will has been on display from her earliest introduction. Wilson’s subversion of this 
particular scene, then, points not to a denial of Frado’s agency as such but, instead, to a 
rejection of the conventional model of agency more generally. If, as I have argued, the 
terms of Frado’s service prove inextricable from her growing body, her individual will 
proves to be a similarly asocial entity. Harkening back to the physical roots of infancy, 
this framing of embodied agency permits both a powerful critique of the vision of 
personhood as economic agency and, perhaps more importantly, a means of preserving 
Frado’s will in the midst of her coercion. By making will a personal physical experience 
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with limited communicability, Wilson also removes the opportunity to analyze and 
dismiss that will as being exclusively determined by her environment. 
As I have suggested, Our Nig is permeated with signs of Frado’s individual and 
inextinguishable will, reframing agency as being as inborn as any of her physical traits. 
The reader’s first glimpse of Frado begins with her beauty but quickly blurs that beauty 
into mental determination; she is, Wilson writes, “a beautiful mulatto, with long, curly 
black hair, and handsome roguish eyes, sparkling with an exuberance of spirit almost 
beyond restraint” (11). Her spirit is not reducible to the sparkle in her eyes, but nor is it 
separate from her physical being. This embodied version of agency is intensified in Frado 
as a mark of her special strength but is not exclusive to her. Instead, the coupling of will 
and flesh also resonates in the side plot of Jane Bellmont’s marriage plans, a strand of the 
novel which works through the troubles of child agency and contract in a far removed 
octave. Pressured to marry her rich suitor over her beloved suitor, Jane registers her 
fettered will through her bodily illness, until her father “bade her not make herself sick; 
he would see that she was not compelled to violate her free choice in so important a 
transaction” (34). With Mr. Bellmont’s admission that “a free, voluntary choice was of 
such importance to one of her health,” Wilson makes clear that embodied agency is not 
the racialized product of blackness but rather appears as a property of human will more 
generally (34). 
The reality of Frado’s will might threaten at times to mask the coercion of her 
situation under the veneer of consent, whether because of her teenaged decision to remain 
“contentedly” already mentioned or even the moment when a much younger Frado 
“resolved to tarry” with the Bellmonts despite the narrator’s promise that she “would not 
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hesitate to wander away should she decide to.” Far from condoning the Bellmonts, 
though, Wilson is instead more fundamentally troubling the terms of consent (17). 
Though the two do overlap, this embodied will exists in imperfect alignment with the 
encapsulated and knowable moment of consent, as its epistemological standing in the text 
is carefully kept at the level of private truth. Frado’s status as “a wild, frolicky thing,” to 
borrow her mother’s half-marveling lament, speaks to a will pointing in multiple 
directions at once, a quality that cannot be questioned but is so unrestrainable that it 
refuses to be channeled into a single, instrumentalizable resource (12). Reiterated later as 
“the spark of playfulness [that] could remain amid such constant toil” as a result of “her 
natural temperament,” this essential source of self is precisely that which thwarts the 
Bellmonts’ disciplinary efforts to control it or, in other words, is aligned precisely with 
the public illegibility of legal infancy (31).  
Similarly, the language describing Frado’s first entrance into the Bellmonts 
carefully establishes the existence of Frado’s will but refuses to presume that either she or 
her readers can have access to its origins. We are told that Mag’s order to go into the 
Bellmont home “seemed a novel request, but she consented” (14). Clearly, some type of 
decision has made. Yet, as the narrator immediately continues, the act simply cannot be 
analyzed further, for “why the impetuous child entered the house, we cannot tell” (14). 
Where, in a true contract, consent would mark a moment of understanding between two 
parties on the strength of which mutual understanding each is then made accountable to 
the other, the choice made here is fundamentally inexplicable and, so, signals no possible 
establishment of a bond. All that is visible is that Frado, even as a small child, possesses a 
will, but the reader is allowed to feel insight into it much less intimacy through it.  
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Such privacy is perhaps a meager comfort, but, little as it is, it preserves a 
personhood for Frado outside of the logic of economic agency that is also more than a 
patronizing indulgence of a child able to be governed and assimilated. Rather than 
writing a young subject transparent to adult scrutiny, a self whose intent may be grasped 
and interrogated in a reductive opposition between consent and compulsion, Wilson 
sidesteps the absolutism of either classification by writing a child whose interiority is not 
on exhibition. By the bracketing of the origin of Frado’s will as unknowable and its 
existence as unquestionable, the agency behind her decisions can be recognized without 
demanding that those particular decisions be perfectly separate from physical necessity. 
Frado’s childish decisions may not be transparently rational, may not be free of duress or 
of bodily need, and therefore may not be those of a liberally imagined subject, but they 
nonetheless demand ethical recognition as being those of a subject. This ability to register 
a choice made in isolation as an act of will, rather than requiring there to be an agreement 
between two subject, is a model that indenture can offer but contract cannot. Much of 
Wilson’s narration acts like those ambiguous “X”s of children signing indenture, 
stipulating a presence that does not allow intimacy.  
 
Coda: A World Shaped by Indenture 
Like many of the child subjects whom I have discussed, Frado’s early life appears 
strikingly singular and Wilson’s reinvestment in privacy seem to codify her loneliness as, 
at best, a necessary protection and, at worst, an existential fact. This, and the fact that my 
analysis has hewed relatively closely to Wilson’s novel, could obscure the wider impact 
of Wilson’s theorization. But the idea of contract as an analogy for a child’s entrance into 
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the adult world has been a central argument in European and American philosophy since 
the time of John Locke. Wilson’s deployment of indenture in the place of contract does 
more than document an unusual labor practice in New England; it opens a basic challenge 
to how we understand social bonds. Social contract theory posits that a nation is made up 
of a collection of voluntary members. Although both Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John 
Locke agree that birth into a society does not entail any obligation to that society, they 
also insist with equal strength that staying in a society indicates full agreement. Rousseau 
writes that “residence implies consent: to inhabit the territory is to submit to the 
sovereign” (153). In Locke’s model, meanwhile, even “the very being of any one within 
the Territories of the Government” is enough to register as a “tacit consent” to that social 
contract (348). While children are nominally free from public obligations, for adults, the 
fundamental need to occupy a space is enough to bind one to the local social order. Thus, 
coming of age stands as an act of endorsement for the world that a subject has aged into. 
What we might call Wilson’s social indenture theory suggests an alternative. A 
population shaped by her version of indenture inverts the presumption that involvement 
in a society reveals something about that person’s beliefs while leaving her responsible 
for physical needs. For Wilson, participation in a community might mean nothing more 
than that someone was born into it and that they rely on it for survival, but it does not 
imply approval or even acceptance. Wilson’s revision allows for thinking about the 
reality of a coming of age without assimilation. Her model creates social resonances of 
this model for subjects who grow up with attachments to systems of power that they can 
never enter. What emerges from Our Nig more specifically, though, is the possibility of 
making demands on authority without reaffirming its legitimacy. Frado demands shelter 
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from the Bellmonts without treating it as reconciliation and accepts her town’s payment 
for medical care as a straightforward matter of rights. She certainly does not regard either 
the Bellmonts or the town as a more legitimate sources of power when she receives it.  
Instead, indenture provides her with a way to narrate the effects of labor as lingering with 
the laborer and to insist that physical care is a basic part of the responsibility that an 
employer has for a worker, but to do so without requiring the worker’s endorsement of 
the deal. Frado has been born into a labor system; she has not agreed to it. 
This reframing also provides an example of the political utility of thinking about 
childhood in new ways. Wilson’s apprentice may not have innocence as it is 
conventionally understood, because she is still expected to earn her keep. Nevertheless, 
the apprentice possesses a denaturalized relationship to power, one that can only be 
justified retroactively from the vantage of her adult self. Similarly, her relationship to 
futurity is tenuous in Wilson’s work, because the indenture’s promise of development is 
effectively void, but this too allows for the possibility of an individual privacy in the 
present. Wilson’s non-teleological reading of childhood thus opens up to a more usefully 
flexing reading than simple futurity can allow. Emphasizing the temporal complexities 
implicit in representations of childhood can help to replace a politics of linear progress 
with one finding equal value in a coming of age that ends in stagnation or regression as 
narratives of progress. 
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Conclusion: Is Childhood Studies Something Other than the Humanities in 
Miniature? 
 
Harriet Wilson’s encounter with a childhood privatized by the market was not a moment 
that would last long in the U.S. In the decades following the Civil War, interest in child 
welfare increasingly moved from being either a family or commercial concern into a 
prerogative of the state. The nation that had only begun including the names of minors in 
the census in 1850 (Jackson and Teeples) had, by the end of the nineteenth century, 
developed laws against child labor, a system of public schooling, requirements for 
educating children and a host of reformers fixated on policies to protect children now 
seen as young citizens (Fass vii-ix). The rise of these “child savers,” eager to secure and 
train waves of future citizens, was likely encouraged by the clearer definitions of 
citizenship that followed the 14th Amendment, which (nominally at least) gave a clear 
definition how how citizenship would be attached to future generations.91 With this 
stabilization, attitudes around the potential wildness of childhood, particularly of boys, 
grew more positive and was more likely to be seen as proof of white male freedom than 
of irredeemability.92 Similarly, the debates around heritability between generations began 
to be dominated by Darwinian notions that held inheritance to be a fundamental property 
                                                           
91 For a discussion of this legal precedents and its many exemptions, see Kristin A. Collins’ 
“Illegitmate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and 
Nation.” The Yale Law Journal. 123 (2013): 2134-2235. 
92 See Kenneth Kidd’s Making American Boys: Boyology and the Feral Tale. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004 or the collected works of Mark Twain. 
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of all life – rather than a characteristic of social systems like family, aristocracy, or 
property.93  
 But this by no means is to say that unequal childhoods ended. As Geoff K. 
Ward’s The Black Child-Savers has shown, even the height of passion for reforms aimed 
at children, progressives consistently allocated fewer, if any resources for the welfare of 
black children. Social Darwinism, popularized in the U.S. by Horatio Alger novels, 
naturalized systemic inequality as the individual failures of children not “enterprising” 
enough to acquire property. The forcible removal and residential schooling of Native 
American children, already started during the antebellum period, began to intensify to 
devastating effects (Adams 8-9), and, beginning around the 1880s, the rise in biological 
Darwinism fueled eugenic attempts to eliminate children of color and children with 
disabilities on a massive scale (Müller-Wille and Rheinberger 95-100). It is equally 
apparent that the social differentiation of childhoods persists into the present. To name 
only a few examples, African American and Latino children of the eighties and early 
nineties could be labeled with the since-discredited diagnoses of the developmentally-
stunted “crack baby”94 or the terminally criminal “super-predator.”95 Similarly 
                                                           
93 Darwin’s 1859 Origin of Species, for example, promises that the terms of social relation used 
by natural scientists, such as “affinity, relationship, community of type, paternity” will, under his 
theory, “cease to be metaphorical, and will have a plain signification” for all forms of life (172). 
He continues, suggesting that all typology will be unified under a single understanding of 
inheritance: “our classifications will come to be, as far as they can be so made, genealogies; and 
will then truly give what may be called a plan of creation” (172). As Staffan Müller-Wille and 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger describe it, this work, “although falling short of presenting a general 
theory of heredity,” was “one of the first widely noticed works that exposed heredity as the 
central problem of biology” (73).  
94 For a longitudinal study undermining the reality of the “crack baby” narrative, see Betancourt, 
Laura M., et al. "Adolescents with and without gestational cocaine exposure: longitudinal 
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dehumanizing descriptions of children as “anchor babies” continue to be used to 
undermine the citizenship of predominantly Latino and Asian American families.96 These 
discourses have direct and physical effects on the lives of such children. Recent research 
shows that not only are hospitals less likely to give black children effective pain 
medication (Goyal et al.) and police officers more likely to use force against African 
American children, white Americans more generally interpret black boys as being 4.5 
years older than they are and as being less innocent than white or Latino peers (Goff). 
 Given the persistence and range of these typologies of “bad children,” what then 
does the particular discursive life of antisocial childhoods in the U.S. offer us? One 
answer lies as much in the institutional structure of U.S. academia as it does in the 
historical particularities of antebellum literature – namely, that the importance of the 
nineteenth-century in consolidating ideas about childhood has had a formative role in the 
shaping of modern child-studies. No one period, of course, has dominated the field, but 
two most common origin points neatly bookend the nineteenth century. On one hand, the 
literary scholar Anna Mae Duane suggests the mid- to late eighteenth century as a 
popular choice, noting that “many practitioners locate the origins of the Enlightenment, 
as part of that era’s interest in human nature” (3). From an economic and sociological 
perspective, another typical touchstone of Child Studies is Viviana Zelizer’s The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
analysis of inhibitory control, memory and receptive language." Neurotoxicology and 
teratology 33.1 (2011): 36-46. 
95 For discussion and critique of the “super-predator” theory in criminology, see Soo Ah Kwon’s 
Uncivil Youth: Race, Activism and Affirmative Governmentality. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 39-42. 
96 For discussion of this trend, see Priscilla Huang’s “Anchor Babies, Over-Breeders, and the 
Population Bomb: The Reemergence of Nativism and Population Control in Anti-Immigration 
Policies.” Harvard Law and Policy Review. 2 (2008): 385. 
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Priceless Child, which traces the formation of the modern sense of childhood as non-
economic (or priceless) to the 1880s through the early twentieth century. Literary 
analyses of childhood show a particularly strong gravitation towards the antebellum 
period (mea culpa), likely because the rise of children’s literature as an explicitly 
marketed occurred during this time and the child-centric nature of some of its most 
canonical texts. Little Eva from Uncle Tom’s Cabin comes to mind, as it has for many 
other scholars, as does the juvenile-centric reading first promoted by Leslie Fiedler in 
1965. The antebellum period is thus a central vantage from which to consider just how 
Child Studies has taken its modern form.  
 In particular, it is worth questioning the concurrence of the rise of Childhood 
Studies with the increasing critique of the category of the human. The emergence of “the 
child” threatens to act as a surrogate for for the figure of the “human” as an object for 
seemingly universal ethical attention. Lee Edelman’s No Future has been somewhat piled 
upon for its failure to consider intersectionalities such as race or disability and for its 
rejections of collectivity.97 Its observations about the centrality of children, or at least 
some children, in U.S. politics, however, are not wrong. I write at a time when the U.S. 
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s critique of her opponent Donald Trump recurs to 
the idea that “our children are watching” a signifier for moral condemnation that leaves 
open whether he should be judged for his many bigotries or his deviation from a set of 
traditional Christian values. It encompasses antiracism, feminism, and Christian 
evangelicalism. None of these ethical positions are named – lest they conflict – but the 
                                                           
97 For one overview of this conversation, see Drew Daniel’s review “Trading Futures: Queer 
Theory’s Anti-Anti-Relational Turn 
201 
 
symbolic pull of these children suffices to evoke whichever might be most appealing to 
the given audience. Even the strictly academic structure of Childhood Studies has 
produced an interesting recapitulation of the academic studies of the human that have 
taken shape since the Enlightenment. In its present form, Childhood Studies encompasses 
Anthropology98, Economics99, Education100, History101, Law102, Literature103, 
Linguistics104, Neuroscience105, Philosophy106, Political Science107, Psychology,108 Public 
Health,109 Religious Studies110, Sociology111, Theatre112, and Women and Gender 
                                                           
98 For an overview of this field and several representative texts, see Courtney L. Meehan’s 
“Directions in the Anthropology of Childhood.” Journal of Family Theory and Review. Vol. 3.2 
(June 2011) 140-149. 
99 See, for instance, Cigno, Alessandro and Furio C. Rosati, The Economics of Child Labour. New 
York: Oxford English Press, 2005 or The Modern Child and the Flexible Labour Market. Ed. 
Anne Trine Kjøholt and Jens Qvortup. New York: Springer, 2011. 
100 This overlap may be too obvious for good examples but see the Journal of Research in 
Childhood Education and Children’s Literature in Education.  
101 See, for instance, the journal Childhood in the Past or The Journal of the History of Childhood 
and Youth.   
102 For instance, see the journals Child Law Practice and Law and Childhood Studies or the 
resource Kindex: An Index to Legal Periodical Literature Concerning Children.  
103 See, for instance, this project. 
104 See the journals Child Language Teaching and Therapy or the Journal of Child Language. 
105 See Duke University’s Child Studies group in the Psychology & Neuroscience Department. 
106 See Murris, Karin. The Posthuman Child: Educational Transformation through Philosophy 
with Picturebooks. New York: Routledge, 2016. 
107 See Politics, Citizenship and Rights (Geographies of Children and Young People Series). Ed. 
Kirsi Pauliin Kallio, Sarah Mills, and Tracey Skelton. New York: Springer, 2015 and Lynch, 
Julia. Age in the Welfare State: The Origins of Social Spending on Pensioners, Workers, and 
Children. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
108 See the journal Educational and Child Psychology or the joint degree programs in Psychology 
and Childhood Studies available at the University Campus Suffolk, the University of Portsmouth, 
or a number of other universities. 
109 See for instance the Maternal and Child Health Journal or Blair et al.’s Child Public Health. 
(2003) 2nd Ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
110 See the Journal of Childhood and Religion and The Society of Biblical Literature’s “Children 
in Biblical Literature” section.  
111 See Gibson, Kristina E. Street Kids: Homeless Youth, Outreach, and Policing New York’s 
Streets. New York: New York University Press, 2011.  
112 See Spotlight on the Child: Studies in the History of American Children’s Theatre. Ed. Roger 
L. Bedard and C. John Tolch. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1989 or Drama and 
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Studies113 – each of which can be studied domestically, along the borders of area studies, 
or comparatively. The interdisciplinary nature of the subject has likely been a part of its 
appeal in recent years, but the overall profile of the field looks very much like a cross 
section of humanities writ large.  
This formation does not need to be interpreted as anything deliberate; it is the 
understandable result of studying a status that might be applied to part of the life of all 
subjects in any part of the world, at any time. However, it is not clear how the idea of 
childhood – which has always been geographically and historically specific and which in 
a U.S. context has been constitutive of racial hierarchies and gender norms – would 
provide an anchor that is any more productive or less harmful than the category of the 
human itself. Indeed, heightened attention to “the child” could be harmful in ways 
beyond those that attention to “the human” might be. If “the human” has been critiqued 
for the defaults implanted by its Enlightenment-era origins, in which to be a person of 
color or a woman a deviation from the normative human, even the purest ethical 
attachment to “the child” as a heterogeneous category can threaten to give adults 
secondary value as less sympathetic subjects. An interest in the welfare of children has, 
for instance, long been a tool for controlling the behavior of the women who carry or 
parent these children.  
If Childhood Studies can avoid falling into all the patterns of studies of the 
human, it must do so by accepting that childhood should never be an entirely coherent 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Theatre with Children: International Perspectives. Ed. Charru Sharma. New York: Routledge, 
2015. 
113 See the spring 2015 special issue of the Women’s Studies Quarterly on “the child” or the 
September 2016 special issue of GLQ on “the child now.” 
203 
 
field of study. Scholars who would never dream of generalizing about “the human” 
continue to make casual reference to “the child,” as if the category were self-evident or 
even possible. Instead, Childhood Studies might be usefully aligned with Animal Studies 
as being an interest in how certain types of figures (namely, animals) have been 
constitutive of ideas about human selfhood without necessarily attempting to say 
anything about the reality of the figure itself. Alternatively, in her introduction to The 
Children’s Table, Duane has suggested Gender Studies as an analogue for the 
multiplicity of childhood. This model has imperfect parallels. For instance, childhood, as 
Robin Bernstein has shown, certainly contains performance but performative models of 
gender may not fit the physicality of childhood well. Still, treating it as a category of 
identity that operates similarly to gender could help to retain activist and policy-making 
approaches to the study of children. 
Regardless, though, of the precise theoretical models that might be developed to 
connect, chronological age, social status and socially recognized age, Childhood Studies 
must not place its center in even a putatively singular subject. As this project has shown, 
a return to one of the origin points of the field reveals the fundamental plurality of visions 
of children. The angelic child never existed without the delinquent, the apprentice, the 
prodigy, or any of the other frameworks for childhood which this project might have 
considered but for which it lacked the space. Instead, these figures – which are 
themselves so invested in attempts to think about the antebellum U.S. as a heterogeneous 
set of populations with discontinuities, exceptions, and difference – point to childhood as 
an object of study in which multiplicity must be a central feature of not only its content, 
but also its methods. In other words, Childhood Studies should perhaps not be about a 
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special class of subjects, or even necessarily subjects at all. It might be more useful to 
consider a field not centered on the subject at all, but on how subjects are individuated or 
generalized and to have ethical attachments that are stranded somewhere between 
personhood and animacy.  
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